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Abstract 
 
This thesis is based on the econometric investigation of the impact of Foreign Direct Investment on 
Nigerian manufacturing firms and banks. Unique data obtained from a survey of Nigerian firms 
conducted by the Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, and United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization was employed for the estimations based on 
manufacturing firms. For the investigation based on Nigerian banks, this study uses the BankScope 
data base. Ordinary Least Squares and Fixed Effects techniques were used to estimate the 
coefficients of foreign presence measures in augmented Cobb-Douglas models for manufacturing 
firm data, and augmented Dealership models for data on banks. Results of the estimations show 
evidence of positive effects of foreign presence on domestic manufacturing firms, while no effects 
were obtained from the estimations based bank data.  
The differences in FDI effects reflect on the sector-specific characteristics of manufacturing firms and 
banks in Nigeria. Manufacturing firms in Nigeria operate at low technology levels and are open to 
foreign direct investment, while the opposite seems to be case of banks in the country. The results 
therefore support earlier thoughts in literature on FDI which assert that positive spillovers exist were 
technology gaps between foreign firms and domestic firms exist, or in sectors open to FDI.  
Important contributions were made in examining the effect of the approaches taken towards the 
measurement of foreign presence on spillover estimates with particular reference to sampling 
procedure and data quality. The study therefore concludes that FDI generates spillovers in Nigerian 
manufacturing firms but attention of empirical investigations should focus on appropriate 
measurement of foreign presence variables, and the specific characteristics of the sector or industry 
being examined.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The impact of Foreign Direct Investment (henceforth FDI) on host countries has been a contentious 
area of research in the fields of economics, international business and politics. In economics and 
international business research, investigation of FDI effects in an economy are undertaken using two 
major approaches. One is the macro approach which involves the empirical investigation of FDI 
effects on economic growth, trade, real wages or employment. And the other is the micro approach 
which relates measures of FDI or foreign presence on smaller economic units such as firms or plants. 
However, in both macro and micro investigations, there is a considerable level of debate and 
contrasting views. Starting from macro investigations, some studies argue that FDI can augment 
domestic capital accumulation and thus enhance economic growth (Slywester, 2005). Similarly some 
show that FDI can fuel domestic investment by raising the investment ratio above the domestic 
savings ratio (Thirlwall, 2006). On the other hand, some studies contend that FDI can crowd out 
domestic investment and create distortions within the economic which deter GDP growth (Chase-
Dunn, 1975). In the same line of thought, Saltz (1992) argue that FDI can raise the price of capital 
and thereby depress investment.       
Similar debates are also evident on micro level analysis of FDI impact which typically involves 
empirical investigation of FDI impact on the productivity or performance of firms, using 
disaggregated data obtained from industrial surveys or census. The fundamental argument on the 
micro level is that new investment from overseas can stimulate (positive spillover) or deter (negative 
spillover) existing domestic firms to greater or lesser productivity. Empirical literature in an attempt 
to establish a standpoint on the debate on the direction and extent of the effects has been rather 
extensive. The focus of micro level investigation of FDI effects has been on manufacturing industry 
which seems to be due to the applicability of production function models to the sector. However, 
micro-analysis of FDI effects can also be applied to the banking sector, despite the limited empirical 
studies based on the sector. In both sectors, there is a lack of consensus on the direction and extent 
of FDI impact in the sector. In studies based on manufacturing sector, evidence from Globerman 
(1979), Kokko et al. (2000), Girma and Wakeline (2000), and Yasar and Paul (2007) show positive 
effects on domestic productivity, while Aitken and Harrison (1999), Lopez-Cordova (2002) and 
Lileeva (2010) report negative FDI effects. Similarly, in banking sector studies, Claessens (2001) and 
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Unite and Sullivan (2003) find negative association of foreign presence on profits, while Lensink and 
Hermes (2004) found positive association on the same. Thus the lack of consensus in FDI spillover 
analysis has been cited as the major motivation for researchers to venture into this area of research. 
Despite the abundance of literature on FDI spillover analysis, very few of them are based on African 
economies. Anyanwale and Bamire (2004), Bwalya (2006), Managi and Bwalya (2010), and Waldkirch 
and Ofosu (2010) seem to be the only empirical studies based on African countries. This is quite 
surprising considering the fact that FDI inflows to Africa rose by 28% in 1998, 39% in 2003, and 78% 
in 2005 (UNCTAD-WIR, 1998, 2003, 2005). However, the dearth of literature is likely to be connected 
with the fact that disaggregated data at the firm or plant level are hardly available in a form that 
permits rigorous econometric analysis which FDI spillover research requires. Datasets obtained 
through surveys conducted by international organisation such as World Bank and United Nations 
have contributed considerably towards making data available for statistical studies on Africa. 
Surveys such as Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) carried out by the World Bank, 
and African manufacturing Enterprise Surveys (AMES) conducted by Centre for the Study of African 
Economies (CSAE) of the University of Oxford and United Nations Industrial Development 
Programme (UNIDO) provide alternative solutions for the shortcomings of data availability on 
African firms.  
The Nigerian Manufacturing firm surveys (NMES) provided by CSAE and UNIDO therefore provide an 
opportunity for the investigation of FDI spillover effects as it contains relevant information for the 
estimation of spillovers. The opportunity to investigate FDI spillovers in Nigeria is particularly 
important as the country has been one of the top five destinations for FDI in Africa for about three 
decades mainly due to its position as the continent’s largest oil producer. Nigeria is also an 
interesting case due to the dynamics of its operating environment which involves a complex 
interplay of economic, political, and institutional factors that potentially affect most economic 
variables, including FDI.  
The present study therefore provides a novel attempt to investigate the impact of FDI on both 
manufacturing firms and banks in Nigeria. The choice of the two sectors is mainly partly due to data 
availability and the fact their data permit the application of established productivity or performance 
models are used in FDI or foreign presence modelling. Also this study conducts econometric analyses 
using a unique data obtained from CSAE-UNIDO surveys, which provide an avenue to depict the 
effects that alternative measures of foreign presence have on spillover estimates. As far as I am 
aware, no study has provided either a comprehensive study on FDI effects on Nigerian 
manufacturing banks or firms, or detailed examination of the implications of the approach(s) 
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undertaken in the computation of foreign presence measures on estimates of productivity or 
performance.      
Despite the relevance or significance of sector such as Energy and telecommunications, this study is 
restricted to the manufacturing and banking sectors for the following reasons. First is the availability 
of disaggregated firm level panel data in the manufacturing and banking sectors of Nigeria, suitable 
for rigorous investigation. Investigating FDI spillover effects requires disaggregated data on 
determinants of a chosen measure of output, as well as foreign equity participation on each firm in 
the sample. Thus most empirical studies rely on extensive surveys and commercial databases as their 
source of information. In the case of Nigeria, despite the relevance of the energy and 
telecommunications industry, there is insufficient disaggregated panel firm level data required for 
FDI spillover analysis. Obtaining such data would require conducting surveys as the available 
institutions do not compile the data in a manner the permits FDI spillover analysis.  
Secondly, a key requirement of data employed or FDI spillover investigation is that considerable 
number foreign and domestic firms exist in the sample. However, in the case of Nigeria Energy and 
telecommunications sectors, domestic firms are rather negligible, as foreign firms largely dominate 
the sectors. Thus applying the standard models such as Cobb-Douglas production function and 
Dealership models could lead to misleading results. In general, the rationale behind the choice of 
restricting the investigation to manufacturing and telecommunications sectors is data driven.  
The restriction of this investigation to the manufacturing and banking sectors implies that 
generalization of the impact of FDI on productivity/performance in Nigerian sectors based on the 
results of this thesis would be limited. Thus the results of the analysis are limited to the two sectors 
which have considerable level of FDI, as the leading FDI recipient sectors were excluded from the 
study. The Energy sector, particularly the oil sector, has attracted some of the biggest MNCs in the 
world since the discovery of oil in Nigeria. Thus the dynamics of FDI in the oil sector, with 
considerable foreign presence for the decades, are bound to be different from that of manufacturing 
and banking sectors. Similarly, the telecommunications sector in Nigeria which has witness huge 
flows of FDI since the inception of mobile telecommunications in 2001. The sector has emerged as 
the fastest growing telecommunications market in the world (Ndukwe, 2005). In general, this study 
is limited in scope as it focuses on sectors with considerable levels of FDI in Nigeria, and not the 
leading sectors.  
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The two sectors in focus in this study have important linkages as banks are known to complement 
the manufacturing industry by providing adequate financial capital. The role of banks in economic 
development dates back to the work of Schumpeter (1911), where banks play an important role in 
financial intermediation which benefits the economy. Banks allocate scare financial resources 
(savings) to entrepreneurs who are deemed to be capable of providing sufficient returns. King and 
Levin (1993) pointed out that the level of financial intermediation is directly related to the rate of 
economic growth. In general theoretical models by different scholars have shown the linkage 
between efficiency of financial institutions and economic growth (Pagano, 1993, Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990; Levine, 1991, Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Saint-Paul, 1992, show the theoretical 
constructs for the relationship between financial institutions and economic growth).  
Within an economy, empirical evidence has shown that industries with more access to external 
financing have higher growth rates (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Banks provide financial resources to 
various forms of industries. In particular, the manufacturing industry is often dependent on banks 
for much of its finance. Galindo and Micco (2004) show evidence of the reliance of manufacturing 
firms on external funding through banks. In Japan, manufacturing firms and financial institutions 
have very strong relationships. The major automobile manufacturing firms also do most of their 
borrowing from group financial institutions. For example the Mitsubishi manufacturing dies most of 
its financial transactions with Mitsubishi Bank, which comprises the Mitsubishi group with other 
subsidiaries (Hoshi et al., 1990). 
In Nigeria there are also strong links between the manufacturing and banking sectors. In an effort to 
stimulate the manufacturing industry through the provision of financial and management expertise 
to small and medium scale industries, the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2001 mandated all Nigerian 
banks to set aside 10% of their profits after tax for equity investment in small and medium 
enterprises, with considerable emphasis on the manufacturing sector (CBN, 2009). This directive was 
know as the Small and Medium Enterprises Equity Investment Scheme, and it provided strong links 
between banks and manufacturing firms in Nigeria. Thus the linkage of these two sectors is also a 
reason for restricting the investigation the sectors.  
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1.2 What is foreign direct Investment? 
 
As FDI is the central theme in this study, it is worthwhile to throw light into its meaning and the 
trends over time. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has continued to be relevant in both the economic 
and political scenes. It is regarded as an instrument of international economic integration (UNCTAD-
WIR, 2008). Over time, the growth of world FDI flows has well exceeded that of world gross 
domestic product (GDP), exports and domestic investment (UNCTAD, 2008). Despite the growing 
relevance of FDI, its meaning still remains unclear to many scholars. A common misconception is 
that foreign direct investment (FDI) in a country is merely the investment that emanates from a 
foreign country. Thus FDI is erroneously assumed to measure all cross-border investment. But the 
definition on FDI is narrower than that of cross border investment, as the later comprises both 
foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment. As a result of this mismatch, it is 
worthwhile to ask the fundamental question: What is FDI?  
 OECD Benchmark definition of foreign direct investment (fourth edition) defines direct investment 
as “a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) 
with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) 
that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor”. The ownership of at least 10% 
of the equity or voting power by the direct investor is a necessary condition for an investment to be 
qualified as a direct investment (OECD, 2008; pp.10). 
To elaborate on this definition, we attempt to throw light on some of the key words or phrases that 
make up this definition. The first is “a category of cross-border investment”. This implies that FDI is 
one of other categories of cross-border investment such as portfolio investment. The second is 
“made by a resident in one economy (direct enterprise)”.This means that direct investor must be an 
enterprise whose parent or head office is in a foreign country. For example, General Motors 
Corporation has its parent office in the United States of America. The third phrase is “with the 
objective of”. The purpose or motivation of the investment is essential in distinguishing direct 
investment from other categories of investment. The objectives of the direct investor should be 
clearly stated. The disclosure of its objectives is the necessary information required to enable the 
categorization of the activity of the direct enterprise.  
The fourth phase is the most crucial one: “establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (direct 
investment enterprise)”. The “lasting interest” implies that for the investment to be characterised as 
‘direct’, the direct investor must possess a significant degree of influence or control in the 
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management of the enterprise. The evidence of this lasting interest is shown by the ownership of at 
least 10% of the equity or voting power of the enterprise .And lastly, “that is resident in an economy 
other than that of the direct investor”. This implies that the residence of the direct investment 
enterprise must be different from that of the direct investor. Thus a direct investor like General 
Motors Corporation in the U.S could establish a lasting interest in a direct investment enterprise in 
Japan. The direct investment enterprise could be a branch, in which the direct investor owns 100% 
of the enterprise; a subsidiary, in which the direct investor owns more than 50% of the equity or 
voting power; or an associate, in which the direct investor holds between 10% and 50% of the voting 
power (OECD, 2008). Subsidiaries and associates are incorporated while branches are 
unincorporated. 
 FDI could be in various modes. The notable modes include: Greenfield investment, which occurs 
when a firm sets up a new operation in a foreign country; Brownfield investment involves expansion 
or reinvestment in already existing foreign affiliates; Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A); Privatisation 
and equity investment; Joint ventures and Strategic alliances, etc. Another way of classifying FDI is 
according to its forms, namely: horizontal and vertical FDI. In simple terms, Horizontal FDI involves 
extending the production of the goods produced in the parent company to a foreign country. On the 
other hand, vertical FDI involves shifting stages of production to a foreign country.   
Most FDI Statistics of different countries are recorded by the following international organisations: 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF). An OECD 
publication, Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, sets the world standard for 
compiling direct investment statistics (OECD, 2008). This standard is in accordance with the IMF 
Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM). The major aim of the 
guidelines is to facilitate international comparisons. On the other hand, UNCTAD focuses on the 
research, policy analysis, and data collection of both trade and foreign direct investment. 
FDI statistics comprises of three standard components (IMF-OECD, 2003; OECD, 2008). The first is 
direct investment position, made up of equity capital and reinvested earnings. Another component 
is direct investment financial flows, which comprises equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other 
capital such as inter-company debt transactions. The third component is direct investment income, 
made up of income on equity, reinvested earnings and undistributed branch profits, and income on 
debt (interest). 
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The major undertakers of FDI are Multinational/transnational corporations (MNC/TNC). The 
activities of TNCs are becoming more relevant in the global economy. The top ten TNCs contribute 
about one percent of the world GDP. Despite these facts about MNCs, it should be noted that MNCs 
are not the only carriers of FDI. FDI can occur without any MNC, as it simply involves the control of 
an enterprise in a country by citizens of another country (Caves, 1971). This suggests that ownership 
of equity is the central requirement for FDI. But Caves (1971) pointed out that most direct 
investments involve a foreign corporate parent, and not merely foreign individuals. 
 
Figure 1.1 FDI inflows: World and country groups 1970-2010 
 
Source: UNCTAD/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
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1.3 Trends in FDI flows 
 
FDI flows typically indicate how the structure of international production changes over time 
(UNCTAD-WIR, 1995). Figure 1.1 indicates that global flows of FDI have been quite cyclical. These 
cycles are deemed to be affected by cyclical fluctuations in GDP with a lag (UNCTAD-WIR, 1992). 
Thus global FDI flows have been experiencing periods of rising flows and declines with varying 
magnitudes. We therefore highlight the regional and sectoral characteristics of FDI flows 
1.3.1 Regional  
 
 An important point which can be observed from Figure 1.1 is that developed countries are the main 
drivers of global FDI flows, as their plots are quite close to, and follow similar pattern. Notable 
periods of surges in global FDI include 1979-1981, 1986-1990, 1994-2000, and 2005-2007. The 1979-
1981 boom was as a result of the second oil crises which favored oil-producing counties, making 
them a promising direction for FDI inflows. As a result, Saudi Arabia became the second largest 
recipient of FDI flows, following the Unites States (UNCTAD-WIR, 1997). The period 1986-1990 was 
characterized by the FDI liberalization wave, rapid growth in world GDP, and technological advances 
in information and telecommunication in developed countries (UNCTAD-WIR, 1997). Developing 
countries saw growth of 46% between 1985 and 1989, reaching $163 billion in 1989. Also the 
emergence of Japan as the largest outward investor contributed the late eighties boom. The next 
period of boom was between 1994 and 2000. Global inflows rose by 9% in 1994, a remarkable 40% 
in 1995, and 10% in 1996; exceeding the growth in nominal GDP and international trade (UNCTAD-
WIR, 1997, 1997). 60% of these increases were all driven by developed countries, with the United 
States accounting for a quarter of global inflows (UNCTAD-WIR, 1997).  
The surge in world FDI inflows continued in 1997 and 1998, despite the 2% decline in world 
economic growth in 1998 (UNCTAD-WIR, 1998, 1999). This was due to considerable growth the U.S. 
and the EU, and an upsurge in cross-border M&As in 1997 (UNCTAD-WIR, 1999). Also, falling costs of 
transportation and communication in developed countries spurred the further rise in inflows 1999 
(UNCTAD-WIR, 2000).Significant rises in global FDI flows were also evident in the period 2005-2007. 
The rise could be attributed to rapid increases in both cross-border M&A and Greenfield investment 
and economic growth in many countries across the world (UNCTAD-WIR, 2007, 2008).   
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Despite the occurrence of FDI booms, there were also periods of significant declines in global FDI 
flows. The global recession in mid 1990s saw a decline in FDI inflows in 1990, 1991 and 1992 
(UNCTAD-WIR, 1991, 1992, 1993). But an abrupt decline was the case in 2001, where global inflows 
remarkably fell by 51% after some strong growth in the latter half of the nineties. Economic 
downturn in developed countries and reduction in stock market participation were major causes of 
the decline (UNCTAD-WIR, 2002). This decline continued in 2002 and 2003, as FDI inflows fell by 20% 
and 18% respectively. During this period, inflows to developed countries halved, and the US 
accounted for about 90% of the decline. As a result, China, which was growing at alarming rate, 
became the second largest recipient of FDI after Luxembourg (UNCTAD-WIR, 2003). However, the 
economic climate in developed countries improved in 2005, but this was not sustained, as the global 
financial crises drove FDI increases into a decline in 2008, with inflows plunging by 14% (UNCTAD-
WIR, 2005, 2009). The decline intensified in 2009, as new investments and cross-border M&As 
declined sharply; the financial conditions of MNCs deteriorated; and most economies were plunged 
into a recession (UNCTAD-WIR, 2010). The decline in global FDI inflows was essentially triggered by 
the developed countries but it had a contagion effect on host countries globally. It was not until 
2010 that various economies started to recover from the recession, thus global FDI inflows began to 
rise modestly (UNCTAD-WIR, 2011).  
Figure 1.2: FDI inflows: Developing countries 1970-2010 
 
Source: UNCTAD/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
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Developing countries have significantly increased FDI inflows over time. Figure 1.2 shows a rather 
upward trend, which is quite clearer than the case of global flows and developed countries flows in 
Figure 1.1. Figure 1.2 shows no clear evidence of cyclicality, unlike Figure 1.1. The rapid growth of 
FDI inflows in developing countries in the mid eighties was driven mainly by Asian countries 
(UNCTAD-WIR, 1992). Despite the decline in global FDI flows in the early nineties, developing 
countries continued to grow significantly (UNCTAD-WIR, 1993). The upsurge in flows continued in 
1992 and 1993, increasing five-fold between 1986 and 1993 (UNCTAD-WIR, 1993). South, East, and 
South-East Asia were the main drivers of the rapid growth, but of particular importance is the 
outstanding growth of China, which accounted for 55% of FDI inflows in developing countries, with a 
remarkable growth of 147% between 1992 and 1994 (UNCTAD-WIR, 1994). China became the 
highest FDI host country among developing countries (UNCTAD-WIR, 1996, 1997), with more FDI 
inflows than the African continent (53 countries). 
The rapid growth in FDI flows to developing countries came to halt in 1998, decreasing by 1.5% 
(UNCTAD-WIR, 1997). The Asian region was particularly affected, as Japanese economy went into 
recession in 1997. FDI flows to Asian dropped by 9%, and China experienced a decline in inflows of 
8% in 1999 (UNCTAD-WIR, 2000). Developing countries regained its FDI inflow growth in early 2000s, 
with a dramatic rise up till 2007. However, as expected, the financial crises led to another decline in 
FDI inflows in developing countries in 2008 (UNCTAD-WIR, 2009). This situation changed in 2010, as 
most countries, including developing countries started recovering from the recession, and FDI flows 
began rising, albeit modestly.   
Africa has been undergoing a remarkable increase in FDI flows, but the rise has been an absolute rise 
rather than a relative one (Asiedu, 2002). In other words, the value of FDI flows has been increasing, 
but its share of global or developing countries FDI flows are declining. The decline in the region’s 
share of global FDI can be linked to the decline in manufacturing sector due to structural obstacles 
(UNCTAD, 2008). Thus, Africa is still the region with the lowest share of FDI flows. However, as a 
result of the rapid economic growth in some regions/countries in Africa, both inward and outward 
FDI has been on the rise. 
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Figure 1.3a FDI Inflows: Africa 
 
Source: UNCTAD/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
An upward trend in inflows of FDI in Africa has remained since 1985. Among the various reasons for 
the rise in inflows, the most notable are: rising demand for natural resources (oil in particular); 
emergence of privatization schemes; increased developmental assistance by the international 
community, rise in commodity prices, etc. However, despite these developments, some key 
problems are still adamant in a majority of the countries in this region. Such problems which impede 
the FDI inflow include political instability, internal conflict1, poor governance, and inadequate 
infrastructure. These problems are known to be “bad news” for foreign investors. 
Developed countries are the main sources of FDI in African countries. As expected, due to colonial 
ties, the majority of FDI in the region originates from European Union countries (UNCTAD-WIR, 
2008). United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Italy, and Germany are the leading investors from Europe, 
while United States is the leading investor from North America. In recent times, countries like 
Canada and Luxembourg have become notable investors in the continent. Although some MNCs 
withdrew their operations in the 90s, the prospect for FDI inflows from developed countries is still 
promising, as the MNCs have been returning gradually. As at 2006, the total number of MNCs was 
6,400.    
                                                          
1
 Countries that were mired with conflicts in Africa include Chad, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and 
Sudan (UNCTAD, 2008). 
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A notable recent development in Africa is the emergence of developing countries (which includes 
Africa) as sources of FDI. The FDI inflows from developing countries originate from mainly Asian 
countries: India, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, China, and Taiwan province of China (in descending 
order). However, South African TNCs have also emerged as sources of FDI especially in the services 
sector (UNCTAD, 2008).  
FDI flows to Africa represent a typical case of location advantages, where the availability of natural 
resources directs the location of MNCs in the continent. Thus countries like Nigeria, Angola, and 
Egypt, which have abundant natural resources, particularly oil and gas are the top recipients of FDI in 
Africa (UNCTAD-WIR, 1995). Figure 1.3a shows that substantial growth in FDI inflows to Africa 
started in the mid 1990s. Prior to the 1990s, flows to Africa had lingered behind in both global and 
developing countries FDI flows. But Africa had its first taste of rapid growth in FDI flows in 1998, 
where inflows grew by 28%, ahead of the growth in other developing countries (UNCTAD-WIR, 
2000). Considerable growth of 39% occurred in 2003, following a renewed rise in investment in 
natural resources (UNCTAD-WIR, 2004). But the most significant growth of the region was the 
remarkable 78% rise in FDI inflows which occurred in 2005 (UNCTAD-WIR, 2006). This dramatic 
upsurge was fuelled by high prices of minerals in the global market. Subsequent growth of 20% and 
16% occurred in 2006 and 2007 respectively, as commodity prices continued to rise, and more 
African countries achieved a more FDI friendly environment (UNCTAD-WIR, 2007, 2008).  
Contrary to expectations, FDI inflows to Africa rose in 2008, despite the global financial crises that 
reduced inflows across most regions in the world. This followed remarkable achievements in 
attracting FDI in Nigeria, Angola and South Africa, and increased investments in the manufacturing 
and services sectors of these countries (UNCTAD-WIR, 2009). However, at the turn of year 2010, FDI 
inflows in the continent started to plummet, as the contagion effects of the world financial crises 
started to set in (UNCTAD-WIR, 2010).   
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Figure 1.3b FDI inflows: Top FDI hosts in Africa 
 
Source: UNCTAD/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
The distribution of FDI in Africa is uneven to a great extent. The unevenness is more prominent 
among countries than among sub-regions.  In 2006, the distribution of FDI inward stock across sub-
regions shows considerable variations. North Africa took the lead with a share of 37%; followed by 
Southern Africa’s share of 33%; West Africa has a share of 20%; while Central Africa and East Africa 
lagged behind with single digit shares of 7% and 5% respectively (UNCTAD-WIR, 2007). In terms of 
inward flows the skewness increases further, as North Africa accounts for 66%; West Africa share 
stood at 19%; while Central Africa and East Africa shares were 11% and 5% respectively (UNCTAD-
WIR, 2007). 
The changes in the direction of FDI flows to African countries is also worthy of note. Figure 1.3b 
shows that Egypt dominated the most of the eighties, while Nigeria dominated the later part of the 
eighties and the first half of the nineties. As earlier indicated, the availability of natural resources, 
particularly oil was the major attraction of MNCs to the extractive industries of the said countries. 
But in that period (before the mid-nineties), FDI was not the major source of external resource 
inflow (only 12%) to the continent, as grants and official loans from developed countries and 
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international agencies constituted a large chunk of these flows (UNCTAD-WIR, 1995). FDI was not 
the desirable choice for MNCs, as the perception that operating conditions were unfavorable was 
the case. But as firm-level data began to show that MNC subsidiaries in African countries where 
highly profitable, the awareness of Africa as a promising destination began to rise (UNCTAD-WIR, 
1995).  
 Angola is a particular country that has dramatically attracted FDI inflows of recent times. Inflows 
into Angola overtook Nigeria and Egypt in 1999 which had been the leading destination for many 
years (UNCTAD-WIR, 2000). This rise is attributed to the extensive direct investments and other 
financial assistance from China. Thus in 2008, Angola became the highest FDI recipient in Africa, 
ahead of Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria. 
Figure 1.4 FDI inflows: Nigeria, 1970-2010 
 
  
Nigeria is the second largest host of FDI, and the largest oil producer in Africa. This is down from its 
position as the largest FDI recipient in the early nineties (UNCTAD-WIR, 1995). Hence the choice of 
focusing on FDI in Nigeria in this study is duly justified. From Figure 1.6, we can notice that FDI flows 
in Nigeria since the 70s have maintained an upward trend. In recent times, the inflows of FDI to 
Nigeria have grown to remarkable heights. In 2005, inflows had a 108% increase, from about $5 
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
$
 m
ill
io
n
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Nigeria
15 
 
billion to $13 billion. This astronomical increase in FDI flows in Nigeria can be linked to the dramatic 
rise in FDI flows from emerging countries in Asia such as China, India, and Malaysia. Another reason 
is the rapid rise in crude oil prices, which increased investment in the petroleum extractive 
industries. Also, Nigeria is deemed to have been reaping the benefits of its turn to democracy, as the 
country seems to be achieving strong economic growth in recent times. FDI flows in Nigeria are quite 
concentrated, as the vast reserves of oil and gas attract MNCs into the extractive industries.   
However, a combination of events and policies are likely to lead to significant declines in FDI flows to 
Nigeria. The first is the global economic crises which affected the MNCs across the globe. However, 
the recent recovery in 2010 is likely to overturn the decline as a result of the recession. But potential 
adverse effects are likely to come from the recent Petroleum Industry Bill passed by the Nigerian 
legislative arm. This bill would require a review of the tax exemptions previously granted to oil 
companies; increased government participation, and enforce local content directive for professional 
and management staff in oil companies (UNCTAD-WIR, 2011).  
1.3 Sectoral trends 
 
Since the 1950s to the mid eighties, world FDI had been focused on the primary sector – raw 
materials and resource based manufacturing (UNCTAD-WIR, 1991). At that time, MNCs were mostly 
of Anglo-Saxon origin, operating in the primary sectors of different developing countries (UNCTAD-
WIR, 1993). In Africa, the majority of inward FDI stock has been in the primary sector, indicating that 
resource-seeking was the primary motive of FDI in the region. Of recent, South Africa, Nigeria, 
Botswana and Madagascar had majority (above 70%) of their FDI in the primary sector. The 
extractive industries in Africa have attracted majority of the FDI in the primary sector. As a result of 
the rise in demand for natural resources (especially oil) from emerging economies, increased 
liberalization of national markets, and soaring commodity prices, TNCs across the world increased 
operations in Africa. An obvious reason is because of the abundance of natural resources in African 
countries2. However, the United States which is the world’s largest consumer of oil has plans of 
reducing its consumption of Middle East oil and increasing its exploration of oil in Africa (UNCTAD, 
2008). 
The emphasis on the primary sector began to change in the late 80s, as FDI flows into the services 
sector began to increase and flows to the primary sector fell. The fall in flows to the primary sector is 
connected to the growing pressure from host developing countries to reap more economic rents 
                                                          
2
 Countries like Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Congo, Gabon, and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya are major oil producers 
in the continent (UNCTAD, 2008). 
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from natural resource exploration, which led to the nationalization and expropriation of some MNCs 
(Kennedy, 1992).Technological advancement and rising incomes in developed countries lead to the 
rise in FDI flows to the services sector from 25% of total FDI stock in the 70s to 50% in the late 80s, 
and 62% in 2006 (UNCTAD-WIR, 1991, 2008).  Investment in financial services has been a significant 
driver of recent rise in flows to the services sector. In Africa countries with significant FDI inflows in 
financial services include Egypt, South Africa, Zambia, Uganda, and Mauritius. 
The share of FDI flows to the manufacturing sector has been on a decline since the early 90s 
(UNCTAD-WIR, 2008). All manufacturing groups have been on the decline, but in the recent global 
financial crises, the Metals and metallic products sub-sector fell significantly (UNCTAD-WIR, 2010). In 
Africa, The share of inward FDI stock in the manufacturing sector between 1996 and 2006 fell from 
40% to 27% (UNCTAD-WIR, 2007). The decline of flows to the manufacturing sector can be 
attributed to the high cost of production, which is as a result of poor infrastructure and insufficient 
human resource, among other reasons. However, the recent global recovery from the 2007 
recession has seen the manufacturing sector grow by 23% (UNCTAD-WIR, 2011), following renewed 
emphasis of both developed and developing countries on the sector.    
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 1.4 Research Questions 
 
The basic enquires of this study are threefold: 
Question 1: Are there spillover effects from FDI to domestic firms in Nigerian manufacturing firms? 
Given the extensive literature on FDI spillovers in manufacturing firms, and the lack of consensus on 
the actual direction and extent of spillovers, unique data employed in this study will contribute to 
the debate by providing a comprehensive analysis on Nigerian manufacturing firms. This will 
contribute towards the attempts to arrive at a standpoint on FDI spillover investigation. The 
approach towards our investigation is to provide estimates of foreign presence measures using 
augmented Cobb-Douglas production functions 
 
Question 2: Does foreign presence in Nigerian banking industry affect domestic bank performance? 
How does the entry or presence of foreign banks affect the performance of domestic banks existing 
in the industry? The availability of population data on foreign presence and the supplementation of 
BankScope data on Nigerian banks enable the use of econometric models of bank performance to 
provide estimates of foreign presence effects. This approach involves the use of accounting 
measures of performance which involves the use of proxies for profits, income, costs, and risks. The 
aim is therefore to provide estimates of foreign presence in the banking sector that would be 
comparable to those of the manufacturing sector 
 
Question 3: How does the approach taken towards the computation of foreign presence measure 
affect spillover estimates? 
This is a methodological question, which involves two procedures. First is to illustrate the potential 
effect of sampling properties and data structure on foreign presence measurement using the unique 
dataset of the Nigerian manufacturing sector. Second is to show the relevance of this effect by 
highlighting its neglect in literature  
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1.5 Objectives of the Thesis 
 
The overall objective of this thesis is to estimate FDI effects on Nigerian manufacturing firms and 
banks, and highlight the relevance of employing appropriate measurements of foreign presence. The 
manufacturing firms sample cover 219 firms over the period 1998-2003, while banking sector data 
cover 38 banks over 1992-2009.  
The study will: 
1. Provide a detailed description of the operating environment in Nigeria, and its implications 
on FDI 
2. Employ unique datasets on Nigerian manufacturing firms and banks for econometric 
estimation of foreign presence impact on productivity or performance 
3. Attempt to harmonise the theories of foreign presence effects on manufacturing firms and 
banks 
4. To show the importance of appropriate measurement of foreign presence using Nigerian 
manufacturing firm data, and highlight its lack of attention in literature by conducting 
extensive literature reviews.   
 
1.6 Contribution of thesis 
 
This study contributes to the debate of the direction and extent of productivity effects of FDI on 
domestic firms by the use of unique panel data on Nigerian manufacturing firms (NMES) and banks 
to provide estimates of foreign presence impact on productivity or performance, in order to arrive at 
a standpoint on a rather ambiguous area of research. Our results which show positive impact of FDI 
on Nigerian manufacturing firms and its absence on banks contribute to hypotheses about spillover 
effects. Of particular importance is that the present study provides evidence in support of “catching-
up” hypothesis (Findley, 1978) which is the notion that sectors with large technology gaps between 
domestic and foreign firms benefit more from spillovers, as the technological levels of domestic 
manufacturing  firms in relation to MNCs is low, which is not the case among domestic banks. As far 
as we know, there is no comprehensive study on FDI spillover effects on banks in literature.  
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This study also synthesizes the empirical investigation of FDI effects on manufacturing firms with 
that of the banking industry, by providing comparisons of various aspects the two industries which 
show their ideological or theoretical similarities in terms of FDI effects despite their wide-ranging 
differences 
A crucial contribution of this study is that it illustrates how the approaches towards the computation 
of foreign presence variable can affect estimates of FDI spillovers. In particular it shows that 
measures of foreign presence are sensitive to the sampling procedure implemented and the quality 
of data employed in the analysis. Thus in exception of cases where the data used for estimations are 
obtained from a census, foreign presence measures computed from an existing dataset obtained for 
the purpose of estimating production functions can lead to misleading results, as the measure 
becomes a random variable subject to sampling error. An extensive literature review conducted in 
this study reveals that previous studies have paid little attention to the relevance of computing an 
appropriate measure of foreign presence.    
 
1.7 Structure of thesis 
 
The general approach in each Chapter of the thesis is to provide a detail study or analysis of 
manufacturing firms alongside banks in Nigeria. Most chapters end with a comparison of both 
sectors in other highlight similarities and differences. In summary: 
Chapter 1 provides the basic research questions, objectives and overview of thesis; with a 
description of FDI trends in the globe, developing countries, Africa, and Nigeria. 
Chapter 2 explores the Nigerian environment with detailed description of manufacturing industry 
and banking industry. It highlights the major changes that have occurred in the two sectors, and also 
macro measures of performance of the two sectors which aid comparisons. 
Chapter 3 highlights global FDI policies and Nigerian policies that affect FDI. It shows that FDI policies 
have been alternating between liberalization and restriction 
Chapter 4 provides the theoretical approaches towards FDI spillovers while pointing out the 
different channels through which spillovers occur. It also highlights the links of FDI spillover theory to 
the neoclassical trade theories and its applicability to banks and other service sectors.  
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Chapter 5 is a crucial chapter in the thesis where an extensive review of spillovers is carried out. It 
focuses on the nature of the investigation carried out, in order to identify gaps or failure to 
emphasize on the computation of measures of foreign presence.  
Chapter 6 describes the data employed for the empirical investigations. A detailed description of 
both manufacturing firm data and banking data was provided. A comparison of data from the two 
sectors was provided at the end of the chapter  
Chapter 7 consists of the econometric modeling and presentation of results for the specifications of 
productivity or performance in both manufacturing and banking sectors.   
Chapter 8 provides the Overall conclusion of the thesis which points out how the research questions 
were answered and points out the need for further research.   
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Chapter 2: The Nigerian context 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This Chapter attempts to describe the environment in which this study is based. In other to 
understand the dynamics of FDI in Nigeria, some important features of the country is worthy of 
mention. This Chapter positions the Nigerian environment as one with large FDI potentials as a result 
of its population and oil reserves on one hand; and on the other hand as a country with significant 
issues of uncertainty, fuelled by political instability, ethnic/religious tensions, and corruption. A brief 
history of FDI in Nigeria is also provided, pointing out the relevance of events such as the decline in 
salve trade and subsequent shift towards legitimate commerce by the British, French, and German 
firms; and Indigenization era which saw the decline of foreign presence in all industries in the 
country. Focusing on the two industries of interest, we highlight the decline of the manufacturing 
industry and the dynamic/volatile nature of the banking industry. The Chapter ends with a 
comparison of the two industries  
2.2 The Nigerian environment  
 
Nigeria is popularly referred as the “sociopolitical giant of Africa” due to its position as the most 
populous country in Africa and the continent’s largest oil producer (Rotberg, 2008). The country is 
the third largest economy in Africa (following South Africa and Egypt), and it has the tenth largest oil 
reserves in the world. The combination of these characteristics makes Nigeria a potential priority 
choice for FDI in Africa and to some extent the world. But in reality, despite the achievements of the 
country in terms of FDI inflows in Africa indicated in Chapter 1, the current position of Nigeria in 
terms the ability to attract FDI is  grossly unsatisfactory, given its enormous potentials. 
The nation has over the years shown to be rather unstable or chaotic in more critical terms. A 
combination of varying degrees of policy overturns; political instability and tensions, and 
communal/religious/ethnic violence have been experienced in the nation (Ogunkola and Jerome, 
2006). Also poor business environment in terms of unreliable power supply, and transportation 
problems adversely affect its investment potentials (Iarossi et al. 2009).  In addition, a global image 
of high prevalence of economic crimes and corruption contributes to its problems. Therefore, in a 
rapidly globalizing world, these problems dent the image of Nigeria as a potential investment 
destination, despite its overwhelming advantage in terms of population and GDP in Africa. However, 
in order to cushion the effects of the challenging conditions, the Nigerian government offers various 
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incentives such as tax breaks and subsidies for “pioneer” or foreign firms which are deemed to 
enhance considerable increases productivity and promote technological transfer (Kehl, 2009). 
However, the shortcomings of Nigeria’s business/investment environment are not the same across 
regions. A survey conducted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and The 
World bank in 2009, shows that Bauchi State has the leading investment environment while Sokoto 
has the least. In recent times, the potential of Bauchi State as an investment location is deemed to 
have diminished due to the emergence of religious/political violence that has marred the security 
conditions of the state.  
To elaborate on the Nigerian situation, it is important to highlight some of the salient facts about its 
economy. Nigeria as an independent nation is a relatively “young” country that attained its 
independence from British colonial in 1960. Subsequent endeavors to restructure and reposition the 
economy, in order to achieve rapid development was interrupted with political and ethic tensions, 
which eventually resulted to a civil war from 1967 to 1970. The end of the civil war was followed by 
an oil boom in 1973, which brought huge wealth to the nation, but this was accompanied by 
increased government monetization of the oil proceeds and large fiscal deficits (Sanusi, 2002). The 
monetary policy in the early 70s comprised of direct controls of interest rate, exchange rate, 
aggregate credit, and cash reserve requirement. In addition, government policy shifted towards 
transfer of ownership to Nigerians, with the enacted of Nigerian Indigenization policy in 1972. The 
late 70s saw deteriorating economic conditions as inflation increased from 10.4% to 20.3% between 
1975 and 1979; and concurrent decline in GDP growth (Sanusi, 2002). 
A global slump in oil prices resulted in an end in the oil boom and a huge reduction in government 
revenue which was largely dependent on the industry. The response to the economic situation was 
further stringent control measures on exchange rate and import restrictions, as provided by the 
Economic Stabilization Act of 1982. This followed political distortions as leadership of Nigeria 
changed hands in 1983 and 1986, following coup plots. The military administration present in 1986 
brought about the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which was broadly an broadly a 
development plan aimed at achieving economic diversification, improving the balance of payments 
position, and achieving non-inflationary economic growth; with economic liberalization and 
elimination of controls as basic objectives (NCEMA, 2003). SAP was therefore a considerable attempt 
towards FDI promotion, as its extensive liberalization policies were encouraging to potential foreign 
investors. However, the rather ambitious development programme was interrupted by three 
political distortions in the decade that followed. 
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The transition to civilian administration headed by Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 brought about a 
renewed commitment towards achieving a stable and enabling economic environment for both 
domestic and foreign investment. Government emphasis on structural reforms, socio-political 
reconstruction, privatization, and building a positive international image restored hope on potential 
investors to the country (Soludo, 2007). A new sense of transparency in public institutions was in 
place, as the civilian administration ushered in various checks in the system in an attempt to combat 
corruption and economic crimes. This led to the establishment of the Independent corrupt practices 
and other related offences commission (ICPC) in 2000, and Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) in 2003, to investigate and prosecute corrupt practices, and to detect and 
prosecute economic and financial crimes in various institutions respectively. Despite the 
shortcomings of these commissions in carrying out their roles, they both achieved considerable 
success in the short-term. According to Transparency International, Nigeria’s ranking amongst most 
corrupt countries in the world fell from 2nd in 1999 to 32nd in 2007, gaining 1.2 points on the 
corruption perceptions index, as shown in Table 2.1.The global ranking had continued to improve in 
2008, but had recently been declining in 2009 and 2010.This development was deemed to have 
affected FDI inflows to the country as the period also had remarkable increases in FDI inflows, as 
corruption is deemed to increase political risk which deters potential foreign investors (Kehl, 2009). 
Empirical evidence has also shown that corruption negatively affects FDI inflows (Shleifer and Vishny 
1993; Hines, 1995; Mauro, 1995; World Bank, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Davoodi, 2000; Wei, 
2000; Ackay, 2001; Lambsdorff 2003). Figure 2.1 shows some evidence of positive correlation 
between corruption perception index and FDI flows in Nigeria. 
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Table 1Table 2.1 Corruption rankings of Nigeria 
Year Corruption perceptions index Global corruption rank  
1996 0.69 1 
1997 1.76 1 
1998 1.9 5 
1999 1 2 
2000 1.6 2 
2001 1.4 2 
2002 1.6 2 
2003 1.4 2 
2004 1.6 3 
2005 1.9 6 
2006 2.2 18 
2007 2.2 32 
2008 2.7 59 
2009 2.5 50 
2010 2.4 44 
Source: Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions index – various issues 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Relationship between Corruption and FDI inflows 
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Aside from tackling corruption, the Nigerian government has also taken necessary steps towards 
boosting the private sector, which is a major element of the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS) implemented in 2004. This lead to extensive privatization of various 
public institutions in the country; which included traditional government institutions such as the 
National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), and Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL). As 
expected, the privatization programme brought in considerable FDI inflows to Nigeria, thus as 
indicated in Chapter 1, FDI inflows to Nigeria increased 108% from about $5 billion in 2004 to $13 
billion in 2005 (UNCTAD-WIR, 2006). At that point the nation seemed to be on a sustainable growth 
path, as the nation plunged into an economic boom, fuelled by high oil prices and successes in its 
home-grown economic reforms (Iarossi et al. (2009). Average GDP growth of 7% was maintained 
between 2003 and 2007; non-oil exports grew by 8% in between 2004 and 2007; and external 
reserves reached a record height of $43.5 billion in 2006 (Soludo, 2007).  
However, in recent times, Nigeria has been facing numerous challenges in implementing its 
economic development programme, and in its efforts in building a positive public image for potential 
investors. The re-emergence of crime, ethnic/religious conflicts have contributed to a gradual fall in 
confidence from international investors. Also the recent global financial crises has affected FDI flows 
to the country, albeit marginally.  
2.3. History of FDI in Nigeria 
 
2.3.1. Pre-colonial era 
 
Nigeria’s economic relationship with the global economy existed before the creation of the country 
in 1914. The two main regions, the northern savannas and the southern forest regions had trade 
relationships with countries within Africa and beyond. A notable and well established international 
trade activity was the Trans-Saharan trade of the northern region of the country. This involved trade 
between the northern region and the North African countries, Europe, and the Middle East. In the 
southern regions, trade was concentrated on the coastal regions. The geographical proximity to the 
Atlantic Ocean facilitated trade with different countries in the southern region. The ports of the 
Bights of Benin and Biafra hosted the major trade transactions of the southern region. European 
countries led by Britain, France and Germany were the major trading partners with Nigeria. 
Within Nigeria, the two major navigable rivers: rivers Niger and Benue were the channels in which 
items of trade were navigated out of the region.  The major items of trade in both the northern and 
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southern regions were salt, leather goods, weapons, textiles, and slaves. These were traded by 
barter for items such as beads, iron, copper, and cowries. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth 
century, slave trade was the most important economic activity in the region (Falola and Heaton, 
2008). Indigenous leaders were deeply involved in slave trade as a major source of revenue for their 
personal interests such as reinforcing their empire with military weapons against their opponents. 
Thus slave trade was promoted by the traditional leaders and middlemen in both the centralized 
communities in the northern region and the southwest regions, and the decentralized regions of the 
southeast region. This lucrative trade continued till about 1850 despite its abolition by the British in 
1807.  
With the decline of slave trade in the 1850s, attention was shifted towards “legitimate commerce” 
which was dominated by the trade in palm products. Initially the European firms which engaged in 
trade with Nigeria conducted trade from the bights of the southern region. These firms did not 
operate beyond the coastal regions due to fear of malaria infection and unfamiliarity of the 
geographic structure of the interior of Nigeria among other reasons. As a result they relied on 
middlemen in the Delta and Calabari regions of southern Nigeria for trade negotiations. These 
indigenous middlemen became unreliable to the trading partners especially the British firms who 
gave them credit facilities which they constantly defaulted. As a result of this unfavourable 
dependence on the middlemen, the British firms sought ways of bypassing these middlemen to 
operate directly in the interior parts of Nigeria. Expeditions made by Dr William Balfour Baikie in 
1854 on the river Niger led to the demystification of the complexities attributed to the region (Falola 
and Heaton, 2008). Baike also made use of the quinine drug as a preventive measure against malaria 
infection. His success in the interior of the region inspired Macgregor Laird to establish the first 
steamer business in the Niger in 1857 (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Although the business folded up 
after some time due to competition from within and outside the region, its existence proved that 
foreign firms could survive in the interiors of the region and therefore bypass the undesirable coastal 
middlemen. As a result of this revelation, different firms originating from Britain, France and 
Germany began expanding their operations towards the interior of the region, especially within the 
major rivers. The expansion of French and Germans firms towards rivers Niger and Benue posed a 
threat on the British interests in the region. To counter the feared competition; the British granted a 
royal charter to a British firm Royal Niger Company in 1893. The charter gave the company, which 
was owned by George Goldie, control of the trade policies in the Niger. The Royal Niger Company 
consolidated with both British and French firms to become the largest firm in the Niger. This 
dominance led to the crowding out of both foreign and indigenous firms in the region.  
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This account of foreign operations in the pre colonial era reveals the plausible reasons for investing 
in Nigeria. This sub-section has shown that amongst other attractions to the region, the primary pull 
factors were the availability agricultural and human resources. The main agricultural resource being 
palm oil and the basic human resource was in the availability of slaves due to the large population of 
the region. Trade in these items were enhanced by the geographical proximity of the region to the 
Atlantic Ocean. The two navigable rivers within the interior of Nigeria, rivers Niger and Benue also 
became an attraction due to its link to other countries in the continent. These attractions lead to the 
scramble for establishing lasting interests in the area by European firms. British firms succeeded in 
dominating the commercial activities in the region, curbing competition from French, German and 
local firms. Thus Nigeria has been an important destination for FDI. Its strategic location at the coast 
of the Atlantic and its abundant human resources are the most likely pull factors.  
2.3.2. Colonial era 
 
Amongst the reasons for the colonization of Nigeria by the British government, the trading interest 
of the British is of particular interest to this study. In order to secure their economic interests in the 
region, British firms called upon their government to take control of the Nigerian territory as a 
means of regulating the rising competition experienced in the region. The main threats to the British 
firms were the increased entrants of firms from other European countries like France and Germany; 
and the monopolistic practices of the indigenous middlemen in the coastal regions of the Nigeria 
territory (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Thus the perception at that time was that a take over of the 
territory by the British will ensure that the economic interests of the British firms are duly protected 
(Aremu, 2003). Colonization of Nigeria had started since 1861, but the amalgamation of the Nigeria 
territories occurred in 1914, under the leadership of Frederick Lugard (Falola and Heaton, 2008).  
In general, the main activity undertaken by the colonial administration was the 
exploitation/extraction of Nigeria’s agricultural, mineral and human resources. According to the Dual 
Mandate established by the colonial administration, the activities of the colonial government would 
satisfy the interest of both the British and Nigerians. The British administration aimed at expanding 
trade by boosting the exportation of raw materials such as cocoa, oil palm, groundnuts, coal, tin and 
columbite and the importation of finished goods (Adeoti, 2002). Also, to enhance the trading 
activities within the region, the colonial government implemented rapid infrastructural development 
within Nigeria. Of particular significance in that period, was the development of transportation 
infrastructure in order to aid trade within and outside the territory.     
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The firms that conducted businesses in Nigeria were not all British, as French, Dutch and German 
firms were also operating in the region. The activities of the foreign firms constituted a large 
majority of the external trade on Nigeria, and enormous profits were made by these firms. At that 
time, the economy of Nigeria was largely controlled by international demand for the products of 
Nigerian farmers and traders (Adeoti, 2002). The administration promoted the production for 
exportation of cash crops such as groundnuts from the northern region of Nigeria; cocoa from the 
south western region; and palm oil from the south eastern and delta regions. The profits made by 
these firms were repatriated to their respective countries while the Nigerian work force used to 
accomplish their aims received marginal wages. Thus an assessing the impact of the activities of the 
foreign firms on the indigenous citizens could be ambiguous as their operations provided 
employment for the indigenes in both the upstream and downstream sectors on one hand; but led 
to crowding out of local firms and exploitation through poor wages on the other hand. In general, 
prior to the Second World War, the activities of the foreign firms which according to the Dual 
Mandate would be of benefit to the indigenous population had no significant positive effect them 
before.  
A major change in the policies of the colonial government occurred after the Second World War. As 
a result of the emergence of indigenous elite class, the colonial administration was pressured 
towards engaging in nationalistic policies. Thus the British controlled government undertook 
developmental projects that were more beneficial to the indigenous citizens. The pressure laid on 
them also resulted in the shift from extractive activities which characterized the operations of the 
foreign firms to manufacturing activities. As the call for nationalization mounted, the colonial 
administration enacted laws to ensure that the interest of the British owned firms were protected. 
The pioneer manufacturing British manufacturing firms were given preferential treatment through 
legal amendments. Aremu (2003, p.47) and Ogbuagu (1983, p.244) outlines the policies that were 
put in place prior to independence as: Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952; Income Tax 
Ordinance of 1952; Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief) Acts of 1957; Industrial 
Development (Income Tax Relief) Act of 1958; Custom Duties (Dumped and Subsidized) Acts of 1958; 
Customs Drawback Regulations of 1959; and the Income Tax Act of 1959. These amendments and 
laws were all geared towards ensuring that the British firms remained dominant in the region after 
independence.  
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2.3.3. Post Independence era 
 
The end of the colonial rule occurred on the 1st of October 1960, and Nigeria gained independence 
from the British government. The policies that were put in place to favour the foreign pioneer firms 
were still in effect for two years after independence. But in 1962, the liberal policies towards the 
activities of foreign firms began to shrink. The Exchange rate Control Act of 1962 demanded the 
permission of the Nigerian Minister of Finance for payments outside the country. Another drift from 
the liberal policies towards foreigners was the campaign that Nigerians must occupy key positions 
the ownership and control of the factors of production (Aremu, 2003). Three regional indigenous 
universities were established, with significant R&D institutes to enhance the capability of Nigerians 
in scientific and industrial research and technology (Adeoti, 2002). Thus although foreign investment 
was promoted, indigenous participation was gradually enforced. A further departure from the liberal 
policies came in the form of bureaucratic obstacles imposed on potential foreign firms wishing to 
invest in Nigeria. The Immigration Act of 1963 demands that foreign firms wishing to operate in 
Nigeria must be granted a ‘Business Permit’ and an ‘Approval Status’ before being allowed to 
operate in the territory.  
The general perception in this period was the lack of trust on the activities of the foreign firms by the 
indigenous ruling class. Thus gradual departure from the liberal policies was experienced in the mid 
1960s  
 
2.3.4. Indigenization era 
 
The Indigenization era is a crucial period in studies on FDI in Nigeria. The lack of growth in the 
absolute values of FDI in Nigeria during the 1970s could be attributed to the effects of the 
indigenization policies. But it should be noted that era which involved “Nigerianization” of the 
economy started in the colonial era. After the Second World War, the growing pressure from the 
indigenous elite led to the consideration of placing Nigerians in helm of affairs during the colonial 
era. The first of such attempt towards “Nigerianization” was the establishment of a Marketing Board 
System which gave the Nigerian government control over the marketing of Nigeria’s export crops 
(Ogbuagu, 1983). This followed the mild restrictive measures adopted post 1962, which has been 
mentioned in the previous section. In 1966, the country witnessed two military coups which led to 
the installation of Gen John Aguyi-Ironsi in January; and later the instalment of General Yakubu 
Gowon in July of the same year, after the assassination of the former. Under General Gowon’s rule, 
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preludes to the indigenization policy include: Companies Act of 1968; Banking Act of 1969; 
Petroleum Act of 1969; and Patents and Design Act of 1970. These were basically measures to 
ensure greater indigenous participation in the different aspects of the economy.   
The actual indigenization decree was declared in 1971 under Gowon’s administration. The basic aims 
of the decree were threefold: The first was to increase the opportunities of Nigerian business men; 
the second was to promote the retention of profits into the economy; and the third promote foreign 
investment in specific sectors such as intermediate and capital goods production sectors (Ogbuagu, 
1983). The Indigenization era came in three statutes: Nigeria Enterprise Promotion Act of 1972; The 
Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act of 1977; and The Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act of 1987. 
Enterprises in Nigeria were classified into three schedules: Schedule I, Schedule II and Schedule III.  
Schedule I enterprises consisted of companies in which the ownership are reserved exclusively for 
Nigerians. Foreigners were therefore not allowed to participate in the ownership or control of the 
listed enterprises. These enterprises include selected companies in the following categories: small 
scale industries, medium scale industries, processing industries, services sector, transportation 
industry, entertainment, media, and retail trade (Ogbuagu, 1983).   
Schedule II requires foreigners to invest a maximum of 40% of equity in the listed enterprises. These 
enterprises included some large scale import substitution industries, processing industries, food 
industries, commercial activities, transportation, construction industries, etc (Ogbuagu, 1983).        
The promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act of 1977 led to a revision of Schedule I 
and Schedule II, and the addition of a entirely new schedule, Schedule III. The reviews of the first 
two schedules was merely the removal of a few enterprises listed previous Act. But Schedule III 
involved the extension of the limit of foreign participation to 60%, especially in sectors with high 
technological requirements (Aremu, 2003).  
The indigenization era marked the most restrictive measures towards foreign direct investment in 
Nigeria’s history. It is therefore not surprising that volume of FDI inflows in Nigeria were somewhat 
stagnant during this era. But this poses some interesting questions regarding the lack of distrust on 
the activities of foreign firms in the region. Did Nigerians experience strong crowding out effects or 
negative spillovers prior to the indigenization era? Or was indigenization motivated by mere political 
sentiment? A notable number of literature have attributed the motivation of indigenization policies 
to the lack cooperation of the foreign firms with the Nigerian government in difficult situations such 
as the civil war which lasted between 1967 and 1970 (Collins, 1977; Forest, 1977; Ogbuagu, 1983; 
Onoge, 1974).  
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2.3.5. Investment promotion era 
 
The indigenization era was followed by another period of restrictive measures. Under the leadership 
of General Olusegun Obasanjo, the National Office of Industrial Property Act of 1979 was enacted. 
The major aim of this act was to scrutinize imported technology coming into Nigeria. The idea was to 
narrow the domestic technological gap by channelling imported technology to specific priority areas 
(Aremu, 2003). Thus the act required that foreign firms would be examined carefully at the entry 
stage to ensure that they conform to the objectives of the act.  
In the wake of global calls for more FDI promotion in the 1980s, the Nigeria government sought 
measures to soft peddle the restrictive measures imposed during the 1970s. This led to the 
promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act of 1987. The basic addition made to the 1977 
act was that under the 1987 act, foreign firms were given the opportunity increase their percentage 
holdings in any enterprise without increasing their voting power (Aremu, 2003).     
The most recent promotional acts that confirmed the “open” status of the country the creation of 
the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC), and the Foreign Exchange Monitoring and 
Miscellaneous Provision (FEMAMP) in 1995. In particular the establishment of NIPC marked the 
transition of Nigeria to a country completely open to FDI. The agency is therefore a member of the 
World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies. The main objectives of NIPC are to co-
ordinate and monitor all investments in the country. The various department of NIPC engage in 
diverse activities such as provision of a one stop investment centre, investment promotion, investor 
relations, policy implementation and external relations, etc.  
The government of Nigeria has over time, developed other schemes that indirectly affect FDI in the 
country. One of such schemes is the Export Processing Free Zones Scheme (EPFZS). The scheme 
provided incentives to businesses which engage in the exportation of goods and services. 
Demarcated zones called Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were set up, and the management of these 
zones was delegated to the Nigerian Export Processing Zones Authority (NEPZA). Other notable 
efforts to promote FDI in Nigeria include granting of Pioneer Status which gives tax holiday to eligible 
firms; and legal provisions that enable repatriation of profits (UNCTAD, 2008).  
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2.4. An Overview of Nigerian manufacturing industry. 
 
As the Nigerian manufacturing industry is part of the focus of this study, it is quite appropriate to 
mention some of the features of the industry. The manufacturing sector of Nigeria is still in an infant 
stage, compared to other sectors in the country and to other similar African countries like Ghana, 
Kenya, and Botswana (Teriba et al 1981; Iarossi et al. 2009). In terms of share of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), the manufacturing sector contributes a relatively small amount. Table 2.2 indicates 
that the share of manufacturing in GDP has been declining over the decades, from 7-8% in the 70s 
and 80s, to only 3% between 2000 and 2009. Figure 2.2 show that rapid growth in manufacturing 
was experienced in the late 70s, which correspond to the “oil boom” years in Nigeria, preceded by 
exponential growth witnessed after independence (Teriba et al. 1981) due to the import-substitution 
policies that led to a 7% rise in late 60s (Utomi, 1998; Soderbom and Teal, 2002). As at 1980, the 
manufacturing sector was at its peak of about 11% of GDP. This declining trend has been the case till 
date, as minor increases in manufacturing shares over the years has been largely unsustainable. At 
its record lowest share value in 2008, manufacturing contributed only 2.4% of GDP, while Crude 
Petroleum and Agriculture contributed about 37% and 33% respectively (CBN Statistical Bulletin, 
2009).  
  
Table 2.2 Growth in manufacturing sector over the decades 
Indicator 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
Manufacturing (% of GDP) 7.1 
 
8.9 
 
5.5 
 
3.1 
 
Capacity utilization (%) 75.4 
 
50.3 
 
34.7 
 
51.2 
 
Manufactured exports (% 
of merchandise exports) 
0.4 
 
0.1 
 
1.6 
 
2.5 
 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, and World development Indicators (WDI) 
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Figure 2.2 Nigerian Manufacturing sector as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source CBN Statistical Bulletin (2009) 
A common measure of the efficiency of manufacturing, capacity utilization, also indicates the the 
Nigerian manufacturing sector has been performing poorly. Table 2.2 indicates that capacity 
utilization declined from an impressive value of about 75% in the 70s to about 50% between 2000 
and 2009. This literally implies that manufacturing industry is currently operating at half of its 
capacity. This is related to the fact that high costs of production and tough environment result in 
both domestic and foreign plants producing below capacity (Kehl, 2009). Figure 2.3 shows a 
remarkable slump from about 73% in 1981 to about 38% in 1985. However, signs of gradual increase 
have been observed in recent times (Iaorossi et al. 2009). 
Figure 2.3 Capacity Utilization in Nigerian Manufacturing sector 
 
Source CBN Statistical Bulletin (2009) 
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Among numerous reasons for the decline of manufacturing growth and capacity utilization, power 
outages, poor transportation, low level of technological know-how, and unrest in the Niger-Delta 
region are most prevalent; resulting to indirect costs of about 16% of sales (NISER, 1997; Iarossi et al. 
2009). This adds to the fixed cost commonly borne by firms, due to the extensive importation of raw 
materials and machinery. This is particularly a problem that led to the poor performance of steel 
companies which depend highly on importation of machinery (NISER, 1997) Of particular adverse 
effect on manufacturing is the impact of power outages experienced in Nigeria. About 97% of all 
Nigerian firms are known to experience significant power outages (Iarossi et al. 2009). Considerable 
transportation problems also affect manufacturing operations. As at 2004, only about 15% of 
Nigerian roads are paved despite the fact that about 70% of transportation by industries are done by 
road (Iarossi et al. 2009). 
Another plausible explanation for the decline in capacity utilization in Nigerian manufacturing could 
be the incidence of “Dutch disease”. The term “Dutch disease” was coined in Corden and Neary 
(1982) to depict the Netherlands experience where the increase in earnings from gas exportation 
resulted in an appreciation of the exchange rate, and consequently, a fall in exports as previously 
competitive exporters lose market share (Barder, 2006). In general, “Dutch disease” describes a 
situation where an increase in revenue from natural resources leads to an increase in the 
expenditure on non-tradables, as well as its demand. The rise in demand for non-tradables results to 
an increase in its price, and an appreciation in the real exchange rate, making the exportation of 
sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture (tradables) less competitive and profitable. As a 
consequence, shrinkage in manufacturing and agriculture could be experienced, leading to a general 
decline in economic growth (Cordon and Neary, 1982, 1984; Budina et al. 2007; Barder, 2006; Ismail, 
2010; Kareem, 2009).   
Thus the decline in capacity utilization experienced in Nigeria, could be as a result of the general 
shrinkage of the manufacturing sector as a result of the “Dutch disease”. However, various scholars 
argue that the “Dutch disease” effect does not explain the decline in Nigeria’s manufacturing 
industry (Budina et al., 2007, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003, Kareem, 2009, among others, 
content that “Dutch disease” does not exist in Nigeria). In particular, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003) pointed out that Nigeria experienced an expansion in manufacturing as the government 
invested heavily in the sector shortly after the oil boom in the early seventies. Therefore the actual 
problem in the case of Nigeria could be the expansion public sector participation in the sector which 
is bound to lead to inefficiencies, rather than the negative effect of the appreciation in real exchange 
rate. Thus the rationale for the substantial public investment in the manufacturing sector was rather 
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linked to political reasons which resulted in gross mismanagement of oil revenue (Bevan et al., 
1998).  
 
However, in terms of manufacturing export growth, marginal increases over the decades have been 
the case. Table 2.2 indicates that manufacturing export as a percentage of merchandise exports had 
increased six fold over the past 4 decades, despite the fact that it constituted only 2.5% of exports in 
recent times. Survey evidence shows that only about 7% of Nigerian manufacturing firms export, and 
the exporting firms are mostly those with some significant foreign ownership (Soderbom and Teal, 
2002). Figure 2.4 shows that manufacturing exports were rather stagnant in the 70s, and up till the 
mid 80s; but in the late 80s, some considerable increases set in. Fuelled by the liberalization policies 
of the late 80s bundled in the Structural Adjustment Programme, considerable domestic and foreign 
investment started to increase marginally. However, the rise in manufactured exports is frequently 
plagued with fluctuations, as large downward swings do occur.  
Figure 2.4 Manufacturing exports in Nigerian manufacturing sector 
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Figure 2.5 Percentage share of value added across manufacturing industries (1991-1996) 
 
Source: World development Indicators (WDI) 
In terms of labour productivity, low –technology light industries such as Food processing industry 
and Textiles industry has been dominant in the sectors in Nigeria since independence (Teriab et al. 
1981; Ukpong and Anusionwu, 1986; Akintola-Arikawe, 1990; Iarossi et al. 2009). These industries 
have also outperformed others in terms of capacity utilization (Soderbom and Teal, 2002). Across 
regions, labour productivity is highest in Lagos State, followed by Ogun State; while Abuja, Sokoto, 
Kano, and Kaduna have recorded considerable levels of productivity (Iarossi et al. 2009).Firm sizes 
also show considerable variation, as larger firms are significantly more labour productive than small 
firms, due to the challenges in the business environment which are borne mostly by small firms 
(Iarossi et al. 2009). Small firms comprise above 90% of Nigeria manufacturing industry (Iarossi et al. 
2009).                                                                                                                    
The number of workers employed in the sector had increase only marginally. As at 2001, the 
manufacturing sector employed about 328,000 workers which were approximately 10% of the work 
force. The ratio of wages to value added is also relatively low at 0.26 as at 2001 (World Bank, 
2002).Overall, the manufacturing industries of Nigeria can be characterised as “dominated by low 
wages, low technology, production of light consumer goods and resource intensive and labour-
intensive industries” (Adenikinju, 2005, pp.14).  
Prior to the emergence of oil production in Nigeria, FDI was concentrated in manufacturing industry 
(Teriba et al. 1981). The Nigerian Development plan in 1975 made efforts to encourage FDI in 
manufacturing by introducing liberal policies to encourage both indigenous and foreign investors 
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(Ukpong and Anusionwu, 1986). Survey evidence shows that good managerial ability increases 
productivity by 60-80% (Iarossi et al. 2009). Thus there is a tendency of Nigerian firms to rely heavily 
on expatriates to contribute their superior managerial and technical skills (NISER, 1997).In recent 
times, FDI in the non-oil industry has reduced to less than 2% of GDP (World Bank- GDF, 2002; Kehl, 
2009). 
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2.5. An Overview of Nigerian banking industry. 
 
Prior to analysing the impact of foreign presence on the performance of banks in Nigeria, it is 
worthwhile to point out salient facts about the sector. The Banking sector in Nigeria is a highly 
dynamic sector, characterized with boom and bursts, frequent changes in ownership and mode of 
operations, and reoccurring entries and exits (Nwankwo, 1980; Soludo, 2004; Agbaje, 2008; Ning and 
Dutse, 2008). The dynamic nature could be linked to the fact that the industry is the most regulated 
industry in the country (Jimmy, 2008), and it is affected by  political  and institutional factors (Lewis 
and Stein, 1997). The industry is concentrated, with the top 10 banks constituting more than 50% of 
the total industry assets and liabilities (Ezeoha, 2007). Figure 2.6 shows the plot of total assets of the 
banking industry as a percentage of GDP. It shows a clear upward trend over the past two decades. 
Of particular note is the significant growth in the post consolidation era (post 2005), making the top 
ten banks in Nigeria among the 1000 top global banks as at 2008 (Amah and Omoh, 2008). However, 
the recent banking distress in 2009 had led to considerable decline in its share of GDP.   
Figure 2.6 Nigerian banks total assets (% of GDP) – 1995-2009 
 
Source: NDIC Annual report – various issues 
Another indicator of the relevance of the banking sector in Nigerian economy is the number of bank 
branches in the industry. Figure 2.7 shows that this measure has grown remarkably over the past 
two decades, from a total of 2,001 in 1990, to 5,565 as at 2009. As in the case of share of GDP, rapid 
growth was highest after the bank consolidation programme of 2005, which led to a 63% rise in bank 
branches between 2005 and 2009.   
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Figure 2.7 Nigeria banks total braches (1989-2009) 
 
Source: NDIC Annual report – various issues 
Another remarkable feature of Nigeria banking industry is its regional concentration. Figure 2.8a 
shows that banks are generally concentrated in the county’s commercial city of Lagos, while the 
capital city of Abuja, the oil region of Rivers, and the south eastern of region of Anambra have 
relatively lower, but considerable number of bank branches. Figure 2.8b shows that the 
concentration of banks in Lagos has been growing over the past two decades, despite the central 
bank’s efforts to spread out the distribution through bank legislation. This indicates that Nigerian 
banks, like most firms in the industry, establish branches in respond to demand. Thus banks are 
concentrated in regions with relatively higher economic activity, exemplified by its concentration in 
Lagos.  
Figure 2.8a Regional distribution in bank branches                Figure 2.8b Regional growth in bank branches 
  
Source: NDIC Annual report – various issues                      Source: NDIC Annual report – various issues 
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2.5.1 Historical exploration of Nigerian banking sector 
 
The section explores the nature of banking in Nigeria over time. The Nigerian banking industry 
depicts a special case of volatility in wide-ranging aspects. Thus the dynamic nature of the industry 
has sparked the interest of notable scholars, who have tried to give account of the industry at 
different points in time. These studies include Brownbridge (1996, 1998), Boone (2005), Lewis and 
Stein (1997), Woldie (2003), among others. Their research focused on different aspects such as: 
evaluation of quality of service (Woldie, 2003); assessment of the impact of policies (Brownbridge, 
1996); political involvement in bank liberalization programme in the 1980s (Lewis and Stern, 1997; 
Brownbridge, 1998, Boone, 2005). Thus each work focused on the assessment or exploration of 
specific events/changes which occurred in the Nigerian banking history. 
However, this section takes a different approach by conducting a historical exploration of changes 
that occurred in the banking industry with emphasis on entry, exits, mergers, and acquisitions. It is 
important to note that the historical exploration is not an attempt towards assessment or appraisal 
of the events that occurred in the industry, but rather an attempt to link the different forms of 
volatility experienced in the industry to the changes in the number of banks observable in the 
industry. Linking these events is not aimed at establishing causality, but an attempt to put the 
observable changes in the industry in context of the events that occurred in the industry. In 
particular, this work tries to link observable changes such as entry, exit/closure, take-over by 
regulatory bodies, and change in bank status, to changes in policies/legislation, political/leadership 
distortions, and economic fluctuations. Thus we try to portray the fact that the a change in the 
Nigerian banking industry such as the closure of a bank could have no link with the managerial 
decisions, but rather an event such as change in political leadership which could lead to the 
dissolution of the board of directors and entire management of the bank.  
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 Colonial Period (1892 – 1959) 
Commercial banking in Nigeria commenced with the establishment of the African Banking 
Corporation3 by the British Treasury in 1872 (Alao, 2010; Anthony, 2008; Woldie, 2003). However, 
the bank was taken-over by the British Bank for West Africa (now First Bank of Nigeria Plc) in 1894. 
The bank was the sole operator in the industry and therefore became the agent of the West African 
Currency Board set up in 1912 (Woldie, 2003). This absolute monopoly was challenged in 1917 by 
the establishment of Barclays Bank Dominion, Colonial and Overseas (now Union Bank Nigeria Plc) in 
Nigeria. At this stage, banking in Nigeria was essentially a “foreign affair” and their operations were 
geared towards British commercial interests and that of the Colonial administration. Competition in 
the industry was very low, and credit, as expected, was available mainly for foreigners (Brownbridge, 
1996; Anthony, 2008).  
Faced with difficulties in obtaining credit from the colonial banks, and an unrestricted entry banking 
environment, local business men set up the first indigenous bank in Nigeria in 1933: National Bank of 
Nigeria Limited (Brownbridge, 1996). Thus foreign domination and monopoly of the industry was 
altered (Alao, 2010; Anthony, 2008; CBN, 2008). Two other indigenous banks followed suit: 
Agbonmagbe bank Ltd (now Wema Bank Plc) and African Development Bank Ltd (changed its name 
to African Continental Bank) started operation in 1945 and 1948 respectively. But soon after, 
another foreign bank, The British and French Bank was set up in 1949. At this point, the banking 
industry was somewhat balanced - foreign banks engaged in the financial interests of the Colonial 
government, and the indigenous banks focusing on the interests of the indigenes of the state or 
region where the local banks were located4.  
A notable feature of this era (1892-1952) was the absence of banking legislation. The only 
requirement for establishing a bank was to register it under the Companies’ Ordinance (Woldie, 
2003). With an environment with no regulation and unrestricted entry, Nigeria, unlike most African 
countries experienced an early indigenous banking boom in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
(Brownbridge, 1998; Ezeoha, 2007). Thus between 1947 and 1952, 185 banks had registered for 
                                                          
3
 African Banking Corporation had its headquarters in South Africa. Upon establishment in Nigeria, it engaged 
primarily on specie movement (Danjuma, 1993; Anthony, 2008) 
4
 The local banks were regionalised, with each bank engaged in providing funds for development of the 
region/state it was located among other activities (Nwankwo, 1980; Brownbridge, 1998).   
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business (Woldie, 2003). However, most of these local banks collapsed shortly after commencing 
operation5 (Brownbridge, 1998; Woldie, 2003).  
In the light of the extensive failure of local banks, the 1952 Banking Ordinance was imposed. This 
marked the first banking legislation in Nigeria, and it specified entry conditions such as minimum 
capital requirements, reserve funds, and liquidity requirements (Woldie, 2003 p.72). The 1952 
Ordinance was amended to form the Central Bank Act 1958, which led to establishment of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria in 1959. This development ushered in an era of bank regulation/legislation.   
 
Table 2.3 Volatility in Colonial period: Era of absence of bank legislation (1892-1951) 
Form of volatility  Number of 
cases  
Outline 
Political/leadership/civil distortions 3  Amalgamation of northern and southern 
protectorates in 1914 
 General strike by Nigerian Labour Unions that 
brought all work and businesses to a halt in 
1945 
 The Richards constitution was implemented, 
bringing a division of Nigeria into North, 
West, and East in 1946 
Bank Entry 190 3 foreign banks and 187 local banks were established 
(entry was unrestricted) 
Bank Exit 178 All 178 banks that collapsed were local banks 
Bank Take-over 1 British Bank for West Africa took over African Banking 
Corporation 
 
Table 2.4 Volatility in Colonial period: Era of bank legislation (1952-1959) 
Form of volatility  Number of 
cases  
Outline 
Policies/Regulation/legislation 2  Banking Ordinance of 1952 
 The Central bank Act of 1958 
Political/leadership/civil distortions 3  The Lyttleton Constitution established a 
federal system of government in 1954 
 Regional self-government established in the 
East and West n 1957 
 Regional self-government established in the 
North in 1959 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 As at 1952 only 4 local banks were existent: National Bank, African Continental Bank, Agbonmagbe Bank, 
and Merchants’ bank. There survived due to funds injected by their respective regional/state governments.   
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Post Independence period: Indigenization wave (1960 – 1977) 
Following the independence of Nigeria on the 1st of October 1960, it was expected that policies will 
lean towards indigenization. This was the case in Nigeria, as economic policies were bent on 
ensuring indigenous participation in all economic activities. The pioneer step taken to promote 
indigenisation was the establishment of the Immigration Law of 1962. The law stated conditions 
foreigners wishing to engage in any form of economic activity in Nigeria. One of such conditions was 
a specific ratio of Nigerians to non-Nigerians employable in foreign enterprises in Nigeria (Ogbuagu, 
1983). Other laws that aimed at indigenization emerged in the 1960s: An Expatriate Quota Allocation 
Board was established in 1966, and a Companies decree was promulgated in 1968; where the latter 
mandated all foreign subsidiaries present in Nigeria to operate as a separate entity form their parent 
organisation. All these measures affected foreign participation in the banking industry during the 
period. 
The most significant distortion from the course of Nigeria banking industry in this period was the civil 
war which occurred between 1967 and 1970. There was an attempt by the south-eastern part of 
Nigeria to form a secessionist state called The Republic of Biafra as a result of political, ethnic and 
religious tensions which existed prior to the war. Thus the defunct Republic of Biafra set up its own 
central bank and currency notes under the Bank of Biafra Decree 1967 (Symes, 1997). An entire new 
financial framework therefore emerged in the region with the main objective of financing the 
ongoing war. The Nigerian Federal Military Government fought against these developments, and 
with significant British support, the federal forces defeated the Biafran forces and regained control 
of the region. All establishments in accordance with the Biafran secessionist state where therefore 
abolished, and control of all economic and financial activities were centralised by the Nigerian 
government.  
Despite the conflict existing in the late 1960s, central banking activities were not completely halted. 
In 1969, just months before the end of the war, the Central bank act of 1958 was amended, and the 
Banking Decree of 1969 was put in place. The decree gave extensive powers to the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) to regulate the quantity, cost, and direction of credit (Brownbridge, 1996). Thus the 
Central bank was empowered to set minimum and maximum lending rates. Shortly after the end the 
civil war, the military Government embarked on “consolidating political independence” by 
establishing the Nigerian Enterprise promotion Decree of 1972 (Collins, 1975, p.137; Ogbuagu, 1983, 
p.250). The decree was essentially aimed at advancing the indigenization wave that was already in 
place prior to the civil war. The 1972 decree specified statutory levels of foreign participation 
allowed in different forms of enterprises. Critics to this Military government alleged that the decree 
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was an “economic war” design to ensure that resources were channelled way from the defeated 
south easterners who were still devastated by the civil war (Ogbuagu, 1983).  
The 1972 indigenization law was revised to establish the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree in 
1977. The 1977 decree imposed stricter conditions for foreign equity ownership of enterprises in 
Nigeria. Foreign participation in enterprises had a 40% ceiling. As a result of this development, the 
Federal Government acquired majority shares in all the colonial/foreign banks, transforming them to 
indigenous banks. At this point, only corporate bodies rather than private individuals could set up 
banks (Woldie, 2003). In the same year, the Rural Banking Programme of 1977 was established. This 
imposed commercial banks to open branches in rural areas. This led to the emergence of 200 new 
bank branches between 1977 and 1980 (Woldie, 2003). Hence a boom in indigenous banking was 
restored. However, due to lack of significant economic activity in the rural areas, the rural banks 
could not meet up with their overhead costs. This directive was a clear case of inefficient allocation 
of resources which expanded operations of banks in the form of branch network but achieved no 
significant rise in the intermediation role. 
The first two decades after Nigerian independence experienced a combination of indigenization and 
expansion of banking activities. However, despite the distortions due to the civil war, banking 
activities regained its momentum in the 1970s. In particular, merchant banks emerged and 
expanded rapidly in the period. An external factor driving the expansion was the oil boom 
experienced during the 1970s which brought huge revenues from oil to the Federal Military 
Government.  
Figure 2.9 Growth in number of banks (1970 - 1985) 
 
Source: NDIC annual report – various issues 
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Figure 2.9 shows the increase in number of banks from 15 in 1970 to 40 in 1985 (Ezeoha, 2007). 
Commercial banks dominated the industry, and they maintained a steady growth while one 
merchant bank exited the industry between 1975 and 1976. The fact that the rate of growth of 
number of banks increased sharply during the economic downturn that started when oil prices (“oil 
glut”) fell in 1981 is quite contradictory. In response to the worsening economic situation which was 
deemed to have occurred as result of too much public spending during the oil boom, the 
government resolved to embark on austerity measures. Thus the Economic Stabilisation Act of 1982 
was put in place to limit importation, increase tariffs, and impose ceilings on central bank foreign 
exchange issues, among other measures (NCEMA, 2003).   
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Table 2.5 Post Independence period 1960 - 1985 
Form of volatility  Number of 
cases  
Outline 
Policies/Regulation/legislation 7  Immigration Law of 1962 
 Expatriate Quota Allocation Board of 1966 
 Companies decree of 1968 
 Banking Decree of 1969 
 Nigerian Enterprise promotion Decree of 
1972 
 Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree of 
1977 
 Economic Stabilisation Act of 1982 
Political/leadership/civil distortions 9  Transfer from Colonial rule to independent 
rule by Nigerian indigenes in 1960 
 Coup plot and subsequent installation of a 
military government in January 1966 
 Counter-coup plot and subsequent change in 
military government 
 Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970 
 Coup plot and subsequent change of military 
government in 1975 
 Failed Coup plot, assassination of military 
head of state, and subsequent installation of 
a new military head of state. 
 Handover from military to civilian rule- 
installation of civilian president in 1979 
 Coup plot and subsequent re-installation of 
military government in 1983 
 Coup plot and change of military government 
in 1985. 
Economic fluctuation 2  Oil boom which led to a annual GDP growth  
of about 6.2% between 1970 – 1978 
 Economic downturn as “oil glut” hit in 1981 
Bank Entry 25 Entry between 1970 and 1985 was driven by a 
combination of a mandate to establish branches in rural 
areas, indigenization policies, and an oil boom which 
expanded the national budget. 
Bank Exit 1 One merchant bank exited the industry 
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Liberalization period (1986-1992) 
As economic liberalization became a popular developmental strategy amongst developing countries 
in the 1980s, Nigeria was not left behind. Thus in 1986, under a newly installed military government, 
and the recommendation of the World Bank, Nigeria embarked on the most ambitious economic 
programme of its history: Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Although the programme was 
recommended by the World Bank, the design and implementation was carried out by the Federal 
Military Government of Nigeria. The main objectives of the SAP were: liberalization of external 
trade, payments system, and exchange controls; elimination of price controls and commodity 
boards, deregulation of interest rate, currency devaluation, and general reduction of the public 
sector activities (NCEMA, 2003, p.8; Lewis and Stein, 1997). In other words, SAP was a long term 
programme aimed at shrinking public sector activities and loosening regulation in a view to enhance 
private participation and promote competition in the economy.  
In the banking industry, implementation of SAP (1986-1987) came in the form of relaxing barriers to 
entry; loosening regulatory instruments – interest rate on lending and savings; liberalising foreign 
exchange dealings of banks; privatization of banks and insurance companies (Lewis and Stein, 1997). 
A direct and nearly instant response to these policies was a rapid expansion in financial services 
(Brownbridge, 1996; Ezeoha, 2007; Lewis and Stein, 1997). An outright surge in banks was 
experienced, as 9 banks (5 commercial and 4 merchant banks) emerged between 1986 and 1987. 
This trend continued all through to 1992, as number of banks increased amazingly from 41 in 1986 
to 120 in 1992 (roughly 300% increase in 7 years).   
Figure 2.10 Changes in the number of banks (1986-1992) 
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Figure 2.10 shows the growth in number of banks between 1986 and 1992.In comparison with 
Figure 2.9, the slopes of the lines in Figure 2.10 are generally steeper. It could also be observed, that 
slopes of the line for merchant banks is evidently steeper than that of commercial banks in Figure 
2.10, implying that merchant banks were seemingly driving the growth in the industry. One may ask 
at this point, what are the reasons or incentives behind the rapid expansion of the banking industry 
in response to the liberalization policies? In Nigeria’s case, the answers to this question transcend 
economic and financial thoughts, as politics and corruption played a huge role in banking activities in 
this era. 
From an economic point of view, a combination of unrestricted entry into a market, no price floors 
or ceilings, and differentiated products, would result in some form of oligopoly which is typically 
characterised as having many buyers and sellers. It is therefore expected, that in the midst of low 
barriers to entry in to the banking industry, deregulated interest rate on lending and saving, and 
liberalized foreign exchange market, incentives for rent-seeking through high interest lending and 
arbitrage opportunities in the foreign exchange markets would be on the rise (Ningi and Dutse, 
2008). In Nigeria’s case, the incentive for rent seeking in the industry was high enough to cause a 
significant migration to the sector, leading to the explosion of firms offering banking services (Lewis 
and Stein, 1997). The industry was highly lucrative, as new banks often had returns on gross 
investment of about 300% (Lewis and Stein, 1997; World bank, 1994). The industry therefore 
witnessed rapid entry of players in search of abnormal profits.  
The implementation of the economic liberalization policies of SAP was not free of politics and 
corruption. Bank licenses were awarded by the Federal Ministry of Finance, on approval of the 
military head of state (Lewis and Stein, 1997; Brownbridge, 1996). Thus bank regulation was highly 
politicised. Retired military officers served on the boards of most the banks, operating in what Lewis 
and Stein (1997) characterised as “diverse patron-client and crony network”. In other words, the 
head of the military government patronises his subordinates with attractive but undeserving 
positions in order to protect their mutual interest and sustain the regime (Boone, 2005; Lewis and 
Stein, 1997). Thus appointments on management boards was not made on the basis of qualification 
or experience, but offered to both military and civilian elites with strong ties to the Military Head of 
State. The situation harboured unethical practises such as “round tripping”, “insider lending”, 
pyramid schemes, check kiting, and duplicate bookkeeping became rampant in the industry (Lewis 
and Stein, 1997). But of greater consequence, was the practise of “insider lending” where the 
management issued loans to themselves and their cronies without much scrutiny. 
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The early stage of the banking boom was not accompanied by a rise in regulatory activities by the 
central bank. There was therefore an imminent need to boost regulatory activities at the time. The 
Government responded to this by setting up the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) under 
Decree No.22 of 1988, to assist the central bank in supervising banks (NDIC, 1989). In the same year, 
the Federal Government, in an effort to establish a “liquidity squeeze” programme in order to tackle 
inflation, ordered the transfer of all Federal and State ministries funds from commercial and 
merchant banks to the Central Bank of Nigeria. An immediate response to this policy was a sharp 
decline in deposits of banks and a subsequent plunge of some banks into liquidity crises (NDIC, 
1989). However, this development did not affect bank entry as 17 new banks were established in the 
same year.      
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Table 2.6 Volatility in Liberalization period (1986-1992) 
Form of volatility  Number of 
cases  
Outline 
Policies/Regulation/legislation 7  An economic liberalization programme, 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was 
established in 1986 
 A second regulatory body, NDIC was set up in 
1988 
 Withdrawal of government ministries’ deposit 
in commercial and merchant banks in 1989. 
 New paid-up capital requirement – 
Commercial banks minimum share capital 
was  increased from ₦10 million to ₦20 
million; while that of merchant banks was 
raised from ₦6 million to ₦12 million in 1989. 
 Issue of Stabilization Securities (SS) – a 
liquidity squeeze strategy in 1989. 
 Bank and Other Financial Institutions Decree 
(BOFID) of 1991 was passed. The Decree 
vested more powers on the CBN. 
 New share capital requirement – Commercial 
banks minimum share capital was  increased 
to ₦50 million; while that of merchant banks 
was raised to ₦40 million in 1991. 
Political/leadership/civil distortions 2  “SAP” riots were held in 1989. The 
programme was getting unpopular among 
Nigerian masses.  
 Failed coup attempt in 1990.  
 
Regulatory agency intervention in banks 2  The boards of directors of 11 banks were 
dissolved and reconstituted in 1990. 
 On the recommendation of the regulatory 
agencies, the Technical Committee on 
Privatization and Commercialization(TCPC) 
scheduled the sale of government shares in 
12 banks 
Economic fluctuation 2  Gulf crises led to rapid rise in oil prices which 
gave huge revenues to Nigeria in 1990. 
 Sharp decline in the value of the naira in 1992 
Bank Entry 79 High levels of migration to the bank industry due to 
profit making opportunities made available as a result 
of liberalization policies. 
Bank exit 1 International Bank for West Africa Ltd exited the 
industry in 1990. 
Change of name/status 1  BCCI (Nigeria) limited changed its name to 
African International Bank (A.I.B) Limited in 
1991. The directors of AIB relieved the 
appointment of all expatriate staff. 
 
The year 1991 marked a gradual shift towards re-regulation, as the Bank and Other Financial Decree 
No.25 was passed. The decree vested more powers on the Central Bank by transferring regulatory 
activities such as licensing from the Federal Ministry of Finance to the CBN (Brownfield, 1996; NDIC, 
1991).The same year also witnessed an additional entry of 12 banks into the industry. 
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 Banking Crises (1993 – 2003)  
In 1992, signs of distress were apparent in the industry. Bad debt to shareholders funds ratio of most 
merchant banks were up to 200%, and that of commercial banks rose from about 500% to 2,300% in 
some cases (Lewis and Stein, 1997; NDIC, 1993). A combination of ineffectiveness in supervision, 
unethical practices by banks, and macroeconomic instability were the major drivers of the distress 
condition (Lewis and Stein, 1997). Also, a failed transition to civilian rule in 1993 as a result of 
annulment of elections led to widespread tensions which resulted in temporal closure of many 
enterprises including banks. The same year also witness a transition to civilian rule, and another 
transition back to military rule6. 
It was therefore not surprising that in 1993, the financial conditions of banks started to worsen. 5 
banks had their management taken over by the CBN, who subsequently constituted an Interim 
Management Board (IMB) for each for each of the banks (NDIC, 1993). Despite these conditions, a 
bank entry was witnessed as Stanbic Merchant Bank started operations in 1993. 
The condition did not get any better in 1994, as the year witnessed the closure of 4 banks and the 
suspension of the license of 2 banks. The Federal Government, under the rule of a newly established 
and allegedly strict military government, promulgated the Failed banks (Recovery of Debts) and 
Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree No. 18 of 1994 (NDIC, 1994). A rather hash decree which 
holds the management and staff members of failed banks responsible for the failure, and therefore 
required to face the full force of law (NDIC, 1994). Arrests, trails, jail sentences, and debt recovery 
practises swept the industry. The result of this was a general panic and loss of confidence in the 
industry which deepened the already worsening financial conditions in place. Thus in 1995, the 
industry was heading towards a state of collapse. 28 banks were distressed, 1 completely shut down, 
and the CBN took actions ranging from constituting supervisory boards to outright take-over of the 
management of some banks (NDIC, 1995). On a different note, the new military government 
reversed the key policies implemented under SAP by fixing interest rates on lending and pegging the 
official exchange of the Naira. This marked a major departure from liberalization to strict 
government control of the economy.  
The chaos in the banking industry continued in 1996, but in 1997, the general macroeconomic 
environment started to improve.GDP growth and a substantial decrease in inflation rate was 
witnessed. The CBN gained more powers in the supervision of a wider range of financial institutions, 
                                                          
6
 1993 was a dramatic year in Nigeria’s history. The year witnessed a major election and its subsequent 
annulment, a transition to civilian rule, and yet another transition to military rule. Widespread tensions and panic 
spread in all sectors of the economy.  
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while NDIC gained autonomous status in executing its role in distress resolution and liquidation. The 
minimum paid-up share capital of banks was raised, and Government approved the liquidation of 
banks that could not recapitalise by 1998 (NDIC, 1998). The year 1998 witnessed the closure of 26 
banks which were initially distressed. The CBN also gained autonomous powers and therefore 
achieved complete independence from the Federal Ministry of Finance. The year also witnessed a 
shock in country’s leadership following the sudden death of the military head of state, and 
subsequent instalment of another military head of state. Elections were held the following year, and 
the country successfully established civilian rule. 
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Table 2.7 Volatility during the banking crisis period (1993-2003) 
Form of volatility  Number of cases  Outline 
Political/leadership/civil distortions 5  Annulment of presidential election and the 
subsequent appointment of an Interim 
National Government resulted in widespread 
tensions which led to the temporal closure of 
enterprises in 1993. Also rapid deposit 
withdrawals were experienced in banks. 
 Transition to civilian rule by the appointment 
of an Interim Governing Council (IGC) in 1993. 
 IGC was overthrown by the military in less 
than 2 months, to re-establish a military 
government in 1993. 
 Sudden death of military head of state, and 
subsequent installation of a new military 
head of state in 1998. 
 Successful transition to civilian rule through 
elections in 1999. 
Policies/Regulation/legislation 9  The newly established military government 
promulgated Failed Banks and Financial 
Malpractice in Banks Decree No.18 of 1994. 
 Establishment of Financial Services 
Coordinating Committee (FSCC) in 1994 to 
harmonise regulation within regulatory 
bodies. 
 Monetary and Credit Policy Guidelines of 
1995 fixed the minimum lending at 21%, and 
a maximum spread of 7.5%. 
 Introduction of the Autonomous Foreign 
Exchange Market (AFEM) in 1995 –  exchange 
rate was fixed at ₦22 to US$1 
 CBN Decree No. 24, BOFID No. 25, and NDIC 
decree No. 22 of 1988 were amended in 1997 
– autonomous status granted to NDIC. 
 CBN Decree No. 37 of 1998 gave operational 
autonomy to the bank – Putting an end to the 
requirement of reporting to the Federal 
Ministry of Finance. 
 The minimum paid-up share capital 
requirement of banks was raised to a uniform 
level of ₦500 million in 1998 
 The paid-up capital requirement for new 
banks was raised to ₦1billion, while that of 
existing banks remained the same in 2000. 
 Universal banking commences in 2001 
Regulatory agency intervention in banks 2  The management of 5 banks was taken-over 
by the CBN in 1993 – Subsequent constitution 
of an Interim Management board (IMB) for 
each of the banks. 
 CBN took over the management of 1 bank in 
2003, following its distressed condition. 
Bank Entry 1 Stanbic Merchant Bank commenced operation in 1993. 
Bank exit 36  4 banks exited the industry in 1994 
 1 bank exited the industry in 1995 
 26 banks exited the industry in 1998 
 3 banks exited the industry in 2000. 
 1 bank exited the industry in 2002. 
 1bank exited the industry in 2003 
Change of name/status 6  Meridian Equity bank Ltd changed its name to 
Equity Nigeria Bank Limited in 1995 
 13 merchant banks converted to commercial 
54 
 
banks in 2000 
 4 banks changed their names in 2000 
 12 banks changed their names in 2001 
 6 banks changed their status to  a public 
limited liability company 
 1 banked changed its status from a merchant 
bank to a commercial bank. 
 
The newly established civilian rule eased out the unfavourable financial conditions. New bank 
entries occurred in 2000 and 2001. Despite the moderate improvements in the system, 5bank 
closures were witnessed between 2000 and 2003. 
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 Consolidation period (2004-2005) 
The appointment of a new governor of CBN in 2004 opened opportunities to undertake reforms in the 
chaotic banking industry. The CBN noted that as of the end of March, 2004, out of 89 banks operating in 
the country, 62 of them were sound, 14 were considered marginal, 11 were deemed unsound, and 2 
banks delivered no returns (Soludo, 2004). In a rather ambitious move, the Central Bank, on July 2004, 
announced an increase in minimum share-capital required for eligibility to operate, from ₦2 billion to 
₦25 billion with full compliance before 18 months from the date of announcement. The apex bank 
advocated for consolidation of the industry through mergers and acquisition. The reason for the radical 
twist was that a bigger capital base will lead to economies of scale, more efficient allocation of 
resources, and risk reduction as a result of improved management (Soludo, 2004).   
Following the announcement, the banks were plunged into a desperate pursuit for survival. The options 
employed by banks included: sourcing for fresh capital through initial public offers, private placement 
and right issues; transfer of reserves to capital; mergers between compatible banks; acquisition of 
smaller banks by bigger banks; or combining any of the strategies (Ningi and Dutse, 2008, p.36; 
Otanngaran, 2004).However, with the limited time given to capitalize, inability to find merger 
partners/acquirers faced by some banks, the consolidation reform resulted in the closure of 14 banks. A 
total of 25 banks emerged from 75 banks as a result of merger/acquisition activity. 
   Table 2.8 Volatility in Consolidation period (2004-2005) 
Form of volatility  Number of 
cases  
Outline 
Policies/Regulation/legislation 1 Consolidation programme – Banks required 
to have share capital at least ₦25 billion in 
2005. 
Bank exit 14 Banks that could not meet the capitalization 
requirement exited the industry in 2005 
Bank Mergers & Acquisitions 21 25 banks emerged from the M&As of 75 
banks in 2005 
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Figure 2.11 Major Changes due to consolidation of the banking industry 
  
 
The enforced consolidation exercise brought about dramatic changes in the industry. Figure 3 shows 
that the number of banks decreased by 356% while adjusted shareholders funds increased by 235% 
(NDIC, 2005). Thus the increase in capital base of banks which was the primary reason for the 
consolidation was achieved. Another remarkable effect of the consolidation was that it deepened the 
capital market. Other significant outcomes include significant fall in interest rates, greater access to 
credit from foreign banks, ownership structure of banks became less concentrated, improvement in 
depositor confidence, and economies of scale in operations (CBN, 2010).  
 Post Consolidation period (2006-till date) 
The following years after consolidation saw positive developments in the industry. Of particular interest 
is the increase in foreign participation in the industry. In 2006, 13 banks initiated strategic 
alliances/partnerships with foreign banks for the management of external reserves of the Federal 
Government (NDIC, 2006). Thus 16 out of 25 banks in the industry had foreign ownership (NDIC, 2006). 
The industry was leapfrogged into a boom which saw rapid expansion of range of services offered, as 
well as branch network. A further 74% increase in shareholders’ funds occurred between 2006 and 
2007(NDIC, 2007). An additional merger of two banks occurred in 2007, bringing a reduction in the 
number of banks to 24 (NDIC, 2007). On a different note, the post consolidation surviving banks were 
given the opportunity to acquire the assets and assume the liabilities of the banks that failed as a result 
of the imposed consolidation reform. 3 capitalized banks took over the assets and liabilities of 4 closed 
banks in 2006, and 4 banks acquired the assets of 10 closed banks in 2007(NDIC, 2006, 2007). At this 
stage, the consolidation was viewed as a success. Nigerian banks accounted for more than 65% of stock 
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market capitalization, total assets rose by 439%, and bank branches in foreign markets rose to 43 
(Atuche, 2009; Chiejine, 2010).     
In 2008, the global economic crises brought about significant effects on Nigerian economy. Due to a 
general fall in demand for oil, the price of oil plummeted. Nigeria, being a country with 80% of its 
government revenue coming from oil, started to witness a general fall in aggregate demand. The fall in 
price of oil revenue in Nigeria was also accompanied with a fall in production as a result of the Niger 
Delta crisis (Atuche, 2009).In the banking sector where most of the credit is channelled towards the oil 
and gas sector, due to its speedy return on investment, the issue of non-performing loans started to 
surface in some banks. The capital market, which was driven by the banks for about 3 years prior to the 
global economic crisis, was in a state of collapse. Foreign investors, aware of the grim outlook of the 
industry, began divesting. Despite these events, the regulatory bodies claimed that the banks were not 
affected by the global economic crisis. 
In 2009, under the directives of a new CBN governor, 8 banks had their executives and boards sacked by 
the apex bank for unethical practises (Atuche, 2009). The CBN revealed that the banks were in a state of 
insolvency and subsequently bailed out the banks by injecting a sum of ₦420 billion into them (CBN, 
2009). This led to era of bank reforms with emphasis on ensuring good corporate governance and risk 
management.     
Table 2.9 Volatility in post consolidation period (2006 - till date) 
Form of volatility  Number of cases  Outline 
Political/leadership/civil distortions 1 First transition from civilian rule to another civilian rule 
in 2007. 
Policies/Regulation/legislation 1 Banking reform aimed at boosting corporate 
governance and risk management practices in 2009. 
Economic fluctuation 1 Global economic crises resulted in plummeting oil 
prices, and thus substantial reductions in federal 
government revenue in 2008. 
Regulatory agency intervention in banks 1 The CEOs and boards of 8 banks were sacked and 
replaced by the CBN. A total of ₦420 billion was 
injected into the banks.  
Bank Mergers & Acquisitions 1 2 banks merged in 2007 
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 Discussion: Searching for a pattern 
Table 2.10 Associating changes in banking industry with different events 
Period Changes in 
Banking 
industry 
Number 
of cases 
Political/leadership/civil 
distortions 
(Number of cases) 
Policies/Regulation/legislation 
(Number of cases) 
Economic 
fluctuation 
(Number of 
cases) 
Post Independence 
period 1960 - 1985 
Bank Entry 
 
25 9 
 
7 
 
2 
 
Bank Exit 
 
1 
 
Liberalization 
period (1986-1992) 
Bank Entry 
 
79 
 
2 7 2 
Bank exit 
 
1 
 
Regulatory 
agency 
intervention 
in banks 
 
2 
 
Banking crisis 
period (1993-2003) 
Bank Entry 
 
1 5 9  
Bank exit 
 
36 
Regulatory 
agency 
intervention 
in banks 
2 
Consolidation 
period (2004-2005) 
Bank exit 
 
14  1  
Bank 
Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
 
21 
post consolidation 
period (2006-till 
date) 
Bank 
Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
 
1 1 1 1 
Regulatory 
agency 
intervention 
in banks 
1 
 
In this sub-section, an attempt is made to discuss the changes that occurred in the Nigerian banking 
industry in the context of political distortion, legislation, and economic fluctuation. The discussion is not 
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aimed at establishing causation, but rather to explore the concurrent events under which these changes 
occur. Thus this section investigates the conditions which are more prominent in the midst of changes in 
the banking environment. We eliminate the colonial period from this analysis mainly because the 
information available is not sufficient to determine the prominent events.  
Table 8 reveals that most significant occurrence of bank entry was in the midst of substantial cases of 
political distortions, legislation, and economic fluctuations. The highest case (liberalization period) 
occurred in a period cases of legislation surpassed that of political distortion within a relatively short 
period of time. However, political distortions were also prominent in periods of bank entry as it came to 
a halt when the distortions normalised after 2003. In the case of bank exits, the most apparent 
conditions seem to be legislation. The highest occurrence of exits (Banking crisis) was in the midst of 
higher cases of legislation than political distortion. Also, it is apparent that a single legislation (Bank 
consolidation) occurred in the same period with 14 cases of bank exit7. Political distortions were also 
prominent during bank exits as 5 of such distortions occurred in the midst of the highest case of bank 
exit. 
Regulatory interventions seem to occur mainly in the midst of political distortion and legislation, but the 
legislation seems to be more prominent. It is quite obvious from Table 8, that the few cases of Mergers 
and Acquisitions occurred in the midst of legislation. Political distortions, legislation, and economic 
fluctuations were negligible during periods of significant M&As. This section therefore concludes that 
the orders of magnitude of events which are simultaneous with changes in the banking industry are: 
legislation, political distortions, and economic fluctuations.  
In summary, the Nigeria banking industry has undergone different forms of changes. These changes are 
driven by different factors which this section has attempted to highlight. This work has explored the 
industry from the colonial period to the recent events such as the recent bank consolidation. A 
documentation of different forms of volatility was outlined, in an effort to link them with observable 
changes in the industry. Thus we therefore advocate for some degree of caution while analysing Nigeria 
banking industry, due to issues of the context of the operating environment. 
 
                                                          
7
 It has been established that the bank consolidation reform led to the exit of 14 banks in the industry (NDIC, 2006) 
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2.7 The manufacturing and banking sectors: A significant contrast 
 
The two sectors in focus in this study show significant differences in many aspects. By definition, these 
two sectors are different as manufacturing is an aspect of industrial production which involves the use 
of capital, labour, and other inputs to produce goods; banking involves the provision of services such as 
accepting deposits and providing credit to the real sector. But there are similar in the sense that they 
both involve the use of inputs to produce outputs which are both measurable. Development scholars 
posit that the dominance of either the manufacturing or banking industry depends on the stage of 
development of a country. Thus economies in the industrial stage of development are expected to be 
inclined towards manufacturing, while developed countries are usually in the knowledge stage of 
development where the services industry such as banking are amongst the most thriving (Sachs, 2004).  
However, the Nigerian economy, a developing economy, stands an a interesting case where the banking 
industry is fairly developed, with considerable implementation of state of the art technology in its 
operations; and in contrast, the manufacturing sector is still in its infant stage, engaged in the 
production of light technology industries such as Food processing and Textiles. The gap between the 
banking and manufacturing sectors have also increased as the share of GDP in the manufacturing sector 
is declining rapidly while that of banking has been on a remarkable rise. The two sectors are both 
affected by the tough business climate of Nigeria, but differ in their respective prominent problems 
faced. While the manufacturing sector faces the challenges of power outages, poor transportation 
network, and shortage of know-how; the banking sector has been plagued with issues of political 
expediency, corruption, and policy overturn over time.   
Government regulation or intervention in the two sectors also differs in magnitudes. The banking sector 
of Nigeria has experienced frequent changes in legislation due to the reoccurring need to control 
unethical practices, political influence on the industry, and also to meet the global state-of-of the art 
operating level. Another reason for high regulation of the industry is due to the sensitivity of the 
industry, as it deals with the deposits of the Nigerian masses that rely on Government to provide 
protection from the imminent excesses of the operators. The manufacturing sector however has not 
been successful in capturing the attention that warrants for increased Government regulation, due the 
fact that most of the firms in the sector are small firms which cannot be properly regulated. Despite the 
existence of government agencies such as Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, Bank of Industry, 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, and National Bureau of Statistics, data on manufacturing firms in 
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Nigeria is of very poor quality. This could be as a result of the fact that the small firms that dominate the 
industry, do not keep appropriate records that government agencies require; or the gross 
ineffectiveness of these agencies in conducting surveys in order to generate data on manufacturing 
firms. However, surveys from international agencies such as the World Bank, and United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) have made efforts in providing data on Nigerian 
manufacturing through surveys. These surveys can only permit limited academic and non-academic 
analysis or investigation, but not sufficient for Government monitoring and regulation. Thus the result is 
the regulation of Nigerian manufacturing firms are most among large size firms but the vast majority of 
small firms are sparingly regulated.  
Another aspect of considerable difference, which is of particular importance to the present study, is 
their respective degrees of openness to FDI. Despite a history of various the degrees of restriction to 
FDI, the manufacturing sector has been “open” since the establishment of Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission in 1995. FDI in the sector is fully encouraged by the Federal Government, due to 
its ability to boost domestic investment, job creation, and potential spillover effects to domestic firms. 
This is in direct contrast to frequent Government protection policies such as import substitution through 
trade restriction. Thus the manufacturing sector is completely open to FDI, but not international trade as 
it undergoes frequent policy overturns on import restriction. Restrictive policies towards FDI do occur at 
different periods in the banking industry. The most recent is the 20% limit on foreign equity 
participation imposed in 2007 by the Central Bank of Nigeria, in order to protect the booming industry 
from foreign control or dominance (NDIC, 2008).  
Foreign presence in banking and manufacturing sectors also differ considerably. Partly due to the 
challenging business conditions, which imply high costs of operation, manufacturing sector of Nigeria 
are dominated by large MNCs which have the capacity to absorb the operating conditions due to 
economies of scale. Small indigenous firms are faced with high costs of production; frequently exit the 
industry, resulting in the dominance of high capacity MNCs in the industry. Thus Nigeria Breweries Plc, 
Nestle Nigeria Plc, and Unilever, which are MNCs engaged in Food processing, dominate Nigerian 
manufacturing (UNCTAD-WID, 2008). In contrast, the banking sector is dominated by indigenous banks 
like Fist bank Nigeria Plc, United Bank of Africa (UBA), and Zenith Bank of Nigeria, dominating the 
industry share capital, and majority-owned foreign banks like Standard Chartered Bank and Stanbic-IBTC 
lagging behind them in terms of share capital.  
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The most evident common ground of the two sectors is their regional concentration. Manufacturing 
firms and banks are mostly concentrated in the commercial and economic hub of Nigeria, Lagos. Both 
manufacturing and banks respond to varying differences in magnitude of economic activity in different 
regions in Nigeria.  
In conclusion, Nigeria as a country in focus is quite dynamic in wide-ranging aspects and in different 
sectors. The relevance of the sectors in focus differs, as well as their positions as potential locations for 
FDI. The manufacturing sector constitutes a lower share of GDP than the banking sector, and it is also 
less dynamic in general. Thus these differences may also manifest on the impacts of foreign presence on 
the productivity/performance of firms in their respective sectors.   
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Figure 2.12.Comparing Manufacturing and Banking sectors 
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Chapter 3: FDI and policies 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The relevance of FDI in the global economy has made it a significant agenda in policy making for national 
and regional governments. The remarkable surge in FDI has various policy implications. Despite the 
rather consensus view that FDI is good for both  the global economy, and national economies, policies 
on FDI are not directed solely towards its promotion. Thus the dynamics of FDI can also be viewed from 
a policy perspective. The two broad directions of FDI policies are towards liberalization and restriction or 
control. On the national level, decisions on whether to control or liberalize FDI the country’s economic 
agenda, the perceived effect of FDI in terms of social and political perspectives, and in recent times, 
issues of national security.  
This chapter highlights the trend of global policies, pointing out the prolonged periods of FDI 
liberalization policies and the re-emergence of protectionism and restrictions. It also highlights the key 
policies made by the Nigerian government that affect FDI flow to the country, and its alignment with 
global FDI policies. The unavailability of sector specific information on FDI policies in Nigeria implies that 
a holistic view will be taken in description.    
3.2 Global trends in FDI policies 
 
The significant upward surge in FDI, which began in the mid 80s sparked interests due its contributions 
to global economic growth and prosperity. Multinationals became more influential in world affairs, 
gaining relevance beyond that of many national governments in the world. As a result, national 
governments and international bodies have paid close attention to the operations of MNCs in order to 
point out their benefits and demerits. On the international realm, the widely held view is that FDI is 
beneficial to both home and host countries, and therefore should be liberal with policy formulations 
leaning towards providing incentives for it. On the other hand, weariness and caution about its long 
term implications in host countries have spurred various degrees of regulatory control by national 
governments at different points in time.  
The eighties came with the liberalization wave which was propped by international agencies such as IMF 
and the World Bank, as a means of achieving efficiency in institutions by shrinking the public sector and 
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boosting the private sector, which also entails opening up for FDI and competition. This saw significant 
number of countries, especially developing countries, converging on common standards such as rights of 
establishment, fair treatment, and protection from nationalization, among others (UNCTAD-WIR, 1993). 
Investment promotion agencies (IPAs) sprang up in different countries, and a race towards the 
attraction of FDI through conviction of locational advantages became prominent in developing countries 
in the nineties. Major drivers of the liberalization initiative were regional integration of countries in 
Europe, the adoption of free market economy systems by Central and Eastern Europe, and a general 
consensus that FDI brings about huge benefits (UNCTAD-WIR, 1991, 1992, 1993). Leading the 
liberalization trend are Central and Eastern European countries and African countries who offered 
various incentives in all aspects of FDI between the 1980s and early 90s (UNCTAD-WIR, 1995). A typical 
example of FDI investment promotion policy is Namibia’s Foreign Investment Act of 1990, which made 
the country open to FDI in all sectors. 
Developments in world trade policies have also affected FDI policies over time. The completion of the 
Uruguay round negotiations and the subsequent establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
brought about significant consequences on FDI. Such laws within WTO that affect FDI policy instruments 
include Trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), General Agreement on Trade and services (GATS), 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing issues, and Trade related intellectual property rights 
(TRIPS), among others (WTO, 2005; Bartels and Crombrugghe, 2009). Thus trade measures such as 
Regional free trade agreements and Export processing zones are likely to result in promotion of FDI in 
member countries, and induced export-oriented FDI respectively (UNCTAD-WIR, 1992, p. 268). Particular 
regional trade agreements with FDI promotion implications include North American Free Trade 
Agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States; and Charter on Regime of Multinational 
Industrial Enterprise (MIEs) in the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States 
(UNCTAD-WIR, 1996, p. 138).  
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Figure 3.1 Changes in FDI policies over time (1992-2010) 
 
Source: UNCTAD – various issues 
 
The global liberalization era lasted for the majority of the past three decades. It is important to note that 
the major promoters of FDI liberalization are industrial countries, who benefit more than developing 
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countries for MNCs. Thus despite the wide-spread conviction of the economic benefits of FDI, some 
developing countries had reservations about being open to all forms of FDI due to their views of possible 
negative effects, especially on social, cultural and political lines.  Figure 3.1 shows that most of the 
global changes in FDI policy between 1990 and 2004 were leaned towards liberalization, as the plot of 
liberalization line follows that of number of changes very closely. But 2005 saw a huge drop in 
liberalization policies as weariness over the effects of FDI began to emerge in different parts of the 
world. It comes as a surprise that the drivers of the fall in liberalization policies and the consequent rise 
in restriction laws are the industrial countries that spearheaded the liberalization wave in the past 
decades. The protectionist wave was partly brought about by the events that followed after 11th 
September 2001 terrorist attack on United States, which to the emergence of protectionist on national 
security grounds. United States, Canada, Germany, Russia, and China, were among the countries that 
enacted laws that restrict various forms of FDI due to national security reasons (Marchick and Slaughter, 
2008).   
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The emergence of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) as a major form of FDI by mostly oil rich countries of 
the Middle East can be linked to the recent control measures on FDI by developed countries. The idea 
that ownership of major assets in the industrial world would be owned by state governments of foreign 
countries in the form of SWFs was greeted by a lot of caution and sometimes suspicion (Marchick and 
Slaughter, 2008; Bartels and Crombrugghe, 2009). Thus this contributed to the emergence of control 
measures on FDI from developed countries who preached the benefits of total liberalization some 
decades earlier. Thus the present situation is that of declining liberalization policies and rising restrictive 
policies towards FDI. Figure 3.2 shows that from the nineties, there has been a gradual decline in the 
percentage of policy changes leaned towards liberalization and a concurrent gradual rise in restrictive 
policies. Thus like some macroeconomic variables such as regional economic growth, there is a growing 
likelihood of convergence of liberalization and restrictive policies.  
 
Figure 3.2 Percentage shares of Liberalization and Restriction (1992-2010)  
 
Source: UNCTAD – various issues 
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policies should accommodate the complexities of intra and inter firm transactions, and international 
network systems of productions, sourcing, technology, and marketing (Bartels and Crombrugghe, 2009).  
 
3.3 Nigerian government policies and FDI 
 
Policies that affect FDI in Nigeria have been alternating between promotion and restriction of various 
degrees. The foremost FDI policies were enacted in the colonial administration, thus their economic 
interest was a major motivation. The Aid to Pioneer Industries of 1952 and Industrial Tax relief of 1958, 
were made to promote investments from both British and non-British MNCs. The later policy involves 
granting a 5-year tax relief on foreign companies on entry into Nigeria (Aremu, 2003). This development 
was soon overridden by desperate calls from Nigerian citizens to “nigerianize” the economy after 
independence in 1960 (Ekundare, 1972). The Exchange Control Act of 1962 came as the first post 
independence restrictive measure on FDI by prohibiting the transfer of money outside Nigeria without 
the consent of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Finance. Thus the act went against the basic precepts of 
FDI liberalization: Assurance for the repatriation of earnings and capital (UNCTAD-WIR, 1993).  
Of greater scale and intensity in terms of FDI restriction, was the Indigenization Decree which began 
with the enactment of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, No. 4 of 1972. This imposed ceilings on 
to foreign ownership of 60% on a total of 22 business activities, and minimum capital requirement. The 
business activities affected included advertising, electronic manufacturing, basic manufacturing, road 
transport, among others (UNCTAD, 2009). Further restrictions on foreign ownership came with the 
Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree of 1977, which lowered foreign ownership limit from 60% to 40%, 
and expanded the list of business activities restricted. The 1977 amended was know as the most severe 
cases of government control on foreign ownership in Africa and the developing world (Biersteker, 1987; 
UNCTAD, 2009). However, the amendment of the decree in 1989 led to the relaxation of some of the 
restrictions previously imposed, but the controls were still present at that time.      
Part of the objectives of the Structural Adjustment Programme of 1986, was to privatize major public 
institutions in Nigeria, especially those of the oil sector. However, foreign investors were excluded from 
the privatization process, as indigenous Nigerian firms became the beneficiaries. The actual opening up 
of Nigerian economy to foreign investment came with the establishment of the Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Decree in 1995. According the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) charter, 
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the decree mandates the commission to provide investment services such as investment promotion, 
investor relations, investment friendly policy advocacy; and to build associations with multilateral 
institutions such as UNIDO, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), Foreign investment 
Advisory Service (FIAS), amnong others. Thus Nigerian economy transformed from an rather FDI 
restrictive economy to an FDI promotion one, allowing up to 100% foreign ownership in many sectors, 
especially non-oil sectors (Kehl, 2009).  
Further FDI promotion measures came with the National Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (NEEDS) in 2003, which extended FDI promotion to include high profile Nigerians abroad and 
Africans in the Diaspora (UNCTAD, 2009). Table 2.1 shows a historical outline of policies that affected 
FDI in Nigeria in chronological order. It can be seen that the promotional measures started in the late 
80s, after decades of government restrictions to FDI. 
 In general, the FDI policy upturns are not restricted to Nigeria, as this chapter shows that global policies 
have also moved from liberalization to gradual protectionism as national security concerns began to 
contribute to policy making. Thus considering the aim of investigating the effect of FDI in sectors, the 
changes in FDI policies would affect the magnitude or stock of FDI flows and thus affect their effects on 
both manufacturing and banking sectors.  
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Table 3.1: An Outline of FDI Policies in Nigeria 
Year Law/policy Motive Aim Comments 
1958 Pre-independence era: 
Industrial Tax relief 
 To grant a maximum 
of 5 year tax holiday 
from inception date, 
to foreign companies 
operating in Nigeria 
This was a strategy to 
attract TNCs by offering 
generous incentives. 
1962 Exchange Control Act, 
1962 
Restrictive measure To ensure that all 
monetary transactions 
within and outside 
Nigeria are permitted 
by the Ministry of 
Finance 
A politically motivated 
law to subdue the 
dominance of foreign 
companies after 
Nigeria’s independence.  
1972 Indigenization Era: 
Nigerian Enterprise 
Promotion Act (NEP) 
Restrictive measure To restrict FDI in 
enterprises. These 
schedules were put in 
place: Schedule 1 
requires 100% 
ownership of 
enterprises by 
Nigerians while  
schedule II requires as 
much as 40% 
ownership by 
foreigners 
 Foreign investors were 
not adequately 
compensated for 
disposition of assets. 
Thus the 
implementation violated 
international investment 
laws. 
1977 Nigerian Enterprise 
Promotion Act (NEP) 
Restrictive measure  An amendment of NEP 
Act, 1972, which 
resulted in lowering 
the maximum limit of 
foreign ownership 
from 60% to 40%, and 
expansion of business 
activities under 
restriction.  
 
1979 National Office of 
Industrial Property 
(NOIP) Act 
Restrictive measure To scrutinize the 
technology coming 
into the country. This 
involved the 
promotion of foreign 
technology to priority 
areas, and protecting 
the negative effects of 
unwanted technology 
into Nigerian economy 
 
1987 Nigerian Enterprise 
Promotion Act (NEP) 
Promotion strategy An amendment of the 
NEP Act 1977, to 
provide an 
opportunity for 
foreign investors to 
increase investment 
without increasing 
their voting power 
Due to the emergence 
of a separate body to 
monitor the compliance 
of the Act, it resulted in 
the development of “red 
tape” to foreign 
investors in Nigeria 
(Aremu, 2003). 
1988 Industrial Development 
Coordinating 
Committee (IDCC) Act 
Promotion strategy IDCC was to act as a 
one-stop agency to 
approve and regulate 
investment in Nigeria 
(as recommended by 
The agency 
underperformed due to 
dishonest practises, as 
enterprises gave false 
information to secure 
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The World Bank). To 
streamline the 
investment procedure 
by shrinking similar 
government 
departments into one 
expatriate quotas.  
1989 Nigerian Enterprise 
Promotion Act (NEP) 
Promotion strategy To eliminate the 
discriminatory 
approach towards 
foreign investors that 
existed in previous 
NEP acts. Schedule I 
and II were abolished, 
and Schedule III was 
amended to allow 
ownership of 
enterprises with more 
than 20 million naira 
capitalization 
A turn around 
amendment to open up 
to FDI 
1990 Companies and Allied 
Matters (CAMA)  
Promotion strategy To mandate foreign 
companies 
incorporate outside 
Nigeria to incorporate 
in Nigeria. Failure to 
incorporate will lead 
to termination of the 
right to operate in the 
country 
The law was basically a 
measure to ensure the 
documentation and 
monitoring of the 
activities of foreign firms 
by government 
authorities.  
1995 Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission 
(NIPC) Act 16, 1995 
Promotion strategy To promote and direct 
investment in Nigeria. 
Also, to market the 
Nigerian investment 
environment to 
potential foreign 
investors 
A more radical approach 
than previous IDDC act 
(Aremu, 2003) 
1995 Foreign Exchange 
Monitoring and 
Miscellaneous 
Provisions (FEMAMP) 
Act 
Liberalization To liberalize foreign 
exchange 
transactions.  
This was an amendment 
of the Exchange Control 
Act, 1962 
1999 Investment and 
Securities Act 
Liberalization To deregulate the 
Nigerian Capital 
market, in order to 
attract FDI 
The enforcement of the 
act required the 
amendment of other 
acts, to avoid the 
conflict of objectives 
 Source: Adapted from Aremu (2003) 
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Chapter 4: The theory of FDI and spillovers 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of the empirical investigation of FDI effects at the firm level originate 
from the theories of FDI. In particular, the notion of the existence of productivity spillovers from FDI is 
fundamentally based on the neo-classical trade theories and the theories of industrial organization. This 
chapter therefore throws light into the underpinnings of FDI spillover mechanism by exploring its links 
with the established theories of FDI. 
This chapter highlights the neoclassical trade theories of Mundell (1957), which argue that restrictions 
on trade enhance factor movements from countries of lower return to countries of higher return. These 
capital movements across countries were regarded as direct investment (Kindleberger, 1969). However, 
we point out in the chapter, that the novel argument by Hymer (1960) that the differences on factor 
interest rates were not the reason for capital movements but rather the desire to undergo investments 
leads to capital movements. The theory also pointed out that the specific advantages possessed by a 
firm are the main motivation for direct investment, and that a direct investor operates in an oligopolistic 
market characterized by product differentiation. This contribution lead to the notion that productivity 
spillovers can occur when MNCs cannot fully internalize the ownership or specific advantages, and 
therefore a spillover to domestic firms in the host country would likely occur. We therefore provide a 
detailed overview of these theories and their links to productivity spillovers in both manufacturing firms 
and banks.  
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4.2 The theory of FDI 
 
 4.2.1. Neoclassical Trade theory 
 
The initial attempt to explain the theory of FDI was made in the neoclassical trade theory. The trade 
theory known as the Heckscher-Ohlin8 model gave the foundations for the formulation of FDI theory. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model essentially advanced on the Ricardian model by introducing a second 
factor of production, capital (Markusen, 1995). Specifically, the model is based on three key 
assumptions: The first is that there are two factors of production (capital and labour); secondly, two 
countries exist (for example country A and B); and two perfectly competitive goods are produced. Hence 
the H-O model is characterized as a “2x2x2” model. A basic departure from the Ricardian model is the 
assumption that technologies between countries are identical. Thus the main difference between 
countries in the H-O model is the difference in factor endowments. By implication, countries have 
different factor intensities and different factor prices. Furthermore, it is assumed that factors are mobile 
within countries, but immobile between countries.   
To illustrate the H-O model, we assume two countries, A and B, where each produces two goods: a 
capital intensive good and a labour intensive good. A is the capital abundant country, and B is the labour 
abundant country. The H-O theorem asserts that country A will export the capital intensive good to 
country B while country B will export the labour intensive good (trade takes place). It is important to 
note that the due to difference in factor prices between countries, the price of the capital intensive 
good will be higher in the labour abundant country and vice versa9. Hence both countries will continue 
trading until the prices of the two goods are equal in both markets. The equality of price the two goods 
implies equality of the factors between the two countries, as price of factors are equivalent to their 
marginal products.    
A significant departure from the H-O model to the FDI theory involves the relaxation of the assumption 
that factors are immobile between countries. Thus this makes provision for the fact that factor 
movements can also occur in the absence of trade. Mundell (1957) extends the analysis to argue that 
                                                          
8
 Heckscher-Ohlin model was developed by two Swedish economists, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. Bertil Ohlin 
won the 1977 Nobel Prize in Economics. 
9
 The capital abundant country will have an excess supply of capital, which results in lower price of capital relative 
to the labour abundant country. 
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restrictions to trade will enhance factor movements and vice versa. The factor movements will be in the 
form of movements from a country of lower return to a country of higher return. In the case of capital 
movements, firms will move to countries where the returns to capital are relatively higher, in quest for 
higher profits. The implication of Mundell’s assertion is that trade and capital movements are 
substitutes. In summary, the difference in returns to capital between countries is the basic reason for 
capital movements from one country to another. This capital movement from one country to another 
was regarded as direct investment by neo classical economists (Kindleberger, 1969).    
 
However, the neoclassical view towards FDI received criticism by some prominent scholars. In a doctoral 
dissertation, Hymer (1960) was the first to provide a credible criticism of the neoclassical theory of FDI. 
He questioned the notion that disparity in interest rates was the basis for capital movements; and that 
FDI would not exist in perfect competitive market. According to Hymer, direct investment is the control 
(indicated by the extent of ownership) of an enterprise of a country by an enterprise of another country 
which involves capital movements. And the desire to undergo direct investment leads to movements in 
direct investment which results in capital movements. This desire to undergo investment is the 
motivation for direct investment and not the differences in interest rates (Hymer, 1960).  He noted that 
the evidence for this thought is seen in cases where capital moves from a country with high interest rate 
to a country with low interest rate. According to the neoclassical theory, the preceding statement would 
have been seen as counter intuitive. To contest the idea of perfect competition, Hymer noted that 
specific advantages which firm posses are the main motivation for direct investment. Thus Hymer views 
the direct investor as an oligopolist (Grubaygh, 1987; Sun et al., 2002). Therefore, imperfection in the 
market is a necessary condition for direct investment to exist. 
 In a similar vein, Kindleberger10 (1969) elaborated on Hymer’s theory, and explained the monopolistic 
advantages required for direct investment. He noted that local firms already posses some advantages 
which the foreign investor need to overcome. These advantages possessed by the foreign firm could be 
in the form of product differentiation, superior managerial and marketing skills, advanced technology, 
economies of scale, etc (kindleberger, 1969). Caves (1971) emphasized on product differentiation as a 
necessary condition for direct investment. He added that product differentiation stimulates rivalry 
through activities like advertising. Furthermore, he noted that in addition to the merits of the 
                                                          
10
 Prof. Charles Kindleberger was Stephen Hymer’s thesis supervisor at the Massachusetts Institute of technology 
(MIT).   
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unique/special asset they posses, foreign firms should also prefer direct investment to other alternative 
forms of acquiring foreign rent. These points implies that perfect competition assumed in neoclassical 
trade theories would not permit FDI, as it is not characterized by product differentiation.  
 
Figure 4.1 Illustration of Hymer’s Theory (1960) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s schematization. 
Figure 4.1 represents the fundamentals of Hymer’s theory. The first box represents imperfect markets, 
which is a necessary condition direct investment. Imperfect markets are characterized by product 
differentiation and monopolistic advantages. These forces stimulate direct investment which involves 
capital movements. Thus a clear distinction between neoclassical theory and Hymer’s theory is that the 
former asserts that capital movements result in direct investment while the later contends that the 
desire to invest as a result of imperfect markets leads to direct investment which involves capital 
movements.  
A different approach was taken by Vernon (1966) in the product life hypothesis. The main objection of 
this hypothesis to trade theories lies in its approach of de-emphasizing factor-proportion theory of 
  
IMPERFECT 
MARKETS 
 
DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
                                                                     
CAPITAL 
MOVEMENTS 
Product 
differentiation 
 
Monopolistic 
advantages 
76 
 
comparative advantage, and emphasizing on the timing of innovation, scale economies effects, and the 
role of uncertainty in trade patterns (Vernon, 1966). To explain the reason for FDI, Vernon asserts that 
at some stage after the introduction of a new product, the producers switch from exporting to foreign 
production. Thus after a new product emerges, it gradually transforms from a differentiated product to 
a standardized product. At the standardized or maturity stage, the product experiences a threat of 
competition from local products in the export target countries. According to Vernon, this threat is a 
significant motivation for shifting production abroad. In summary, Vennon’ theory attempted to answer 
the question ‘when’ does foreign investment occur (Dunning, 1979). 
4.2.2 Industrial organisation theory: Internalisation 
 
Hymer’s work marked a turnaround point from the neoclassical trade theory to the industrial 
organization theory (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). It changed the focus of multinational theory from the 
nation (macro) to the firm (micro) (Hennart, 2001). The questioned that remained unanswered at that 
point was: ‘Why do firms, rather than markets internalize cross border transactions?’ (Dunning, 2001; 
pp.41).Buckley and Cason (1976) made the first comprehensive attempt to show how cross border 
transactions involving intermediate products were internalized within MNCs rather than within markets. 
The theory was based on Coarse (1937) market failure theories. Their basic assumption was that profit 
maximization occurs in the midst of imperfect markets. In their theory, they pointed out that modern 
businesses extend their activities to include interdependent activities such as marketing, research and 
development, training, and managerial skills. These activities are linked by flows of intermediate 
products which require a separate market. Buckley and Cason (1976) opine that due to the imperfect 
nature of these intermediate markets, internal markets emerge to avoid the demerits of imperfections 
in the external market. Thus the existence of imperfect markets creates the incentive for internalisation 
of the firm. Another theory of internalisation was developed by Hennart (1977) under the inspiration of 
McManus (1972). He asserted that the existence of imperfect competition generates transaction costs 
which can be eliminated by through internalisation.   
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Figure 4.2 Internalization process by Buckley and Casson (1976) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s schematization 
 
Figure 4.2 is a diagrammatic representation of Buckley and Casson (1976) internalization theory. It starts 
with the first stage in which modern firms carry out activities that are interwoven and linked by flows of 
intermediate products. The second stage involves the emergence of a market for intermediate products 
in order to harmonise these business activities. These intermediate markets are known to be imperfect, 
and therefore efficient organisation becomes a challenge. As a result of this imperfection, there is an 
incentive to avoid these markets. To avoid these markets, internal markets are formed across countries. 
Thus the third stage involves the emergence of MNCs through the internalization of the markets.    
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4.2.3 OLI framework by John Dunning 
 
By the late seventies, there was a need to unify the theories of foreign direct investment, as previous 
theories focused on particular directions in their analysis. This was in order to consolidate the reasons 
why a firm will decide to engage in FDI. Thus in 1976, during a Noble symposium at Stockholm, John 
Dunning introduced a comprehensive blend of the trade theories with internalisation theory to develop 
the OLI eclectic theory of FDI. OLI stands for Ownership-Location- Internalisation advantages. According 
to Dunning a firm will engage in FDI if theses three conditions are satisfied (Dunning, 1979). At this 
juncture, we explain each of these conditions in turn.  
Ownership (O) advantages 
These are unique advantages a firm possesses relative to its competitors in the foreign market. In 
accordance with Dunning’s theory, FDI would occur when the merits of implementing the advantages 
are higher than its opportunity costs. These “O” advantages could be in different forms (Dunning, 2000). 
It could be in the form of monopoly advantages possessed by firms as shown in Bain (1956) and Hymer 
(1960). The creation of barriers to entry could also depict ownership advantages as identified in Caves 
(1971, 1982) and Porter (1980, 1985). In the same vein, the ability of managers to detect and explore 
resources and potentials globally can be seen as “O” advantages.  
In recent times, “O” advantages appear in the form of alliance capitalism, which involves synthesizing 
assets with comparative advantages of a firm and that of its competitors. Dunnig (2000) indicates that 
the following theories explain the “O” advantages: Product Cycle theory (Vernon, 1966), Industrial 
organization theories (Hymer, 1960; Caves, 1971, 1974; Dunning, 1958); Internalization theory (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982).                                                                                                                                          
 Location (L) advantages 
This explains the advantages that determine where FDI is situated. Particular countries possess 
advantages that enhance the ownership advantages. These “L” advantages could be in the form of 
complementary assets (Dunning, 2001). 
Dunning (2000) pointed out that the idea of L advantages has different views according to disciplines. 
Economists have investigated the impact of exchange rates on the location of FDI (Cashman 1985; Froot 
and Stein, 1991; Rangan 1998). Business scholars assert that a competitive advantage involves the 
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optimal location of portfolio assets (Porter 1994, 1996; Enright 1991, 1998). In the nineties, economists 
and industrial geographers explored the clustering of economic activity in certain geographic regions 
(Audretsch 1998; Krugman 1991, 1999; Venebles 1998; Scott 1996; Stoper 1995; Stoper and Scott, 
1995). According to Dunning (2000), theories that explain location advantages include Traditional 
Location theory (Hoover 1948; Hotelling 1929; Isard 1956); Internationalization related theories 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Cavusgil 1980; Daniels 1971); Agglomeration theories (Audretsch 1998; 
Enright 1991, 1999; Forsgren 1989) Spatial concentration related theories (Florida 1995; Scott 1996; 
Storper and Scott, 1995) Complementary assets related theories (Teece et al. 1997; Chen and Chen, 
1998, 1999); Government induced incentives theories (Loree and Guisinger, 1995; UN 1996a); Exchange 
rate theories (Aliber 1971; Cushman 1985; Froot and Stein, 1991).  
 Internalization advantage 
Following the acknowledgement of the fact that a firm with ownership advantages would decide to 
invest in a country with location advantage, an important question will be: Why would the firm choose 
to carry out the foreign investment by itself instead of engaging in other arrangements such as licensing 
or exportation. This answer to this question was given in the various forms of internalization theory- 
When transaction and organization costs of these other arrangements outweigh the costs of 
internalizing the market, the firm will choose to engage in FDI. These transaction costs are know to rise 
as imperfections in the market rises (Dunning, 2000). It should be noted at this juncture, that one of the 
distinctive features of I advantages is that it requires O and L advantages. Dunning (2000) outlines the 
following theories that explain internalization advantages: Orthodox internalization theory (Caves 1996; 
Buckley and Casson, 1976; Ghoshal et al. 1997); Efficiency related theories (Caves 1982; Teece 1981; Liu 
1998).   
It is important to note that the eclectic theory assumes that all the three advantages must be present 
before there will be foreign direct investment. In other words, all three advantages are necessary, but 
no one is sufficient (Sodersten and Reed, 1994).  
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4.2.4. Types of FDI 
 
The OLI framework led to the classification of FDI into four different types, namely: natural resource 
seeking FDI, market seeking FDI, efficiency seeking FDI, and strategic asset seeking FDI (Dunning, 1998). 
Identification of these types of FDI underpins most empirical literature on the determinants of FDI. We 
now explain these types of FDI in turn. 
The Natural Resource Seeking FDI 
Some countries or regions are known to possess certain resources in abundance. Thus it is not surprising 
for MNCs which uses such resources to choose to locate subsidiaries in such locations. But what are 
these resources and what type of MNCs seek them? The answers to these questions lie in the further 
categorization of natural resource seekers. According to Dunning (2008), there are three groups of 
natural resource seekers.  
The first group are the seekers of physical natural resource. This comprises mainly MNCs engaged in 
primary production and manufacturing, seeking for resources in mostly two broad categories: Fossil 
fuels lead by crude oil, coal, gas, metals, diamonds, etc. Agricultural products such as palm oil, cocoa, 
rubber, sugar, etc. Africa is known to be the hob of natural resources. This could explain the recent 
surge in FDI flows to Africa, particularly from China and India (UNCTAD, 2006), where the main 
attraction of MNCs to Africa is its abundance in natural resources. The second group are the seekers of 
cheap and efficient labour. Of recent, this motive for FDI is increasing due to the emergence of 
industrializing developing countries such as Mexico, Taiwan an Malaysia which seek cheap and 
resourceful labour in China, Morocco, Vietnam, and Turkey (Dunning, 2008). The manufacturing and 
services sector are the main undertakers of cheap labour seeking FDI. Due to the desirable impact on 
host nations’ economy, especially on employment, host countries have implemented free trade and 
export processing zones (EPZs) in order to attract such FDI.  
Third group are the seekers of technological know how, managerial and organisational skills. This motive 
usually leads to collaborative alliances between countries and regions. 
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 Market seeking FDI 
The motive for FDI could be to invest in a country due to the size/growth potential of its market, or the 
countries within the same region. This motive that entails seeking for market for goods and services is 
known as market seeking FDI. It has been noted that most MNCs that engage in this form of investment 
were previously exporters to the host country, who decided to carry out direct investment due to 
unfavourable tariffs and other barriers levied on their exports (Nicholas, 1986; Dunning, 2008). Thus 
host governments play an active role in encouraging this form of investment through imposing controls 
and barriers on imports. In addition to size of market, they are other reasons for market seeking FDI. 
These other reasons why firms may choose to carry out market-seeking FDI was outlined in Dunning 
(2008). The first reason is that some firms react to the decision to invest abroad by their suppliers and 
customers. Thus it becomes economically reasonable for them to follow them to invest overseas. 
Another reason for engaging in this type of investment arises due to the need for products to adapt to 
the culture and tastes of the host country. As a result firms decide to engage in direct investment in 
order to ensure that their products remain competitive in the midst of local products. The third reason is 
to reduce production and transportation cost by supplying in the market or in the regions around it. 
Lastly, a reason for market-seeking FDI may be to respond to competitors’ investments in major markets 
across the globe. This situation is also known as the “follow your leader” or “bandwagon” strategy 
(Knickerbocker, 1973; Dunning, 2008).  
Efficiency seeking FDI 
The motive for FDI could be to reduce the cost of production or to achieve economies of scale. Due to 
structural differences among countries, firms are able to take advantage of the favourable factor costs 
and product prices in order to diversify risk. This type of FDI is known as efficiency seeking FDI, and it 
generally entails rationalization of the structure of international activities by firms in order to improve 
efficiency. 
Strategic asset seeking FDI 
In order to protect O advantages, firms may acquire or purchase the assets of existing firms. The aim is 
to strengthen their global competitiveness as part of their long term strategic objectives (Dunning, 
2008). Thus strategic seeking FDI involves the pursuit of physical assets, R & D, market knowledge, 
human capital, etc, to enhance ownership advantages on one hand and subdue those of the competitors 
82 
 
(Dunning, 2008). The existence of strategic assets stem from the imperfections of the intermediate 
product market.  
4.3. The theory of FDI spillovers in manufacturing firms 
 
MNC activities have increased remarkably across the globe. Thus enquiry into their impact on host 
country has also increased in both political and economic spheres. In particular, the effects of MNCs on 
host country (domestic) firms have been a matter that has spurred some ingenuity in explaining its 
mechanisms. Different theories on the mechanism or the channel through which MNC generate 
spillovers on domestic firms exist in literature. These theories however do conflict on the direction of 
impact of each identified channel of spillovers. Theoretical literature has identified four channels of 
productivity spillovers on domestic firms. These are: Demonstration effect, Worker’s turnover/mobility, 
competition, and linkages. 
Critical to the study of FDI spillovers, is the role of technology transfer and technology diffusion in 
generating spillovers. Both technology transfer between MNCs and technology diffusion or transfer 
from MNC to domestic firms, involve costs (Wang and Blomstrom, 1998), but the costs are decreasing 
with the age of the technology transferred. Technology transfer occurs between the parent firm and the 
MNC subsidiary or affiliate in the host country. This transfer to subsidiaries is requires some amount of 
time, which is less than half of the time that would have been spent through licensing or joint ventures 
(Romeo, 1980). It is also deemed to bring newer technology to host country firms than through licensing 
(Mansfield and Romeo, 1980). In general, transfer of technology across borders is a major contributor of 
economic growth, especially in developing countries (Kuznets, 1966). However, the technology 
transferred to developed countries tends to be newer than that transferred to developing counties 
(Mansfield and Romeo, 1980). 
Teece (1977) points out that the technological know-how possessed by MNC subsidiaries in host 
countries can diffuse to domestic firms with potential beneficial results. The key reason for technological 
diffusion is the existence of ownership advantages (Dunning, 1993), which can be in the form of 
intangible assets like technological ability, managerial, and marketing skills, are transferred in the form 
of knowledge capital (Markusen, 1995). In most cases (especially in developing countries) MNCs are 
assumed to be superior to domestic firms (Conyon et al. 2002). MNCs also invest more funds into 
human resource training and Research and Development (Edfelt, 1975; Goncalves, 1986). These 
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desirable skills or attributes of MNCs can “spill-over” to domestic firms causing increases in productivity. 
However, spillovers do not occur immediately MNCs commence operation in a host country, as some 
time is required for the intangible assets brought about through FDI becomes internalized in domestic 
firms (Globerman, 1979).  The speed at which spillovers occur as well as the direction, are dependent on 
the channel at which it occurs 
We therefore throw light into spillover mechanisms by explaining the four identified channels of 
productivity spillovers 
Figure 4.3.The mechanism of FDI productivity spillovers 
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
Figure 4.3 represents the mechanism of FDI productivity spillovers. It starts with the transfer of 
technology from the parent MNC to the subsidiary in the host country. This transfer is quite clear and 
does not involve much difficulty, despite the fact that it involves costs and it takes some time. The stage 
with more complexity is the spillover of technological know-how from subsidiaries to domestic firms 
through the four identified channels represented in arrows in Figure 4.3.   
4.3.1. Demonstration channel 
 
This occurs when domestic firms observe, imitate, and/or adopt the technological practices of MNCs. It 
is known as one of the strongest channels of productivity spillovers (Blomstrom, 1986). As earlier 
indicated, learning the technologies of MNCs by host country firms usually involve costs. The model 
developed by Wang and Blomstrom (1992) shows that the cost of imitating the technology of MNCs is 
inversely related to the rate of technology spillovers; while the investment in imitation is positively 
related. Glass and Saggie (1992) went further to demonstrate how the quality of technology transferred 
through imitation depends on the technology gap between MNCs and domestic firms. Their model 
shows that higher incentives to imitate or innovate in host countries increase the quality of technology 
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that home countries transfer to the host country. Their paper points out that a host country government 
can therefore attract state-of the art technology by encouraging investment on activities that promote 
imitation and innovation (such as R&D) through subsides, and discourage low quality technology usage 
through taxation.  
Sawada (2010) extends the imitation models of Wang and Blomstrom (1992) and Glass and Saggie 
(1998) to include the notion that MNCs have an incentive to prevent spillovers while host country firms 
have an incentive to gain spillover in their model. The idea that MNCs possess means of avoiding 
technology leakage had been established in literature (Djankov and Hoekman, 1998). Javorcik (2004) 
points out that the means of avoiding leakages include intellectual property rights protection, trade 
secrecy, and strategically locating in countries with low absorptive capacities. Sawada (2010) follows this 
line of thought to define both expenditure on host country firms to gain technology spillovers and 
expenditure of MNCs to prevent spillovers as fixed costs which are strategic substitutes11. Their model 
point outs out that imitation undertaken by host country lowers marginal costs, which is an indication of 
the extent of technology spillovers. Thus comparing the marginal costs of production for MNCs and 
domestic firms indicates their respective levels of technology, and therefore the technology gaps. 
Spillover ratio is therefore defined as “the ratio of the reduction in the marginal cost of the home firm to 
the difference n the marginal costs of both firms without spillovers” (Sawada, 2010, pp. 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Expenditures that are strategic substitutes imply that spending on one result in the reduction of the marginal 
profitability of the other.  
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Figure 4.4: Productivity/technological spillovers through demonstration channel 
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
           
Author’s schematization 
Figure 4.4 represents the mechanism of demonstration effects. From left to right, the MNC subsidiary 
transfers technology to domestic firms through various degrees or combinations of imitation, reverse 
engineering, and technology adoption. Desirable host country characteristics such as geographical 
proximity and absorptive capacity are important mediating factors of demonstration effects channel of 
technology transfer.  
4.3.2. Workers’ mobility 
 
Worker’s mobility is a channel of spillovers that occurs when workers from MNCs move to domestic 
firms or set up their own firms in the host country. An important question is: What brings about such 
movement of workers from MNCs to domestic firms? A starting point would be to look into the 
characteristics of MNCs, where the lobour movement emanate from. It has been established in 
literature that MNCs offer more training to workers than their domestic counterparts (ILO, 1981; 
Lindsey, 1986). Gershenberg (1987), Djankov and Hoekman (1999), and Sousa (2001) among other 
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studies show that MNCs provide more training than domestic firms in Kenya, Czech Republic, and UK 
respectively. Thus the knowledge exposed to MNC workers (especially indigenous staff) is a asset that 
domestic firms in the host country industry would wish to exploit. The movement of local workers from 
MNCs to local firms therefore offers opportunities for domestic firms to acquire and adopt the 
knowledge in their operation, thus productivity or efficiency increases are bound to be the case.  
Mobility of local workers from MNCs to domestic firms is evident in some studies. Gerschenberg (1987), 
Pack (1993), and Glass and Saggie (2002) are among the studies that show evidence of labour 
movement from foreign to domestic firms. As in the case of demonstration channel, MNCs have an 
incentive to prevent labour movement from their firms, as movements will diffuse the technology, and 
consequently bring about competition for market share in the industry. The most plausible way MNCs 
attempt to prevent workers’ mobility is to pay local workers relatively higher wages than domestic firms. 
Evidently, Gorg et al. (2002) found that workers in MNCs earn higher wages and experience higher wage 
growth than their domestic counterparts.  
An explicit analysis of the conditions of workers’ mobility was provided by Fosfuri et al. (2001), using 
game theoretical models. The starting point of the model is the decision of an MNC to engage in FDI 
rather than exporting or licensing, due to its profitability advantages. The model regards the superior 
technology of the MNC as exogenous, and transfers this technology by sending managerial staff to train 
local workers in the host country. The training of local staff involves a cost as well as fixed costs 
associated with operating in a different environment. But the MNC subsidiary enjoys monopoly of the 
industry due to absence of technological know-how of local firms at the stage. The MNC also has the 
incentive to pay relatively high wages to local workers in order to maintain its position as a monopoly of 
the technological know-how. Thus technology transfer to a local firm only occur when a worker in the 
MNC is offered and higher wage by a local firm, and she decides to move. If the MNC losses the trained 
worker, it re-deploys training staff to the subsidiary and the process starts again. The model however 
assumes that both MNC subsidiary and local firms have symmetric information about the value of the 
trained worker; local firms cannot hire workers from the MNC home country; technology transfer by 
imitation is ruled out; and zero profits will be made if trained worker is not hired. Figure 4.3 shows the 
diagrammatic representation of this process: 
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 Figure 4.5: Productivity/technological spillovers through Workers’ mobility    
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
              
             
  
Author’s schematization 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the mechanism of workers’ mobility of turnover. From left to right, the MNC parent 
firm transfers some training staff to the subsidiary as soon as operation commences, to train some 
subsidiary indigenous staff on ways of carrying out the company’s operations. The training staff returns 
to the parent firm months after the training ends. This movement becomes a cycle when a considerable 
number of host country workers move to indigenous firms, or set up their own companies represented 
by the arrow pointing at the third box.  This movement will require the redeployment of training staff to 
the host country, and this cycle continues as long as indigenous workers continue to move to other 
firms. In reality, the second stage movement of workers from subsidiaries to domestic firms can be 
prevented through high pay packages and contract agreements offered by MNCs.  
4.3.3. Competition 
This effect of competition in an industry as a result of MNC presence is widely acknowledged in 
literature (Kathuria, 2000). MNC entry can disrupt the pre-existing market equilibrium in a host country, 
making domestic firms to react towards protecting their market share and profits (Blomstrom and 
Sjoholm, 1997). A possible consequence of MNC entry is that domestic firms will be motivated to 
increase efficiency in use of resources in order to increase productivity (Barrell and Pain, 1997; 
Blomstrom and Kokko, 1999; Driffield, 2001; Bosco, 2001). Competition that results from MNC 
entry/presence is particularly important in countries where restrictions to imports exist, as it enhances 
technological diffusion to domestic firms that strive in the market (Haddad and Harrison, 1993). Also, 
competition can achieve positive spillovers to domestic firms when the MNC goods are close substitutes 
to domestic firm goods (Barrios and Strobl, 2002). 
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However, the competition brought about by MNC entry can adversely affect domestic firms. Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) was the first study to demonstrate the negative spillover effect of MNC presence 
through competition. They argue that in the short run, an imperfectly competitive market in a host 
county with fixed costs of production can experience a fall in demand for their products on the entry of 
a foreign firm with lower marginal costs (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). The fall in demand for products of 
domestic firms due to foreign entry will result in higher unit cost of production as fixed costs would be 
borne by a shrinking market. MNCs however are in advantage position, as they are already established 
with higher capacity to bear the fixed costs than domestic firms (Sembenelli and Siotis, 2002). The 
resulting effect in such cases would be a fall in productivity of domestic firms and thus negative 
spillovers from FDI. Aitken and Harrison (1999) refer to this impact of MNC as the “market-stealing 
effect” of foreign firm entry. Buffie (1993) had earlier indicated that FDI could crowd out domestic firms, 
resulting in decline in aggregate capital stock of the industry, and as a consequence, a fall in 
employment of the industry. Makusen and Venables (1999) also acknowledge that foreign firm entry 
could capture the share of market previously owned by domestic firms. 
The negative effects of MNC entry in the short-run could be offset in the long-run when domestic firms 
invest in new technology in order to maintain market shares (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1996). In some 
extreme cases, MNC entry could lead to exit of domestic firms that can not bear the burden of a rise in 
their unit cost of production. However, the firms that exit the industry in these cases are mostly the 
inefficient firms, thus the exit of some domestic firms increases the efficiency level of the industry 
(Blomstrom, 1986).  
In general, the effects of competition are dependent on characteristics of both MNC and domestic firms. 
Host countries with adequate absorptive capacities and technological know-how are likely to reap the 
positive benefits of competition. The opposite is the case for domestic firms with low absorptive 
capacities and limited technology.   
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4.3.4. Linkages (Vertical spillovers) 
 
Unlike the other channels of spillovers, linkages are pecuniary externalities that affect domestic firms. 
Linkages involve market transactions (Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare, 2003). They typically result from the 
purchase of goods from suppliers or customers. Two types of linkages exist in literature: Backward 
linkages, which occur when MNCs generate spillovers which benefit domestic suppliers in the upstream 
sector; and forward linkages, which occur when MNCs generate spillovers to domestic customers in the 
downstream sector. Linkages can also be broadly defined to include cases where the effect could be 
negative. Thus there can be negative backward or forward linkages.  
Backward linkages are more likely as MNCs tend to be mostly engaged in the production of final 
consumer goods, using intermediate goods produced by domestic firms as inputs. Rodriguez-Clare 
(1996) model shows that the necessary conditions for backward linkages include the high costs of 
communication between parent firm and subsidiary, and availability of large variety of intermediate 
goods in both home and host countries. Thus the complex nature of the final goods produced by MNCs 
will lead domestic suppliers of intermediate goods to increase production and variety of these goods. 
The increase in the variety of goods can raise the general productivity of industries in a particular host 
country. The driving force of backward linkages is the abilities or capabilities of domestic suppliers, 
which motivate MNCs to interact with them (Dunning, 1958; Cantwell, 1989).  
In many cases, the backward linkages exist due to intentional assistance of domestic suppliers through 
the provision of technology by MNC producers. This is because unlike the case of horizontal spillovers, 
MNCs do not have the incentive to prevent backward linkages, as it positively affects their own 
productivity.  Thus spillovers through this channel frequently occur (Javorcik, 2004). However, there are 
cases where MNC entry has no effect on domestic suppliers in the upstream sectors. This may be due to 
the fact that all inputs are imported by the MNC.  
The present study however limits investigation of productivity spillovers to horizontal spillovers. The 
exclusion of vertical spillovers or linkages is mainly due to data unavailability, as empirical investigation 
of linkages are data demanding. 
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Figure 4.6 Backward and Forward linkages  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author’s schematization 
Figure 4.6 shows a simple illustration of the mechanism of FDI linkages. The MNC subsidiary as a final 
good producer can cause pecuniary externalities on domestic suppliers in the upstream sector as 
demand for their intermediate goods produced increases, leading to an expansion of output. This 
expansion of output generates efficiency, as average costs fall due to economies of scale. The 
mechanism is similar when the MNC is the intermediate supplier. Superior intermediate goods 
distributed effectively will increase the efficiency of upstream customers in the host country.  
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4.4 The theoretical background of foreign bank entry effects on bank performance 
 
The theory of foreign bank effects follows the FDI theory highlighted in 4.1. As in the case of MNCs in 
the manufacturing sector, banks decide to invest abroad due to specific/ownership advantages they 
wish to utilize in foreign financial markets (Hymer, 1960; Dunning, 1980). According to Dunning (1989), 
similar to the manufacturing sector, the ownership advantages of MNCs in the service sectors such as 
banks are in the form of product differentiation, economies of scale and scope, and superior access to 
inputs. In terms of product differentiation, Dunning (1989) noted that the creation and sustainability of 
brand image and goodwill relative to competitors is a common attribute of MNCs, which they exploit in 
foreign countries. In banks, product differentiation would be in the form of advantages or superiority in 
the capacity to deliver services and produce modern financial products at lower costs than competing 
banks. Economies of scope in the variety of services of highly capitalized banks, and the economies of 
scale in lowering costs of operation due to their size, gives foreign banks huge advantages in the host 
economy. The capacity of foreign banks also gives them advantages in sourcing for inputs at lower costs, 
making them relatively efficient in the industry.  
With ownership advantages, banks can engage in international delivery of their services for reasons such 
as to follow their customers, which are in most cases, multinationals (Clarke, et al., 2003; Naaborg, 
2007); or to explore the host country market. A key driver of foreign banks entry is liberalization and 
deregulation of host country sectors, which include banking (Dunning, 1989). The economic and 
financial liberalization wave experienced in the 1980s, many countries “opened up” to foreign 
investment in the banking sector. But how does the operation of foreign banks affect domestic banks in 
host countries? MNC theories by Dunning (1989) and Levine (1996) shows that the channels of FDI 
productivity spillover in the manufacturing sectors are also true in service sectors such as banks. Foreign 
banks, having superior intangible assets such as managerial skills and effective service delivery can 
transfer technology or know-how  to domestic banks through similar channels to the manufacturing 
firms such as demonstration, workers’ mobility, and competition (Wu, 2011).   
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Figure 4.7 Foreign bank entry effect mechanism 
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Figure 4.8 shows the mechanism of foreign bank entry effect. From left to right, the foreign bank 
decides to invest in a foreign country, and transfers its technology to the subsidiary bank in the host 
country. The operation of the subsidiary leads to changes in domestic bank performance through 
channels such as demonstration, workers’ mobility and competition. The key channel of productivity 
externalities on domestic firms is competition. A consensus view on the effect of foreign presence in 
host countries is that their operations will increase competition, and therefore spur domestic banks to 
improve performance in order to remain in the industry or to maintain its relevance (Bhattacharaya, 
1993; Clarke, et al., 2003; Unite and Sullivan, 2003; Naaborg, 2007).  
                         
4.5 Harmonizing FDI spillover and foreign bank effect models 
 
The mechanism of FDI spillovers on domestic firms can be applied to the banking industry to a 
considerable extent (Levine, 1996; Xu, 2011). Starting from the reasons for the decision to invest in a 
foreign country, the presence of ownership advantages which motivates internationalization of 
operations is true for both manufacturing firms and banks. However, the form of ownership advantages 
is fairly different in the two sectors. While MNCs in manufacturing sectors rely on the proportion of R&D 
activities, professional, scientific, and engineering workers in the entire labour force of the company as a 
competitive edge; banks rely on their ability and capacity to coordinate information necessary for the 
delivery of superior services at the lowest possible cost (Dunning, 1989). But the underpinnings of 
ownership advantages which consists of various degrees of the combination of product differentiation, 
economies of scale and scope, and superior intangible assets is applicable in both manufacturing and 
banking sectors.  
Foreign 
bank                           
- Parent firm with 
ownership 
advantages 
Foreign 
bank  
- Subsidiary in 
host country 
Domestic 
banks 
– experience changes 
in performance due to 
foreign bank entry 
Technology transfer 
Demonstration 
Workers’ mobility 
Competition 
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There are also some differences in the pull factors of MNCs and foreign banks. MNCs engaged in 
manufacturing typically expand operations abroad to serve a different market, to exploit abundant 
natural resources in host country, or to increase efficiency in production due to reduced labour costs in 
the host county. These locational advantages are the major reasons manufacturing firms across the 
world flock to locations such as China and India. In the case of banks, despite the fact that these motives 
for FDI converge, some are specific to the banking sector or the services sector in general. Of particular 
prominence is the evidence that banks follow their customers such as multinationals to foreign locations 
(Clarke, et al., 2003; Naaborg, 2007). In the case on market-seeking FDI, while MNCs manufacturing are 
commonly incentivized to invest in foreign countries by host governments; foreign banks often face the 
obstacle of bank regulation and legislation which is rather more dynamic in the sector. Banks are highly 
regulated institutions, and thus cases of deregulation and liberalization motivate foreign banks to set up 
subsidiaries in such industries.  
The consequences of the operations of foreign bank subsidiaries are quite similar to that of MNCs in the 
manufacturing sector. Productivity or performance changes on both types of firms arise through 
channels such as demonstration, workers’ mobility, and competition highlighted in section 4.2.However, 
Linkages as a means of FDI productivity spillovers, seems to be restricted to manufacturing firms, as it 
involves suppliers or consumers of intermediate physical goods, which is not the case in banking sectors. 
The most prominent channel through which foreign subsidiaries affect domestic banks is competition. 
This motivates domestic banks to upgrade services in other to keep its customers, and thereby maintain 
relevance in the industry.  
Figure 4.7 shows the relationship between the two theories. It shows that there are some common 
grounds in phenomenon of ownership advantages and the channels of productivity externalities in both 
MNCs in manufacturing and foreign banks. Differences however exist in the forms of ownership or 
competitive advantages and the fact that linkages as channel of FDI spillovers, seems to be peculiar to 
the manufacturing sector.    
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Figure 4.7.The mechanism FDI spillovers in manufacturing and foreign bank effects 
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In conclusion, this chapter had provided a theoretical background to the empirical investigation of 
spillovers and foreign bank effects by highlighting the underpinnings of FDI theory and its ability to 
explain the existence of spillovers on domestic firms. We also pointed out that the theories that explain 
the FDI spillovers in the manufacturing industry are applicable to the banking industry. Chapter 6 and 7 
will however show that despite the similarities in the mechanism of FDI impact on both industries; their 
empirical investigations involve the use of quite different models.  
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Chapter 5: Review of empirical literature 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A crucial contribution of this thesis is the identification of aspects of FDI spillover literature that has 
been rather neglected. In particular we extensively review literature on FDI spillovers in manufacturing 
in order to point an aspect that has not been given appropriate attention. We pinpoint in this chapter 
that there are potential problems with previous empirical investigations of spillovers in terms of lack of 
attention paid to the data from which the measure of foreign presence is computed, especially in 
relation to number of firms in each region or sector and the sampling methodology implemented.  
Thus in order provide a critique of previous literature, a starting point would be to provide an overview 
of the directions of research on FDI spillover literature. This chapter therefore provides a comprehensive 
review of literature on FDI spillovers in manufacturing firms and foreign bank presence effects on 
domestic banks. Literature on the former is enormous while that of the latter is relatively new and 
limited. Thus our critic of literature presented in section 5.5 will focus on manufacturing firms. However, 
the problems pointed out using literature on FDI spillovers in manufacturing firms also apply to that of 
banking industry.   
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5.2 Review of empirical literature on FDI spillovers in the manufacturing Industry 
 
There is an enormous amount of empirical literature on the investigation of productivity spillovers from 
FDI in the manufacturing sector. The approach towards the investigation is dependent on how 
productivity is defined. In literature, the most common measures of productivity are Value of output, 
Value added in production, labour productivity, total factor productivity (TFP), and differences in 
production functions (Lipsey and Sjoholm 2005). A dominant approach in literature which we follow in 
this study is the measure productivity based on differences in production functions, using value of 
output and value added in production as dependent variables. Relating the model to the effects of FDI 
involves the augmentation of the model to include measures of foreign presence. In the case of FDI 
spillovers on domestic firms, the coefficient of the foreign presence measure in a productivity model run 
on domestic firms is considered as the extent and direction of productivity spillovers. 
Thus the typical methodology is the specification of variants of a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
which relates a measure of output (Aitken and Harrison, 1999), value added (Konishita, 2000) or total 
factor productivity (Barrios and Stobl, 2002) with explanatory variables that are deemed to affect 
productivity. Thus the typical empirical specification of spillovers can be represented as follows: 
                     
                                                                                                   (1) 
Where K and L represent capital and labour respectively. FE is the percentage of equity owned by 
foreigners, FP is the constructed variable that measures spillovers, and   is the error term. Subscripts i 
and j represent firm and sector respectively. FDI spillovers are measured by the coefficient and 
significance of    in a regression. Thus while      determines whether foreign firms are more productive 
than domestic firms;    determines whether foreign presence affects the productivity of all firms or 
domestic firms in the sector.  
However, measuring productivity by comparison production functions involves rather strong 
assumptions. These include the assumption that there are no differences in technological knowledge 
involved in determining the factor combinations or plant size (Lipsey and Sjoholm 2005). Thus the 
technological knowledge involved in running a large plant is identical to that of a small plant. This 
assumption also holds while comparing capital intensive plants and labour intensive plants. However, 
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this assumption seems to be unrealistic especially in the case of productivity spillovers from FDI as 
foreign firms are bound to possess technological knowledge entirely different from that of domestic 
firms. Thus these technological differences could be wrongly captured as differences in production scale 
or factor choices (Lipsey and Sjoholm 2005). However panel techniques applied in this study are capable 
of controlling for firm-specific heterogeneity which may bias estimates.  
Another approach towards modeling FDI spillovers present in literature, are methods that control for 
potential endogeneity in the model. The endogeneity issues in estimating production functions 
undermined the empirical estimation of productivity for a long time. Griliches and Mairesse (1995) 
explicitly show the shortcomings of estimations that treat production inputs as exogenous. Their work 
also assessed different approaches towards solving this problem in literature. Of particular note is the 
Olley and Pakes semi-parametric estimation procedure which has been commended by productivity 
scholars (Griliches and Mairesse 1995; Van Biesebroeck 2004). Thus in the case of productivity spillovers 
from FDI investigation, estimation of TFP by the Olley and Pakes method abound in literature (Javorcik 
2004; Keller and Yeaple 2004, Todo and Miyamoto 2006; Koestas 2008).  
The estimation procedure proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) essentially performs two crucial tasks in 
the estimation of TFP. The first is that it accounts for firm specific productivity differences which reveal 
unique changes over time. Secondly, it controls for the entry and exit of firms. Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) method also follows a similar approach to that of Olley and Pakes (1996). The major distinction 
beign that Olley and Pakes assumes that investment is an increasing function of productivity and 
capital, while Levinsohn and Petrin modelled material inputs as a monotonic function of the same. 
However, despite the availability of the choice of approach is dependent on data availability and 
characteristics of the firms examined. Our approach in this study however is to review empirical 
literature on FDI spillovers according to the nature of the investigation employed in the studies. Thus we 
identify two broad categories of spillover investigation: Studies on spillover occurrence and Studies on 
determinants of spillovers. The latter category is further divided into Studies on the effect of MNC 
characteristics on spillovers, Studies on the effect of domestic firm characteristics on spillovers, Studies 
on the effect of host country characteristics on spillovers. 
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5.2.1 Empirical studies on Spillover occurrence 
 
Empirical literature has often focused solely on the search for the existence of spillovers, without 
explicitly associating any determinant to its occurrence. Thus this section deals with studies that attempt 
to ascertain whether spillovers occur irrespective of the any particular characteristic of the MNCs, 
domestic firms or the context of the investigation. This sub-section focuses on studies that search for 
either intra-industry (horizontal) spillovers, inter-industry (vertical spillovers), or regional spillovers. 
Studies on vertical spillovers are further disentangled into backward spillovers (backward linkages) and 
forward spillovers (forward linkages).  
Early studies on spillovers were based on developed countries using industry level data. Caves (1974) 
investigated the presence of spillovers in Australia and Canada. Using both labor productivity and profit 
models, the study found positive intra-industry spillovers in Australia, but weakly negative spillovers in 
Canada. Similarly, Globerman (1979) found a positive relationship between foreign presence and labor 
productivity among Canadian industries. At this stage, FDI spillover investigation was mainly carried out 
on the industry level, without controlling for firm heterogeneity in their respective models. This was 
partly as a result of unavailability of disaggregated firm level data for such analysis. Thus results based 
on industry data during this period might be misleading as the industrial classification in the seventies 
implies that the number of observations might be limited12 (Caves 1974 was based on 110 industries), 
and therefore might not permit rigorous econometric analysis required for appropriate estimation of 
spillovers. 
 Haddad and Harrison (1993) was the first study to employ firm level panel data for the investigation of 
FDI spillovers. Their analysis found no evidence of spillovers amongst 4,236 Moroccan firms over the 
period 1985 to 1989, using augmented production function estimations. Chuang and Lin (1999) used a 
different approach by using both probit and OLS model to investigate FDI spillovers in 8,846 Taiwanese 
establishments. Their work found positive productivity and R&D spillovers. It is important to note that 
these studies were based on the assumption that spillovers are bound to be positive if they exist. 
Therefore the term ‘spillovers’ was defined as an externality, implying that the spillovers were bound to 
be positive. But this notion was contested in Aitken and Harrison (1999), where robust inter-industry 
negative spillovers spillovers were found on Venezuelan firms between 1976-1989 using panel data 
                                                          
12
 Industrial classification of manufacturing industries in the seventies is broader than their current classification, 
implying that the observations of empirical work in seventies literature are likely to be limited.  
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techniques (fixed effects). This negative spillovers were attributed to the existence of “market stealing 
effect” of the presence of MNCs (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).Thus their study threw light into the fact 
spillovers can actually be negative.  
 Despite the availability of firm level panel data, some studies found no evidence of productivity 
spillovers. Khawar (2003) found no evidence of intra-industry spillovers amongst 2,362 firms in Mexico. 
Similarly, Ruane and Ugar (2004) using Fixed/Random effects, found no relationship between foreign 
presence and labour productivity in 4,600 firms in Ireland, over the period 1991 to 1998. Different 
results were found in a study of agro/agro-allied companies in Nigeria by Ayanwale and Bamire (2004). 
The study found positive and significant intra-industry spillovers using fixed effects estimations. In a 
similar vein, Yasar and Paul (2007) examined the existence of intra-industry spillovers in 437 firms across 
five countries: Poland, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz Republic. Their analysis found foreign 
presence in an industry results in an increase in labour productivity of domestic firms. In direct contrast, 
Waldkirch and Ofusu (2010) found significant negative relationship between foreign presence and the 
level of value added per employee in their study on 200 firms in Ghana, using Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) technique of estimation. However, the results using the growth rate of the model 
yielded positive spillovers.    
These contradicting results in earlier studies spurred recent studies to take different methodological 
approaches towards the investigation of intra-industry spillovers. One of such approaches is the use of 
instrumental variable (IV) technique. Jordan (2010) argued that foreign presence measure typically 
employed in literature (share of foreign employment in industry) is likely to be plagued by endogeneity. 
Thus the study employed the overall FDI in manufacturing industries in Mexico as an instrument for 
foreign presence variable. This resulted in positive intra-industry spillovers. Another approach was the 
use of spatial dynamic model in modeling spillovers in 29 provinces in China by Hun and Sun (2010). This 
involves the assumption that the 29 provinces are spatially arranged, and thus would require estimation 
techniques that control for spatial interdependence. Using GMM estimations, their study found positive 
spillovers from FDI in China.  
In the quest to explain spillover occurrence, different studies attempted to uncover other forms of 
spillovers aside intra-industry spillovers. One of such forms is Intra-regional spillovers, which is simply 
the observed impact of the presence of MNCs on domestic firms in the same region. There are two 
forms of inter-regional spillovers: spillovers that occur amongst firms in the same industry and region; 
and spillovers amongst firms in the same region but not in the same industry. Haskel (2007) and Mullen 
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and Williams (2007) examined the presence of intra-regional spillovers in the U.K. and U.S. respectively, 
both using the regional share of employment by foreign firms. The two studies found no evidence of 
spillovers.  
As the question of whether FDI spillovers exist became a global issue and as data for its investigation 
became more disaggregated, different studies searched for spillover occurrence in all possible existing 
forms. Of particular importance is the inclusion of inter-industry/regional analysis in spillover 
investigation. Thus the occurrence of spillovers was sought among suppliers of intermediate goods 
(backward spillovers), buyers of intermediate goods (forward spillovers). Different articles therefore 
combined different forms of spillovers in their model(s).Lopez-Cardova (2002) in addition to examining 
intra-industry spillovers, examined the presence of inter-industry spillovers (backward spillovers and 
forward spillovers). As in most cases, the study relied on input-output tables of Mexico to compute 
measures of vertical spillovers. Using data of 5,700 plants, Lopex-Cardova (2002) found contrasting 
results between intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers: Negative intra-industry spillovers, and 
positive forward and backward spillovers. More robust results for backward spillovers were found in 
Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2003). Using a large dataset of 38,926 firms in Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, and 
Brazil; their analysis found strong support for the existence of backward linkages.  
Harris and Robinson (2004) provided a comprehensive investigation of FDI spillovers, by examining intra-
industry, backward, forward, and regional spillovers in UK firms over the period 1974 to 1995. Using 
GMM estimation technique, their study found no evidence of spillovers in ether forms of spillovers. A 
similar study by Driffield et al. (2004) also explored the presence of spillovers within/across industries 
and regions in the UK, over the period 1984 to 1992. The major difference between Harris and Robinson 
(2004) and Driffield et al. (2004) is that while former was base on firm level data, the latter was based on 
industry-level data. Another difference is that the number of year observations in Harrison and Robinson 
(2004) more than double that of Driffield et al. (2004). However, the two studies are similar due to the 
fact that they both used the Office of National Statistics (ONS) as data source, and GMM technique of 
estimation. Despite these similarities, results of Driffield et al. (2004) largely differ from those of Harris 
and Robinson (2004), as the former reported no intra-industry spillovers, positive forward spillovers, and 
negative backward spillovers. 
Comprehensive investigations of spillover occurrence in African countries also exist in literature. Bwalya 
(2006) examined whether intra-industry or inter-industry spillovers occur in 145 firms in Zambia. The 
results of the analysis show evidence of both positive intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers, using 
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both fixed/random effects and GMM techniques. Similar positive results were obtained in Managi and 
Bwalya (2010), which involved the extension of the dataset, included manufacturing firms in Kenya and 
Tazania. 
 
Table 5.1 Studies on Spillover occurrence  
 
Author  Data Country Aggregate Dependent 
variable 
Estimation 
Technique 
Results 
Caves (1974) 87 manufacturing 
industries in Canada                                                           
23 manufacturing 
industries in Australia 
Canada 
and
Australia 
Industry Profit; Value 
added per 
employee   
OLS Positive intra-
industry 
spillovers in 
Australia                                                                               
Weak negative 
intra-industry 
spillovers in 
Canada 
Globerman (1979) Data sourced from the 
annual Census of 
Manufactures - sample 
of 4-digit Canadian 
manufacturing indistries 
Canada Industry Value added 
per employee 
OLS Positive intra-
industry 
spillovers 
Haddad and 
Harrison (1993) 
data on manufacturing 
firms, over the period 
1985-1989                                        
Morocco firm level  value added OLS No intra-
industry 
spillovers 
Chuang and Lin 
(1999) 
8,846 establishments 
for 1991                                  
Taiwan firm-level TFP model                                                                           -1st stage 
probit 
equation                                       
2nd stage 
OLS 
regression 
Positive intra-
industry 
spillovers                    
Positive R&D 
spillovers 
Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) 
3,955-6,044 firms btw 
1976-1989                
Venezuela firm-level  Output OLS                                                                             
WLS                                                                                   
within 
estimates -
fixed 
effects  
Negative intra-
industry 
spillovers 
Lopez-Cordova 
(2002) 
5,7000 plants, over 
1993-1999 in Mexico 
manufacturing                                             
Mexico plant level  Output  Olley and 
Pakes 
(1996) semi 
parametric 
estimation 
Negative intra-
industry 
spillovers                
Positive 
backward 
spillovers                             
Positive forward 
spillovers  
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Alfaro and 
Rodriguez-Clare 
(2003) 
Unbalanced panel of 
38,926 observations, 
1997 - 2000                                     
Chile, 
Mexico, 
Venezuela 
and Brazil 
firm-level  Output OLS Positive 
backward 
spillovers 
Khawar (2003) 2,362 firms in 20 
industries  
Mexico firm-level - Labour 
productivity 
OLS No spillovers 
Harris and 
Robinson (2004) 
Information on 14-
19,000 establishments 
in 20 industries over the 
period  1974-1995                                                                                   
UK plant level  Output  GMM No spillovers 
Ruane and Ugur 
(2004) 
4,600 companies (all 
companies), btw 1991-
1998               
unbalanced panel                                                         
Ireland plant level  Labour 
productivity - 
output/emp 
Fixed 
/Random  
No spillovers 
Ayanwale and 
Bamire (2004) 
Data on agro/agro-allied 
companies listed in the 
first tier market of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Commission and the 
CBN, 1987-1996, panel 
data 
Nigeria  firm level Output/wage OLS                                                                                   
Fixed 
Effects 
Positive intra-
industry 
spillovers 
Driffield et al. 
(2004) 
Industry and regional 
level data on 20 
manufacturing sectors 
in the UK, covering 
1984-1997                                                      
UK  Industry  Output  GMM 
estimator 
No intra-
industry 
spillovers                             
Positive forward 
spillovers                               
Negative 
backward 
spillovers 
Bwalya (2006) 145 firms for the period 
1993-1995                
Zambia firm level Output OLS                                                                              
Fixed/Rand
om Effects                                  
GMM                                                      
No intra-
industry 
spillovers                          
Positive
backward 
spillovers                             
Positive regional 
spillovers  
Haskel et al. (2007) Unbalanced panel data 
of 13,000-23,000 plants 
per year over the period 
1973-1992                                                          
UK firm level Output OLS                                                                              
IV  
Positive intra-
industry 
spillovers                     
No regional 
spillovers  
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Fan and Hu (2007) 998 Chinese firms from 
1998 to 2000, in 14 
economic sectors                         
China firm level Logistic value 
of R&D 
efforts;TFP 
model; Labour 
productivity 
model 
OLS                                                                             
Fixed 
Effects 
Positive R&D
spillovers 
Mullen and 
Williams (2007) 
312 observations for 
1997                               
U.S. firm level Value 
added/emp 
OLS No spillovers 
Yasar and Paul 
(2007) 
437 firms in Poland, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz 
Republic                                                                      
Poland, 
Moldova, 
Tajikistan, 
Uzbekista
n, and 
Kyrgyz 
Republic   
firm level TFP ; Labour 
productivty 
OLS Positive intra-
industry 
spillovers  
Bitzer and Kerekes 
(2008) 
10 manufacturing 
sectors in 17 OECD 
countries btw 1973-
2000 
OECD Industry Gross output  FGLS; fixed 
effects and 
a set of 
time 
dummies 
  
Managi and 
Bwalya (2010) 
727 manufacturing firms 
in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe, over the 
period 1993-1995                                       
Kenya, 
Tanzania 
and 
Zimbabwe 
firm level Output  GMM Positive intra-
industry 
spillovers                
Positive 
backward 
spillovers 
Jordaan (2010) unpublished data fro 
the 1994 Mexican 
manufacturing census - 
entire population                                   
Mexico industry 
level 
Labour 
productivity - 
output/emp                                       
OLS                                                                                
IV 
Positive intra-
industry 
spillovers 
Sun (2010) 144 sectors in  Chinese 
manufacturing in 2004                                         
Source: China Economic 
Census Yearbook 
China industry 
level
Output/TFP 
model 
OLS No spillovers 
Lileeva (2010) Balanced panel of 8,088 
Canadian-controlled 
plants, over the period 
1981-1997                                                                  
Canada  plant level  Labour 
productivity  
Fixed 
effects  
Negative intra-
industry 
spillovers            
No backward 
spillovers                                          
Positive forward 
spillovers  
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Waldkirch and 
Ofosu (2010) 
Comprehensive panel 
dataset of 200 firms , 
over the period 1992-
1996                                                                                   
Ghana firm level Value added; 
TFP; Labour 
priductivity - 
value added 
per worker 
OLS                                               
Levinsohn 
and Petrin 
(2003)                     
System 
GMM 
Negative intra-
industry 
spillovers (level 
effect)                                                                    
Positive intra-
industry 
spillovers 
(growth effect) 
Xu and Sheng 
(2011) 
unbalanced dataset of 
134,130-169,810 firms, 
over the period 2000-
2003                                                                   
China firm level Output model Levinsohn 
and Petrin 
(2003);                   
GMM  
Negative intra-
industry 
spillovers                 
Positive forward 
spillovers                                
Negative 
backward 
spillovers  
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5.2.2 Studies on determinants of Spillovers 
 
Spillovers and domestic firm characteristics  
Absorptive capacity 
The lack of consensus in empirical literature on spillovers has spurred the investigation of whether 
specific characteristics of domestic firms are necessary for spillovers to occur. One of such qualities is 
the absorptive capacity of domestic firms in particular industry or region. The most dominant proxy for 
absorptive capacity in literature is the expenditure/investment in R&D. Other measures include level of 
education of employees, the value of intangible assets in a firm etc. 
Kathuria (2000) and Kinoshita (2000) are amongst the early studies that found that investment in R&D 
by domestic firms was a necessary condition for spillovers to occur in their OLS estimations on India and 
Czech Republic respectively. Similar results of on complementarity of spillovers and R&D were obtained 
by Barrios and Strobl (2002) using fixed effects estimation on panel data of 2,100 firms in Spanish 
manufacturing firms. Sembenelli and Siotis (2008) also show that profitability of domestic firms is 
positively related to the intensity of R&D in the industry which enhances spillovers. Schoors and van der 
Tol (2002) showed that effect of absorptive capacity of domestic firms is directly related to the openness 
of the sector, using cross sections of Hungarian manufacturing firms in 1997 and 1998. Keller and Yeaple 
(2004), show that high-tech industries in the United States exclusively possess the capabilities to absorb 
spillovers from MNCs, while the opposite is the case for low-tech industries, thus a nonlinear 
relationship existed across industries. Identical results were found among high-tech industries in the UK 
using 7,516 firms between 1989 and 1999 in Girma (2005). Girma and Wakelin (2007) also show that the 
effect of absorptive capacity of UK domestic firms has a regional dimension. Similarly, Qi et al. (2009) 
found that variations in absorptive capacities of domestic firms across provinces in China can explain the 
regional differences in FDI spillovers.   
Further evidence of the positive impact of absorptive capacity on spillovers abounds in literature. Todo 
(2006), found that the size of R&D of domestic firms is directly associated with the extent of spillovers in 
Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 1995-2002. Bransletter (2006) also found that knowledge 
spillovers to and fro domestic firms in Japan are more robust through R&D facilities. Studies based on 
Chinese manufacturing all show evidence that absorptive capacity enhances spillovers. Blake et al. 
(2009) show that the R&D expenditure per capita in local Chinese firms boosts spillovers. Chen et al. 
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(2010) also show that strong absorptive capacity is required to benefit from FDI spillovers using industry 
level data on 195 industries in China, while Zhao and Zhang (2010) used level of human capital as a 
measure of absorptive capacity and showed its complementarity with positive spillovers, using firm level 
data on China.   
However, Castellani and Zanefi (2003) findings suggest that absorptive capacity of domestic firms do not 
affect spillovers, using a panel data set of 3,932 firms in France, Italy and Spain.  
 
Table 5.2 Effect of absorptive capacity on spillovers 
Author  Effect of absorptive capacity 
Kathuria (2000) Positive spillovers among Scientific subgroup that invest in R&D 
Kinoshita (2000) Positive spillovers only when domestic firms invest in R&D 
Barrios and Strobl (2002) Positive spillover only on forms with appropriate absorptive capacity 
Schoors and van der Tol (2002) Positive effect of absorptive capacity on spillovers in open sectors 
Castellani and Zanfei (2003) No effect of absorptive capacity on spillovers 
Keller and Yeaple (2004) Positive spillovers only in high-tech firms with appropriate absorptive capacity  
Girma (2005)  Positive spillovers only in high-tech firms with appropriate absorptive capacity  
Todo (2006)  The size of R&D of domestic firms enhances positive spillovers 
Branstetter (2006) Positive knowledge spillovers strongest through R&D 
Girma and Wakelin (2007) Positive effect of absorptive capacity has a regional dimension 
Sembenelli and Siotis (2008) Positive spillovers among R&D intensive industries 
Blake et al. (2009) Positive spillovers directly related to domestic firms R&D expenditure per capita 
Qi et al. (2009)  Absorptive capacities across provinces affect spillovers 
Zhao and Zhang (2010) Complementarity between human capital of domestic firms and spillover effects 
Chen et al. (2010)  Absorptive capacity required for spillover occurrence 
 
Technological gap  
The notion that technological gap between domestic firms and MNCs could affect spillovers, is related to 
the absorptive capacity hypothesis. But rather than assume that the absolute capacity of domestic firms 
to absorb spillovers as a determinant, the technological gap hypothesis compares the technological 
ability of domestic firms with that of MNCs. Empirical literature shows that both small and large 
technological gaps can affect spillovers in different directions. A widely held view is that the small 
technological gaps enhance positive spillovers. Thus this view supports the absorption hypothesis, as a 
small technology gap implies higher absorption capacity. Kokko et al. (1996) found positive and highly 
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significant effect of foreign presence on Uraguayan manufacturing firms with small technology gaps with 
MNCs, while no spillovers were observed among firms with large technology gaps, between 1998 and 
1990. Similarly, Girma and Wakeline (2000) found that technological spillovers from MNCs to Uk firms 
are easier when technology gaps are small. Dimelis (2005) also show that Greek firms with small 
technology gaps have larger positive spillovers from FDI, while firms with large technology gaps 
experience negative spillovers.  
In the same line of thought, some studies find that large technology gaps between domestic and foreign 
reduce positive spillovers or enhance negative spillovers. Takii (2005) found negative spillovers among 
Indonesian firms with large technology gaps, using panel data for the period 1990-1995. Similar results 
were obtained in Le and Pomfret (2011) where negative spillovers existed among Vietnamese firms with 
large technology gaps. In the same vein, Todo (2006) found that the extent of positive spillovers to 
Japanese firms is reduced among firms with large technology gaps. Blalock and Gertler (2008) also find 
that positive spillovers are diminished among Indonesian firms with large technology gaps. Their results 
are in line with Holstein (2010), where technological distance between foreign and domestic firms in 23 
countries results in reduced spillovers, and the emergence of negative spillovers (inverted U-shape 
relationship).  
However, the contrasting view that large technological gaps enhance positive spillovers exists in 
literature. The view is in line with the assertion by Findley (1978) that technologically deprived industries 
or regions are better positioned to benefit from positive spillovers from FDI. This notion is referred as 
“catching-up” hypothesis. Sjohlm (1999) found positive spillovers among Indonesian firms with large 
technology gaps. Castellani and Zanfei (2003) also found a positive relationship between technology 
gaps and extent of positive spillovers among firms in France, Italy and Spain. Peri and Urban (2006) 
showed positive and significant effect of large technology gaps on the extent of spillovers on 800 
German and Italian firms over the period 1993-1999.   
Some studies also find no effect of technology gaps on spillovers. Aslanoglu (2000) found no evidence of 
technology gap impact on the extent of spillovers in 500 Turkish firms. Similarly, Vahter (2011) also show 
that technology gaps have no effect on spillovers among Estonian manufacturing firms.  
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Table 5.3 Effect of technology gap on spillovers 
Author  Effect of technology gap  
Kokko et al. (1996) Small tech gaps enhance positive spillovers 
Sjoholm (1999) Large tech gaps enhance positive spillovers 
Aslanoglu (2000) No effect of tech gaps on spillovers 
Girma and Wakelin (2000) Small tech gaps enhance positive spillovers 
Castellani and Zanfei 
(2003) 
Large tech gaps enhance positive spillovers 
Takii (2005) Large tech gaps enhance negative spillovers 
Dimelis (2005) Small tech gaps enhance positive spillovers; Large tech gaps enhance negative 
spillovers 
Peri and Urban (2006) Large tech gaps enhance positive spillovers 
Todo (2006)  Large tech gaps diminish positive spillovers 
Jordaan (2008) Large tech gaps enhance positive spillovers 
Blalock and Gertler (2008) Large tech gaps diminish positive spillovers 
Nicolini and Resmini 
(2010) 
Small tech gaps diminish positive spillovers 
Holstein et al. (2010) Large tech gaps diminish positive spillovers 
Vahter (2010) No effect of tech gaps on spillovers 
Le and Pomfret (2011) Large tech gaps enhance negative spillovers 
Todo et al. (2011) Large tech gaps enhance positive spillovers 
 
Domestic firm orientation/sector 
The direction and extent of spillovers can be affected by the orientation of domestic firm operation, as 
well as the sector. This is linked to the absorptive capacity hypothesis, as the orientation in operation 
determines the ability of domestic firms to absorb spillovers. Wang and Hu (2007) found negative 
spillovers among labour-intensive industries in China, while technology-intensive industries experienced 
no spillover effect. This is in direct contrast to Fillat and Woerz (2011), where positive spillovers were 
obtained among labour and resource intensive firms in a sample of 35 countries. In the same vein, 
Nicolini and Resmini (2010) found positive spillovers in low-tech firms in an unbalanced panel of 50,000 
firms in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. This conflicts with the results of Le and Promfret (2011), where 
negative spillovers were obtained using Vietnamese data.  
Similar to the domestic firm orientation effect on spillovers, is the sector in domestic firms operate. 
Akulava and Vakhitova (2010) found positive horizontal spillovers among Ukrainian firms in the 
secondary sector; while no backward or forward spillovers were found in the same sector. No spillver 
effects were found in the primary and services sector.   
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Table 5.4 Effect of domestic firm orientation/sector on spillovers 
Author  Effect of dom. Firm orientation/sector 
Wang and Hu (2007)  Negative in labour-intensive industries; No spillovers in technology-intensive 
industries 
Nicolini and Resmini (2010) Positive spillovers in low-tech firms 
Akulava and Vakhitova (2010) Positive horizontal spillovers in secondary sector; No spillovers in primary and 
services sector 
Le and Pomfret (2011) Negative spillovers in low-tech industries 
Fillat and Woerz (2011) Positive spillovers in labour and resource intensive industries 
    
 Spillovers and MNC characteristics  
Ownership/Origin of MNC 
The search for an explanation for the varied empirical results of FDI spillover investigation has also led to 
a closer examination of the characteristics of MNCs that potentially transmit productivity spillovers. The 
degree of ownership of MNCs is deemed to influence the extent and/or direction of spillovers. Djankov 
and Hoekman (2000) obtained positive spillovers from joint ventures on Czech domestic firms. Similarly, 
Dimelis and Louri (2002) found that effect of foreign presence on low and medium productivity 
domestic Greek firms emanate from minority foreign owned firms. Javorcik (2004) found positive 
backward spillovers from partially owned MNCs in Lithuania, and no spillovers from fully owned foreign 
firms. Similar results of positive spillovers through backward linkages were obtained on Romanian firms 
in Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008). Dimelis and Louri (2004) show that positive spillovers from minority 
foreign owned firms are only observable among small domestic Greek firms.  
In the same line of thought, some studies show that majority of wholly owned foreign firms diminish 
positive spillovers or exude negative spillovers. Takii (2005) found that higher foreign ownership of 
MNCs reduce the extent of positive spillovers among Indonesian firms, while Khalifah and Adam (2009) 
showed that wholly foreign firms transmit negative spillovers to domestic Malaysian firms. However, in 
direct contrast, Sinani and Meyer (2004) show that the positive effects of spillovers on Estonian firms 
come from majority foreign owned firms. Early studies like Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) and Kinoshita 
(2000) found no effect of the degree of foreign ownership on domestic firms in Indonesia and Czech 
Republic respectively.  
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Table 5.5 Effect of MNC degree of ownership on spillovers  
Author  Effect of MNC degree of ownership 
Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) No effect of degree of ownership 
Djankov and Hoekman (2000) Positive spillover from joint ventures 
Kinoshita (2000) No effect of degree of ownership 
Dimelis and Louri (2002) Positive spillovers from minority y foreign owned MNCs to low and medium 
productivity domestic firms 
Javorcik (2004) Positive backward spillovers from partially owned foreign firms; No spillovers 
from fully foreign owned firms 
Sinani and Meyer (2004)  Positive spillovers from majority foreign owned firms  
Takii (2005) Majority foreign owned firms diminish positive spillovers  
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) Positive backward spillovers from partially owned foreign firms 
Khalifah and Adam (2009) Negative spillovers from wholly foreign owned firms 
 
Another hypothesis in literature is that the origin of MNCs affects the direction and extent of spillovers 
in domestic firms. The idea is related to that of technology gaps, as MNCs from different countries differ 
in technological levels and thus technology gaps with domestic firms will differ. Thus as level of 
technology gaps is deemed to have impact on spillovers, the origin of MNC which can affect technology 
gaps would be expected to have an indirect impact on spillovers. Girma and Wakelin (2000) found that 
FDI from Japan has the highest negative spillover effect on UK firms compared to the U.S and other 
countries. Similarly, Kosteas (2008) investigation on Mexican firms obtained relatively higher positive 
spillover effects of FDI from Canada than those form the US and the rest of the world. In studies based 
on China, Abraham et al. (2010) and Du et al. (2011) found that export driven FDI from Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan have no spillover effects on domestic firms. Furthermore, Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2010) found backward linkages from FDI from American Romanian supplying industries. Also, 
Monastiriotis and Alegria (2001) found that Greek MNCs provide lager positive spillovers on Bulgarian 
firms than those from other nationalities.   
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Table 5.6 Effect of MNC origin on spillovers 
Author  Effect of MNC origin 
Girma and Wakelin (2000) Highest negative spillover effect from Japanese MNC 
Kosteas (2008) Canadian MNCs provide higher positive spillover effects than US and the rest of 
the world 
Abraham et al. (2010) No spillovers from FDI from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan 
Du et al. (2011) No spillovers from FDI from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2010) 
Positve backward spillovers from American MNCs 
Monastiriotis and Alegria 
(2011) 
Positive spillovers from Greek MNCs 
 
MNC motivation/orientation 
Another determinant of spillovers is the motivation or orientation of MNCs prior to entry into the host 
country. This is also linked to the type of MNC, its industry, and its country of origin. Girma (2005) found 
positive spillovers among “Technology-sourcing” MNCs in the UK increases with the absorptive capacity 
of the sector. In direct contrast, Driffield et al. (2009) found the presence of “Technology-sourcing” 
MNCs results in negative spillovers, using industry level data of 13 countries. Furthermore, Li et al. 
(2001) found that “market-oreinted” MNCs results in positive spillovers, while “export-oriented” MNCs 
have no spillover effect. This is in contrast to the findings of Kokko et al. (2001) and Girma et al. (2008), 
where export-oriented MNCs generate positive spillovers in Uraguay and UK respectively.  
A similar argument is that the operational orientation of the MNC affects spillover effects. Sinani and 
Meyer (2004) found that labour-intensive MNCs generate larger spillovers in Estonia, than equity 
intensive MNCs. However, Gorg et al. (2006) found no spillover effect from labour intensive MNCs, but 
positive spillovers from capital and material intensive spillovers.  
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Table 5.7 Effect of MNC motivation/orientation on spillovers     
Author  Effect of MNC motivation/orientation 
Li et al. (2001) Positive spillovers from market-oriented MNCs; No spillovers from export oriented 
Kokko et al. (2001) Positive spillovers from export-oriented MNCs 
Girma (2005)  Positive spillovers from technology-sourcing MNCs 
Driffield et al. (2009) Negative spillovers from technology sourcing 
Sinani and Meyer (2004)  Positive spillovers from labour and sales intensive MNCs larger  than equity-intensive 
MNCs 
Gorg et al. (2006) No spillover effect from labour-intensive MNCs; Positive spillovers from capital and 
material intensive MNCS 
Girma et al. (2008)  Positive spillovers from export-oriented MNCs 
 
 
5.2.4 Spillovers and host-country characteristics 
 
Country-specific factors have been identified in empirical literature as important determinants of 
spillovers. Distribution of both domestic firms and MNCs differ across countries. Some countries have 
industries clustered in a particular zone. Such zones could be special economic or export zones marked 
out by the national governments to promote specific goals. The homogeneity or heterogeneity in the 
distribution of such zones across countries could explain the similarity or dissimilarity of the extent and 
direction of spillovers. Driffield et al. (2004) found that positive spillovers are stronger in “non-assisted” 
areas, i.e. regions in the UK that do not receive subsidies or grants from the government. This is similar 
to the findings by Girma and Wakelin (2000, 2007), that found that regions in the UK with Government 
assistance experience less positive spillovers from FDI. Abraham et al. (2010) also found similar results 
for Chinese firms, where positive spillovers occurred only in special economic zones that were 
purposefully created to attract FDI. 
The concentration of industries in a specific area or region can also enhance positive spillovers. De 
Propris and Driffield (2006) obtained positive spillover results among “cluster-areas” in the UK (regions 
geographically agglomerated with smes), while negative spillover results were obtained for “non-cluster-
areas”. This is similar to the findings by Mariotii et al. (2011), where industries that are “co-located” 
experienced stronger positive spillovers. A similar line of thought is the notion that the geographic 
distance between domestic firms and MNCs can affect the extent and direction of spillovers. Lu et al. 
(2009) found positive spillovers among domestic firms located close to MNCs in China, while negative 
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spillover results were obtained for those in remote areas. However, Vahter (2010) found no effect of 
geographical proximity of domestic and foreign firms on spillovers in Estonia.    
Table 5.7 Effect of regional characteristics on spillovers 
Author  Effect of regional characteristics 
Girma and Wakelin (2000) Positive spillovers are diminished in "assisted-areas" 
Driffield et al. (2004) Positive spillovers in "non-assisted" areas 
De Propris and Driffield (2006) Positive spillovers in cluster areas; Negative spillovers in non-cluster 
areas 
Girma and Wakelin (2007) Less positive spillovers among Government assisted zones 
Abraham et al. (2010) Positive spillovers only in special economic zones 
Mariotti et al. (2011) Positive spillovers through co-location 
Lu et al. (2009) Positive spillovers among nearby dom. Firms; Negative spillovers 
among remote dom. Firms 
Vahter (2010) No geographical proximity effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
Table 5.8 Studies and Spillover determinants 
Author  Data Country Aggregate Dependent 
variable 
Estimation Technique Effect on 
spillovers 
Kokko et al. 
(1996) 
289 plants in 
Uraguayan 
manufacturing 
sector , 1988-
1990                      
Uraguay plant level  Value 
added/emp 
model  
OLS Small tech gaps 
enhance positive 
spillovers 
Sjoholm 
(1999) 
24,468 
establishments 
for 1980 and 
1991                                                                  
Indonesia firm-level Value 
added/emp  
OLS  Large tech gaps 
enhance positive 
spillovers 
Blomstrom 
and Sjoholm 
(1999) 
16, 494 
establishments in 
329 industries at 
a 5-digit level for 
1991                                  
Indonesia firm-level vadded/emp  OLS No effect of 
degree of 
ownership 
Kathuria 
(2000) 
368 large-sized 
firms belonging to 
26 sectors for 14 
yrs - from 1975-
76 to 1988-89 
India firm-level Gross value 
added; 
Change in 
relative 
technical 
efficiency 
OLS  Positive spillovers 
among Scientific 
subgroup that 
invest in R&D 
Kinoshita 
(2000) 
1217 
observations, 
1995-1998 - 
Unpublished 
panel data                                                                                                                                        
Czech 
Republic 
firm-level value added  OLS Positive spillovers 
only when 
domestic firms 
invest in R&D; No 
effect of degree of 
ownership 
Kokko et al. 
(2001) 
 
1,243 private 
manufacturing 
firms in 74 four 
digit industries in 
1988                            
 
Uraguay 
 
firm-level 
 
Value 
added/emp 
 
OLS 
 
Positive spillovers 
from export-
oriented MNCs 
Aslanoglu 
(2000) 
500 firms in 28 
sectors in 1993                          
Turkey firm-level  Value 
added/emp 
OLS No effect of tech 
gaps on spillovers 
Girma and 
Wakelin 
(2000) 
firm level panel 
dataset of over 
3700 domestic 
fims in the UK 
manufacturing 
over the period 
1988-1996                                                                       
UK firm-level  Output 
model  
OLS Small tech gaps 
enhance positive 
spillovers; Highest 
negative spillover 
effect from 
Japanese MNC 
Djankov and 
Hoekman 
(2000) 
513 firms quoted 
on the Prague 
Stock exchange, 
1992 - 1996 
Czech 
Republic 
firm-level Gross 
Output  
OLS                                                                                      
Fixed/Random effects 
estimation 
Positive spillover
from joint 
ventures 
Li et al. 
(2001) 
191 sub-
manufacturing 
sectors in China                                                                                     
State Statistical 
Bureau of China, 
1997 
China Industry Value added 
per 
employee 
3 stage least squares 
;OLS - for comparison 
Positive spillovers 
from market-
oriented MNCs; 
No spillovers from 
export oriented 
Barrios and 
Strobl (2002) 
2,100 Spanish 
manufacturing 
Spain firm-level TFP                                                                      OLS                                          
Fixed Effects 
Positive spillover
only on forms with 
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firms for the 
period 1990-1998                                        
appropriate 
absorptive 
capacity 
Schoors and 
van der Tol 
(2002) 
1084 firms in 
1997 and 1998                           
Used as cross-
section of firms                                                     
Hungary firm-level Labour 
productivity 
- 
output/emp 
OLS                                                                                 
Treatment effects 
model 
Positive effect of
absorptive 
capacity on 
spillovers in open 
sectors 
Dimelis and 
Louri (2002) 
4,056 
manufacturing 
firms in Greece in 
1997                                                                                                              
Greece firm-level Labor 
productivity 
– output per 
worker 
OLS                                                                                  
Quantile regression  
Positive spillovers
from minory 
foreign owned 
MNCs to low and 
medium 
productivity 
domestic firms 
Castellani 
and Zanfei 
(2003) 
Panel data of 
3932 firms over 
the period 1992-
1997                                                     
France, 
Italy, and 
Spain  
firm level Output OLS                                                                               
Fixed Effects 
No effect of
absorptive 
capacity on 
spillovers; Large 
tech gaps enhance 
positive spillovers 
Keller and 
Yeaple 
(2004) 
1,115 US owned 
firms that were 
active 1987-1996 
U.S. firm level TFP Olley and Pakes (1996)                                            
OLS 
Positive spillovers
only in high-tech 
firms with 
appropriate 
absorptive 
capacity  
Javorcik 
(2004) 
1918-2711 firms 
btw 1996-2000                       
Source: 
Lithuanian 
Statistical Office 
Lithuania firm level Output OLS                                                                                                 
Olley and Pakes  (1996) 
semi-parametric 
estimation  
Positive backward
spillovers from 
partially owned 
foregn firms; No 
spillovers from 
fully foreign 
owned firms 
Sinani and 
Meyer 
(2004)  
294-434 firms, 
1994-1999                                                                 
Estonia firm level Output Fixed effects                                                               
Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) 
Positve spillovers
from majority 
foreign owned 
firms; Positive 
spillovers from 
labour and sales 
intensive MNCs 
larger  than 
equity-intensive 
MNCs  
Driffield et 
al. (2004) 
 
Industry and 
regional level 
data on 20 
manufacturing 
sectors in the UK, 
covering 1984-
1997                                                      
 
UK  
 
Industry 
 
Output 
 
GMM estimator 
 
Positive spillovers 
in "non-assisted" 
areas 
Girma (2005)  7,516 companies 
over the period 
1989 to 1999                                                                          
UK firm level  Output; TFP  GLS-AR(1) - 
Generalized Least 
Squares estimator with 
first-order 
autoregressive error  
Positive spillovers 
only in high-tech 
firms with 
appropriate 
absorptive 
capacity; Positve 
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spillovers from 
technology-
sourcing MNCs   
Takii (2005) sample of 
Indonesian firms, 
1990-1995                                                                
Indonesia firm level  Value 
added 
Fixed effects Large tech gaps 
enhance negative 
spillovers; 
Majority foreign 
owned firms 
diminish positive 
spillovers  
Dimelis 
(2005) 
2,589 firms, 1995-
1997                                           
Greece firm level Output  OLS  Small tech gaps 
enhance positive 
spillovers; Large 
tech gaps enhance 
negative spillovers 
Todo (2006)  Panel data of 
21,404 
observations of 
Japaneses 
manufacturing 
firms over the 
period 1995-2002                             
Japan firm level TFP  OLS                                                                              
Instrumental Variable 
(IV) estimation 
The size of R&D of
domestic firms 
enhances positive 
spillovers; Large 
tech gaps diminish 
positive spillovers 
Branstetter 
(2006) 
Unbalanced panel 
data set for 189 
Japanese firms 
for the years 
1980-1997                                                                                
Japan firm level Number of 
citations 
made by the 
U.S. patent 
applications 
of Japanese 
firm i in year 
t to 
indigenous 
U.S. patents 
Binomial fixed effects 
regressions 
Positive 
knowledge 
spillovers 
strongest through 
R&D 
Peri and 
Urban (2006) 
unbalanced panel 
of 800 manu firm, 
1993-1999                                                                    
Germany 
and Italy 
firm level TFP  OLS                                                                               
Fixed Effects                                                           
Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003)                      
Superlative index                                               
Efficiency frontier                                             
GMM                                 
Large tech gaps
enhance positive
spillovers 
Gorg et al. 
(2006) 
Panel data on 
Hungarian 
manufacturing 
firms for the 
period 1995-2001                     
Source: Officially 
reported balance 
sheet data  
Hungary firm level   OLS No spillover effect 
from labour-
intensive MNCs; 
Positive spillovers 
from capital and 
material intensive 
MNCS 
De Propris 
and Driffield 
(2006) 
 
23 manufacturing 
sectors, 11 
standard planning 
regions covering 
1993-1998                                 
 
Uk 
 
Industry 
 
Value added 
 
GMM estimator 
 
Positive spillovers 
in cluster areas; 
Negative spillovers 
in non-cluster 
areas 
Girma and 
Wakelin 
(2007) 
Unbalanced panel 
of 2,773 
establishments 
over the period 
1980-1992                                                                     
UK firm level Output; TFP  Olley and Pakes (1996)  
method                                         
OLS                                                                                          
Fixed Effects                                                                
GMM 
Positve effect of 
absorptive 
capacity has a
regonal dimension
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Wang and 
Hu (2007)  
196 three-digit 
sectors                          
Source - annual 
report of China 
for 2001, 
complied by the 
State Statistical 
Bureau 
China Industry - 
prefered 
bcos 
spillovers are 
cmmonly 
hypothesize
d to fall 
along 
industry or 
regional 
lines 
Sales                  OLS Negative in 
labour-intensive 
industries; No 
spillovers in 
technology-
intensive 
industries 
Sembenelli 
and Siotis 
(2008) 
29,318 
observations, 
unbalanced 
panel, varying 
each year btw 
1983 and 1996                                                                        
Spain firm-level Profitability GMM Positive spillovers 
among R&D 
intensive 
industries 
Jordaan 
(2008) 
aggregate plant 
level observations 
to the detailed 6-
digit industry                      
Mexico firm level  labour 
productivity  
OLS Large tech gaps 
enhance positive 
spillovers 
Blalock and 
Gertler 
(2008) 
Unbalanced panel 
of 15,800 firms 
over the period 
1988-1996                                 
Indonesia firm level  Output  Fixed Effects                                                             
Olley-Pakes estimation 
Large tech gaps
diminish positive 
spillovers 
Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 
(2008) 
13,129 firms in 48 
industries btw 
1998-2003                                                                           
Romania firm level Cobb-
Douglas  p.f. 
- TFP model  
OLS                                                                               
Levinsohn-Petrin 
approach 
Positive backward
spillovers from 
partially owned 
foregn firms 
Kosteas 
(2008) 
3218 Mexican 
manufacturing 
plants from 1984-
1990 - ownership 
information is 
only available for 
1990 
Mexico plant level  value of 
production 
Olley-Pakes estimator 
(well explained) 
Canadian MNCs 
provide higher 
positive spillover 
effects than US 
and the rest of the 
world 
Girma et al. 
(2008) 
 
Unbalanced panel 
of 4,600 firms 
over the period 
1992-1999                              
 
U.K. 
 
firm level 
 
Output; TFP  
 
Olley and Pakes (1996) 
method - for calculating 
TFP measure 
 
Positive spillovers 
from export-
oriented MNCs 
Blake et al. 
(2009) 
998 Chinese firms 
in 5 
manufacturing 
industries in 2000 
- cross section                                                               
China firm level Value 
added; TFP  
OLS Positive spillovers 
directly related to 
domestic firms 
R&D expenditure 
per capita 
Qi et al. 
(2009)  
panel data of 
domstic industrial 
enterprises in 30 
provinces in 
China                                                    
China firm level Malmquist 
productivity 
TFP index 
Fixed Effects                                                             
Random Effects  
Absorptive
capacities across 
provinces affect 
spillovers 
Khalifah and 
Adam (2009) 
Panel dataset of 
20,455 
establishments 
over the period 
2000-2004                                                                      
Malaysia firm level labour 
productivity 
- value 
added/emp 
OLS                                                                                
Fixed Effects/Random 
Effects  
Negative spillovers
from wholly 
foreign owned 
firms 
Driffield et 
al. (2009) 
Panel of 13 
countries, 11 
UK Industry TFP GMM estimator Negative spillovers 
from technology 
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manufacturing 
sectors and 10 
years                                                                     
Sourced from 
ONS and OECD 
data 
sourcing 
Lu et al. 
(2009) 
 
162,000-270,000 
firms over the 
1998-2005                                                                    
 
China 
 
firm level 
 
Output  
 
OLS                                                                              
Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) 
 
Positive spillovers
among nearby 
dom. Firms; 
Negative spillovers 
among remote 
dom. Firms 
 
Zhao and 
Zhang (2010) 
panel data of 39 
industrial sectors, 
over the period 
2001-2006                            
China industry 
level 
Value added OLS Complementarity 
between human 
capital of 
domestic firms 
and spillover 
effects 
Chen et al. 
(2010)  
panel data of 195  
four digit 
industries, over 
the period 2000-
2005                                                                               
China industry 
level 
Value added 
per 
employee 
Fixed Effects                                                        
FEVD - estimated by 
bootstrapping                                               
Seeming unrelated 
regression system 
(SUR) 
Absorptive
capacity required 
for spillover 
occurrence 
Nicolini and 
Resmini 
(2010) 
unbalanced panel 
of 50,000 
manufacturing 
firms operating in 
3 transition 
countries: 
Bulagaria, Poland, 
and Romania; 
over the period 
1998-2003 
Bulagaria, 
Poland, 
and 
Romania 
firm level Output ; TFP  OLS                                                                   
Olley and Pakes (1996)                                             
Small tech gaps 
diminish positive
spillovers; Positve 
spillovers in low-
tech firms 
Holstein et 
al. (2010) 
cross-sectional 
data from 6.7 
million firms, 
from 211 
goegraphic 
regions, within 23 
countries                                                                      
23 
counries 
firm level Value added  GLS Large tech gaps 
diminish positive 
spillovers 
Vahter 
(2010) 
Two surveys; 
1,185 and 1,264 
dom owned firms 
in Estonian 
manufacturing  
over the period 
1998-2000 and 
2002-2004 
respectively 
Estonia firm level TFP; labour 
productivity 
2SLS- IV                                                                       
Fixed Effects                                                         
TFP is estimated with 
Levinsohn-Petrin 
(2003) method  
No effect of tech 
gaps on spillovers 
Abraham et 
al. (2010) 
unbalanced panel 
of 23,613 firms 
over the period 
2002 and 2004                      
China firm level output/TFP 
model 
Olley and Pakes (1996)                                            
OLS                                                                            
Fixed Effects  
No spillovers from
FDI from Hong
Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan 
Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 
(2010) 
45,864 firm-year 
observations, 
over the period 
Romania firm level TFP model semiparametric 
approach suggedsted 
by Ackerberg, Caves 
Positve backward 
spillovers from 
American MNCs 
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1998-2003                                           and Frazer (2006) built 
on the work Olley and 
Pakes (1996) and 
Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) 
Akulava and 
Vakhitova 
(2010) 
unbalanced panel 
of 10,046-15,724 
firms, over the 
period 2001-2007              
Source: Ukranian 
Statistical 
Committee 
Ukrain firm level Output  Pooled OLS                                                          
Fixed/Random Effects  
Positive horizontal
spillovers in 
secondary sector; 
No spillovers in 
primary and 
services sector 
Le and 
Pomfret 
(2011) 
unbalanced panel 
of 8,601 firms, 
over the period 
2000-2004 
Vietnam firm level Labour 
productivity 
- gross 
output to 
total 
employees  
OLS Large tech gaps 
enhance negative 
spillovers; 
Majority foreign 
owned firms 
diminish positive 
spillovers;Negativ
e spillovers in low-
tech industries  
Todo et al. 
(2011) 
panel data on 
Chinese firms, 
over the period 
2000-2003                                      
China firm level Value added  GMM Large tech gaps 
enhance positive 
spillovers 
Du et al. 
(2011) 
162,033-336,768 
firms, over the 
period 1998-2007                                                 
China firm level output 
model  
OLS                                                                             
Fixed Effects                                                                 
Olley and Pakes (1996) 
method  
No spillovers from
FDI from Hong
Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan 
Monastirioti
s and Alegria 
(2011) 
around 14,000 
firms for the 
period 2002-2005                                                                 
Bulgaria firm level output (total 
sales)  
OLS                                                                                 
Fixed Effects                                                           
IV-FE 
Positive spillovers
from Greek MNCs 
Fillat and 
Woerz 
(2011) 
highly unbalanced 
data of 8 
industries in 28-
35 countries, over 
the period 1987-
2000                                     
Source: UNIDO 
Statistics 
database; OECD 
International 
Direct Investment 
database; ….etc 
35 
countries 
industry 
level 
labour 
productivity 
- gross 
output per 
employee  
GLS                                                                            
System-GMM 
Positive spillovers
in labour and 
resource intensive 
industries 
Mariotti et 
al. (2011) 
 
panel of 76,507 
manufacturing 
firms in 23 
industries, over 
the period 1999-
2005 
 
Italy 
 
firm level 
 
TFP  
 
Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003)                    Fixed 
Effects                   
 
Positove spillovers 
through co-
location 
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5.3. Review of empirical literature on impact of foreign presence on domestic banks 
 
5.3.1 Dealership models 
 
The underpinnings of the empirical investigation of foreign bank entry are based on theoretical models 
of bank performance introduced in the eighties, known as dealership models. The models assume that a 
bank is a “risk averse dealer” facing the risk of time asymmetry for the demand for loans and the supply 
of deposits (Angbazo, 1997). This section highlights the various versions of the dealership model from 
the pioneer work by Ho and Saunders (1981), to the extensions carried out by Allen (1988), Angbbazo 
(1997), and Maudos and Guevara (2004). This study also shows that most empirical work on the impact 
of foreign presence/entry on bank performance employ different forms of augmented dealership 
models.  
The dealership model assumes a bank as a risk-averse “dealer” in the credit market faced with the 
uncertainty that results from the non-synchronous nature of demand for loans and supply of deposits 
(Ho and Saunders, 1981). This non-synchronous characteristic of loans and deposits is as a result of 
differences in maturity times and sensitivity to interest rates. In other to offset the costs of the 
uncertainty, banks demand a premium to provide on-time loan and deposit services. This premium for 
the service is evident as interest margins or spreads. Ho and Saunders (1981) provided the first 
comprehensive analysis of the determinants of interest margins using the dealership model. A key 
assumption of the model is that loans and deposits are homogenous. 
In their model, they show that a bank is assumed to have three components in their wealth portfolio, W: 
W = Y + I + C                                                 (1) 
Where Y is the base wealth; I is the difference between the value of loans and deposits, called the net 
credit inventory; C is net cash or money market position, defined as the difference between money 
market loans and borrowings. Equation (1) can be specified in terms of their expected returns: 
W= (1+  )                                           (2) 
I = (1+  )                                                            (3) 
C = (I+r)                               (4) 
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where   ,   , and r represent expected returns on wealth, Inventory and net cash respectively. Wealth 
and Inventory consist of random variables that affect the rates of return    and   . The bank is assumed 
to be a passive dealer, capable of altering prices which affect the demand for loans and deposits. Thus     
  = p – b;   = p +a;   -   = a + b = s                                                                                                                     (5) 
Where   and   denote prices of deposits and loans which are set constant for the period in question, p 
is the bank’s conjecture of the actual price of loan or deposit; a and b are the fees for the on-time 
services delivered by the bank. The loan and deposit prices   and   are negatively related to rates, but 
positively related to the fees (a and b) which are manipulated to determine the interest spread (a + b). 
By manipulating the fees, the bank can control the demand for loans and deposits in such a manner that 
the transaction risk created by the stochastic nature of loans and deposits can be mitigated by these 
fees or spreads. By specifying the expected utility of wealth by the bank, Ho and Saunders (1981) show 
that bank spreads depend on the extent of managerial risk aversion, size of transactions undertaken by 
bank, structure of bank market, and the variability of interest rates. The empirical application by Ho and 
Saunders (1981) involved accounting for market imperfections which consists of implicit interest on 
deposits (IR), opportunity cost of holding reserve requirements (OR), and default risk on loans (DP). 
   =   +       +       +       +                                                                                                                       (6) 
Where     is the pure spread which exists due to transaction uncertainty. Ho and Saunders (1981) 
measured (1) with the following accounting variables:  M is measured as interest income – interest 
expense/total assets; IR is the total noninterest expense – total noninterest revenue/total earning 
assets; OR is the total noninterest bearing reserve assets/total earning assets; and DP is the net loan 
charge-offs/ total earning assets. 
The major difference between the Ho-Saunders version of the dealership model and that of Allen (1988) 
was the relaxation of the assumption of homogenous loans and deposits to account for cross-elasticities 
that may exist between bank products. Allen’s model considers two kinds of loans: m and n which the 
bank can manipulate the spreads such that a rise in demand for one type of loan implies the fall in 
demand for the other, thus substitution effect exists. Its main contribution was therefore to show that 
the when cross elasticities of demand between bank products are accounted for, pure interest spreads 
are likely to reduce.   
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Angbazo (1997) approach towards the dealership model was to extend the Ho-Saunders model and 
incorporate loan default risk and interest rate risk. Thus the model accounts for risk neutral spread 
which is directly related to monopoly power, pure default risk, money market interest rate volatility, and 
the interaction of default risk with interest rate volatility. Empirical specification of the Angbazo model 
involves specifying net interest margins (NIM) as a function of the pure spread    
 (.), bank specific 
variables    which are deemed to affect NIM, and an error term   . Thus  
NIM = F (   
 (.),   ,    )                                                                                                                                               (7) 
From (7), NIM can be expressed as a function of default risk, interest rate risk, Default *Interest risk, 
liquidity risk, capital base, implicit payments, noninterest earning reserves, management, branching. 
Default risk can be measured as net charge offs; interest rate risk exposure can be measured as (Net fed 
funds sold + Trading account securities + Securities maturing in less than one year + Customers liabilities 
to bank due to outstanding acceptances) – (Domestic and foreign deposits + Other borrowed money + 
bank liabilities on customers’ acceptances outstanding); Liquid risk can be measured as ratio of liquid 
assets to liabilities; capital base can be measured as core capital/total assets (risk of solvency); Implicit 
interest payments can be measured as non-interest expense – non-interest revenue/ average earning 
assets; Non interest bearing reserves can be measured as non-interest bearing assets/average earning 
assets; Management quality can be measured as the ratio of earning assets to total assets.     
Further extension of the Ho-Saunders model was undertaken in Maudos and Guevara (2004). The major 
contribution of the Maudos-Guevara model was the inclusion of operating costs as a determinant of 
interest margins. Their model was developed from the criticism of the Ho-Saunders model by Lerner 
(1981) which argued that intermediation process carried out by banks involve operating costs. These 
cost are related to deposits and loans, and thus the net credit inventory can be expressed as a function 
of thesis costs: C(I) = C(L) + C(D).Their model shows that these operating costs are positively related with 
margins. The theoretical determinants of interest margin according to the Modus and Guevara (2004) 
model therefore accounts for competitive structure of markets (elasticity of demand for loans and 
supply of deposits), operating costs, risk aversion, money market interest rate volatility, credit risk, 
interaction between interest rate risk and credit risk, average size of credit and deposit operations, 
payment of implicit interest, opportunity cost of keeping reserves, and the quality of management 
Empirical modeling of the impact of foreign presence on bank performance in literature typically 
involves the augmentation foreign bank presence measures as a determinant of margins in dealership 
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models (Poghosyan, 2010). However, analysis on the impact of foreign entry on bank performance goes 
beyond the use net interest margin/spread as an indicator of performance, to include other 
performance measures such as return on assets (ROA), Before-tax profits, Non-interest income, 
overhead costs, among others. 
 
Unlike the case of FDI spillovers in the manufacturing sector, empirical investigation of the impact of 
foreign presence on domestic banks is limited in amount of literature available. The investigation 
typically involves the augmentation of bank performance models to include a measure of foreign 
presence. In general, evaluating the performance of banks has been focused on specific aspects. These 
include: earnings, efficiency, risk-taking, and leverage (ECB, 2010).However empirical literature on bank 
performance show that the choice of accounting measures for these aspects differ according to the 
nature of investigation carried out. Thus despite the abundance of different accounting measures of 
bank performance, the empirical model employed depend on the sought of enquiry being made. 
Literature on the impact of foreign entry/presence on bank performance focuses on measures of 
profitability, income, and costs. Thus the following accounting identity derived from a bank’s Income 
Statement is widely used13 : 
Before Tax Profits/Total assets = (Net Interest Margin + Non-interest income – Overheads – Loan Loss 
provisioning)/Total assets     
 
 Narrowing down the investigation of the effect of foreign presence on domestic banks is a relatively 
new direction of research (Okuda and Rungsomboon, 2007; Naaborg, 2007). This section therefore 
reviews literature on the effect of foreign entry on different measures of bank performance by 
examining the findings of different empirical studies  
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Demirguc-Kunt and Hinga (1999) and Claessens et al. (2001) are among the notable studies that are based on the 
accounting identity.  
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5.3.2. Foreign presence and profitability 
 
Three measures of profitability dominate empirical literature on bank performance: Net interest 
margins (NIM), Before-tax profits (BTP), and Return on Assets (ROA). According to Aiber (1984), foreign 
banks can offer lower interest rates on loans and higher rates on deposits in an attempt to compete 
with domestic banks. This could lead to a general decline in interest income as domestic banks struggle 
to maintain the size of their loan portfolio, and a rise in interest expense as domestic banks try to attract 
new customers (Unite and Sullivan, 2003). Terrel, 1986; Bhattacharaya, 1993; Claessens et al. 2001; 
Cardenas, et al., 2003; Hermes and Lensink, 2004; Giannetti and Ongena, 2005 are notable studies that 
found that the entry of foreign banks is lead to a reduction in interest rate spreads/margins in host 
countries. However, Okuda and Rungsomboon (2007) show that the fall in interest spreads is 
experienced in the short run in Thailand. In the long run, domestic banks are likely to improve 
operational efficiency and develop new sources of funds which will result in an increase in spreads. 
Similarly, the general notion is that competition brought about by foreign presence leads to a reduction 
in profits due to some loss in market share to foreign banks (Terrel, 1986; Caprio, et al., 2001; Cardenas 
et al. 2003; Hermes and Lensink, 2004; Giannetti and Ongena, 2005; Uiboupin, 2005). Competition 
drives domestic banks to seek other means of revenue other than tradition banking methods (Unite and 
Sullivan, 2003). Bhattacharaya (1993) points out that the fall in profits would arise from the convergence 
of prices towards marginal costs as a result of increased competition. However, Okuda and 
Rungsomboon (2007) show that in the long run, domestic banks would find alternative sources of 
revenue and undergo efficiency improvements which results in a rise in profits in Thailand banking 
industry. Lensink and Hermes (2004) found that the effect of foreign entry on domestic banks is 
ambiguous, since both costs and margins increase simultaneously in their cross-country study of 48 
countries. 
Studies using ROA as a measure of profitability show rather contrasting results. Shen et al. (2009) found 
a positive relationship between foreign presence and ROA among 48 banks in China, while Wu et al. 
(2007) found no effect of foreign presence on ROA of 14 Chinese banks.    
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 5.3.3. Foreign presence and overhead costs 
 
Foreign presence is viewed as medium of promoting efficiency which would lead to fall in operating 
expenses (Bhattacharaya, 1993; Berger and Hannan, 1998; Claessens et al. 2001; Hermes and Lensink, 
2004). The entry of foreign banks is expected to put pressure on domestic banks which may be engaged 
in outdated or inefficient practices, making them improve/update their operational and managerial 
structures in order to remain competitive in the industry (Claessens et al. 2001; Unite and Sullivan, 2003;  
Hermes and Lensink, 2004). This is based on the assumption that foreign banks are more efficient in 
providing financial services than the domestic banks in the host country. However, empirical literature 
does not fully support the inverse association between foreign presence and bank overhead costs. 
Claessens et al., (2001) and Unite and Sullivan, (2003); and found negative significant effects of foreign 
presence on costs, while Liuhto et al. (2006) and Okuda and Rungsomboon (2007) found both negative 
and positive effects  
Okuda and Rungsomboon (2007) argue that the decreases in operational costs of domestic banks are 
only experienced in the long term, but in the short term, a rise in operational costs will be the case as 
they would have to invest funds to achieve increased efficiency. Liuhto et al. (2006) found that foreign 
entry reduces overheads of domestic banks in advanced countries and the opposite is the case for 
developing countries, using a data set of 10 countries. Similarliy, Lensink and Hermes (2004), using a 
larger data set of 48 countries, found that a negative effect of foreign presence amongst banks in 
developing countries and no effect amongst developed countries. However, Xu (2011) found overall 
positive effect of foreign presence on overhead costs in 144 banks in China, over the period 1999-2006.  
5.3.4. Foreign presence and risks 
 
Bank risks typically involve risks associated with its basic business of lending and borrowing (Santomero, 
1997). The general notion in banking literature is that increased competition in banking results in higher 
risk taking (Keely, 1990; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998; Boyd and Nicolo, 2005; Dick, 2006). It is therefore 
expected that foreign presence which increases competition would result in greater risk exposure, 
especially in the short run (Claessens et al. 2001; Unite and Sullivan, 2003). The greater risk exposure is 
triggered by consequences of competition such as falling profit margins (Bhattacharaya, 1993; Unite and 
Sullivan, 2003) and the motivation of domestic banks to issue loans to relatively less creditworthy 
customers (Claessens, et al., 2001). In empirical literature, the most common measure of bank risk is 
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loan loss provisions. Loan loss provisions are non-cash expenses set aside for loan defaults or bad debts. 
Relative to the association of foreign presence with other measures of performance, the effect on loan 
loss provisions show some fair level of consistency in the results. Unite and Sullivan (2003) and Lensink 
and Hermes (2004) show positive relationship between foreign presence and loan loss provisions. 
However, Classens et al. (2001) and Luihto et al. (2006) found insignificant effects of loan loss provisions 
in their regressions. 
In general, the common ground held in literature on foreign presence is the foreign bank entry or 
foreign presence brings about competition which could affect bank performance in different ways. 
While the direction of effect of each performance indicator variable is not clear cut, different views on 
for each direction of effect exist. Thus the question of how foreign presence is expected to affect each 
bank performance variable is an empirical question.  
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Table 5.9 Studies on the effect of foreign presence on bank performance 
Author  Data Country Aggregate Dependent 
variable(s) 
Estimation 
Technique 
Effect of foreign 
presence 
Claessens et al. (2001) 7,900 commercial 
bank observations 
in 80 countries 
over the period 
1988-1995                                   
80 
countries 
bank level Net interest 
margins/ta;                             
before tax; 
profits/ta;                                 
Non-interest 
earning assets/ta;         
Overhead/ta;                                               
Loan loss 
provisioning/ta 
Weighted least 
squares 
No effect on NIM; 
Negative effect on 
BTP; Negative 
effect on NII; 
Negative effect on 
Overhead costs; 
No effect on loan 
loss provisions 
Unite and Sullivan (2003) Sample of all 
domestic and 
foreign banks 
over the period 
1990-1998            
Philippines  bank level Interest rate 
spreads;                     
Accounting 
profitability;                  
Non-interest 
income;                               
Operating 
expenses;                                 
Risk 
GMM                                                                      
Fixed Effects 
Negative effect on
spreads; Negative 
effect on profits; 
Negative effect on 
NII; Negative effect 
on operating 
expenses; Positive 
effect on risk 
Lensink and Hermes 
(2004) 
Bank level data 
for 48 countries 
for the period 
1990-1996 
48 
countries  
bank level Net interest rate 
margin/ta;            
Before tax 
profits/ta;                               
Overhead cost/ta;                                       
Loan loss 
provisioning/ta 
Threshold 
estimation 
technique 
Positive effect on 
NII; Positive effect 
on NIM; Positive 
effect on BTP; 
Positive effect on 
overheads; Positive 
effect on loan loss 
provisions. But 
when interacted 
with GDP: Negtive 
effect on NIM; 
Negative effect on 
NII; Positive effect 
on loan loss 
provisions; Profit 
and overheads 
become 
insignificant 
Liuhto et al. (2006) 319 banks over 
the period 1995-
2001 in 10 
countries: 
Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lativa, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, and 
Slovania               
Source: 
Bankscope; 
National Central 
banks 
10 
countries 
bank level Income of banks - 
Net interest 
margin; Non-
interest income to 
total assets;                                            
Profitability of 
banks - Before tax 
profits to total 
assets                   
Bank costs - 
Overhead costs to 
total assets; Loan 
loss provisions to 
total assets 
Arellano-Bond 
linear dynamic 
panel data 
estimation                                
Fixed effects                                                   
OLS 
Negative effect on 
NIM, No effect on 
NII; No effect on 
BTP; Positive effect 
on overheads; No
effect on loan loss 
provisions. But 
when interacted 
with GDP: Positive 
effect on NIM; 
Negative effect on 
NII; Negative effect 
on BTP; Negative 
effect overheads; 
No effect on loan 
loss provisions  
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Okuda and 
Rungsomboon (2007) 
panel data on 17 
domestic and 4 
foreign banks in 
Thailand, over the 
period 1990-2002                                                     
Thailand bank level Non interest 
expenses;                             
Earnings before 
tax/ta;                              
Diff btw interest 
earning ratio and 
the interest 
expense ratio 
OLS Positive effect on 
overheads; 
Negative effect on 
BTP; Positive effect 
on spreads 
Wu et al. (2007) Panel data of 14 
Chinese banks, 
over the period 
1996-2004                        
China bank level Return on Assets Fixed/Random 
Effects  
No effect on ROA 
Naaborg (2007) 244 banks in CEE 
countries                                                                       
CEE bank level Net interest 
revenues                            
Overhead costs                                        
Profit before taxes 
SUR, OLS Negative effect on 
BTP 
Shen et al. (2009) Unbalanced panel 
data of 48 Chinese 
banks, over the 
period 1997-2007                                                                  
China bank level Return on Assets                                        
Net interest ratio                                      
Net interest 
margin (NIM)                    
Cost to income 
ratio 
Least square
dummy variable
method (LSDV) 
Positve effect on 
ROA; No effect on 
NII; Positve effect 
on NIM; No effect 
on Cost to income 
ratio 
Poghosyan (2010) Unbalanced data 
on 11 Central and 
Eastern countries 
(CEECs), over the 
period 1995-2006                                             
11 Central 
and Eastern 
countries 
(CEECs)  
bank level Interest rate 
margins  
Fixed Effects No effect on NIM 
Xu (2011) 114 Chinese 
banks over the 
period 1999-2006 
China bank level Net interest 
margins                               
Noninterest 
incomes                            
Costs                                                                 
Loan loss 
provisions                                 
Profits  
Arellano-Bond 
linear dynamic 
panel data 
estimation                    
GMM 
Positive effect on 
NIM; Positive 
effect on NII, 
Positive effect on 
costs 
Lin (2011) 1085 non-
financial publicly-
traded firms with 
non-missing 
values of total 
assets and sales, 
listed on Shanghai 
or Shenzhen stock 
exchange during 
2001-2005 
China firm level Outcome variable - 
long-term bank 
loans in year t 
scaled by total 
assets 
OLS No effect on long-
term loans 
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5.4. A comparison of literature on FDI spillovers in manufacturing and foreign bank 
entry effects 
 
Despite the similarities in the theories of the effect of FDI on domestic manufacturing firms and banks 
highlighted in Chapter 4, their respective empirical literatures are quite different in many aspects. An 
obvious point is the dominance of literature on FDI spillovers in manufacturing industries relative to 
foreign bank entry effect studies. While FDI in manufacturing has been a focus of empirical analysis since 
the 70s, that of the banking industry is quite recent, with the most comprehensive paper being 
Claessens et al. (2001). Also, as expected from an extensively researched area, there has been 
considerable variation and ingenuity in modeling FDI spillover in manufacturing, as opposed to the 
rather homogenous foreign bank entry effect models in literature. 
Empirical literature on both FDI in manufacturing and banks are based on the augmentation of 
performance or productivity models dominant in research on the sector. Thus research on FDI spillovers 
in manufacturing make use of different versions of augmented Cobb-Douglas production function 
models, while foreign bank entry effect literature deals with versions on dealership models. Measure of 
productivity dominant in FDI spillover in manufacturing literature include output, value added, and total 
factor productivity; while that of banking employs indicators of performance which include Net interest 
margin (NIM), Before tax profits (BTP), Return on Assets (ROA), Net interest income (NII), Overheads, 
and loan loss provisions. Thus unlike the manufacturing sector studies where performance is captured 
by measures that indicate the returns from the use of inputs, banking performance models extend 
performance measures to indicators of costs (Overheads) and risks (loan loss provisions). In terms of 
measures of foreign presence, the dominant measure in manufacturing firm literature is the foreign 
share of employment in each sub-industry. But banking data on this area of research are not usually 
categorized into different operational types. Thus the different types of banks such as investment banks 
and mortgage banks are considered to be in the same category. The bundled nature of banking data 
creates difficulty in measuring foreign presence in the bank performance models, as variation in the 
variable would be limited to year observations. Thus foreign presence in dealership models is usually 
measured as the share of foreign firms in a particular year.  
In terms of ability of models to explain variations in performance or productivity, Augmented Cobb-
Douglas models seem to fit the data on manufacturing firms more than dealership models fit banking 
data. The former seem to be well defined and established, in the sense that explanatory variables such 
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as capital and labour are usually present in the empirical model. However, the latter seems to be 
plagued with inconsistencies, as similar explanatory variables are used to explain different measures of 
bank performance. In some cases, some variables function as explanatory variables in one model, and 
dependent variable in another model. An example in the variable Overheads, used as a regressor for 
Before-tax Profits, but also functions as dependent variable in measuring efficiency of banks.   
Figure 5.1 shows that studies on FDI on manufacturing firms differ from that of banks in some aspects. 
They both involve the augmentation of models of performance or productivity in their respective 
sectors, but their specifications differ significantly. In general, there is a lack of consensus in literature on 
the impact of FDI in either manufacturing firm or banks. Results from their empirical investigations show 
no clear pattern or convergence in direction of FDI effects on both sectors. 
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Figure 5.1 Comparing empirical literatures on FDI spillovers in manufacturing with foreign bank entry 
effects 
 
Manufacturing sector – 
empirical investigation of FDI spillover 
Banking sector – empirical 
investigation of foreign bank entry 
effects 
Limited literature – relatively new 
direction of research  
Enormous literature – 
extensively researched  
Size of literature 
Augmented Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
Augmented Dealership model 
Type of model 
Output; Value added; Total 
factor productivity (TFP) 
Net interest Income (NIM); Before-
tax profits (BTP); Non-interest income 
(NII); Overheads; Loan loss provisions 
Both models are based on measurable indicators of performance/productivity 
Measures of performance /productivity 
Models are well defined and 
established – high explanatory power; 
some consistency in explanatory 
variable – capital and labour always 
present  
Models are rather vague – low 
explanatory power; inconsistent 
explanatory variables often used - 
the same explanatory variables are 
often used for different dependent 
variables 
Commonly computed as foreign 
share of labour in industry 
Commonly computed as share of 
foreign banks in a country in a 
particular year 
Measures of foreign presence 
Observations/Comments of models 
Lack of consensus on the effect of foreign presence on domestic firm 
productivity/performance in both sectors 
Results of empirical investigation 
Basic description of models 
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5.5. Problems with empirical investigation of FDI spillovers: A critique of previous 
studies 
 
5.5.1. Previous reviews of FDI spillovers literature 
 
Since the seventies, empirical studies on productivity spillovers from FDI abound in literature. It is 
therefore not surprising that prominent scholars have reviewed the evidence in order to arrive at 
conclusions. Notable among such reviews are Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), Gorg and Strobl (2001), 
Saggi (2002), Gorg and Greenaway (2004), Lipsey and Sjoholm (2005), Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005), 
and Smeets (2008). The primary objective of most of these reviews has been to uncover the reason for 
mixed results across different empirical studies of FDI spillovers. The inconsistency of results has also 
been the major motivation for researchers to venture into this area of investigation.  
Varied and contrasting answers have been given as the reason behind the lack of consensus in results of 
spillovers investigation. Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) suggested that design, methodology and data of 
empirical studies on FDI spillovers are the main reasons for the mixed results. In direct contrast, Lipsey 
and Sjoholm (2005) contended that methodological procedure has no effect on the results. They noted 
that different specifications applied on Indonesian micro data, yielded similar results14. Their results 
reflect on the argument that the extent and direction of spillovers vary by country and not by 
methodology (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998; Lipsey and Sjoholm 2005; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005). An 
extension of this thought is that studies on developed countries are more likely to yield similar results 
than those on developing countries (Saggi, 2002).  Empirical reviews on FDI spillovers reveal that the 
most cited reason for the disparity in results across countries is that countries differ in absorptive 
capacities, and therefore different consequences of FDI are expected (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998; Saggi 
2002; Smeets 2008).  
The quest to understand the reasons for the inconclusiveness of the investigation has spurred critical 
insights into the patterns of the results obtained. Thus surveys on the empirical evidence have made 
notable observations. One of such is that vertical spillovers are more likely to exist than horizontal 
spillovers (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005). The reason for this could be that MNCs have an incentive to 
                                                          
14
 Takii (2001) applied value added as dependent variable, while Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) and Todo and 
Miyamoto (2002) made use of value added per employee. In addition to value added per employee, Sjoholm (1999a, 
1999b) applied growth in value added per employee as dependent variables. On the other hand, Blalock and Gertler 
(2003, 2003) specified output as their dependent variable. All these different specifications applied on Indonesian 
data yielded positive and significant results. 
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ensure that their suppliers or customers in other industries are efficient than they do for their 
competitors in the same industry. This is simply because the efficiency of MNC suppliers or customers 
would benefit them in terms of higher quality products, lower prices for intermediate goods, effective 
and prompt delivery of products in the case of where MNCs are customers; and higher demand, 
consistent market etc in the case where they are suppliers. Of particular interest, are the observations 
made about the data and methodology of investigating spillovers. 
The most distinct observation made about empirical studies on spillovers is that cross-section studies 
tend to find more significant results than panel studies (Gorg and Strobl 2001; Javorcik and Spatareanu 
2005). However, evidence also posits that the results obtained in cross section studies are questionable, 
since they fail to control for time invariant differences in productivity which are bound to be related 
with foreign presence (Gorg and Strobl 2001; Gorg and Greenaway 2004).Thus the coefficients obtained 
from cross section regressions are likely to be biased. On the other hand, panel data techniques such as 
fixed and random effects techniques can control for time invariant effects (Baltagi 1995). In line with this 
argument, is the fact that FDI spillovers are not expected to be instantaneous; therefore studies based 
on data collected over time would be more appropriate for the analyses (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998; 
Gorg and Greenaway 2004).  
Another issue regarding the data used for spillover studies is the appropriate level of aggregation of the 
data. It can be observed that the older studies (Caves 1974; Globerman 1979; Blomstrom (1986) made 
use of mostly industry level data, but over time, micro/firm level data began to feature in literature. 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) Saggi (2002), Gorg and Strobl (2001) argue that firm level studies are more 
appropriate for investigating spillovers. Saggi (2002) notes that plant/firm level studies do a better job in 
controlling for endogeneity than industry level data. But Keller (2004) contends that endogeneity could 
only be controlled through finding good instrumental variables. 
Other issues pinpointed in surveys include the accuracy of data measurements and variable definitions. 
Lipsey and Sjoholm (2005) questioned the reliability of output measures such as sales and value added 
used widely in literature. They noted that firms have an incentive to manipulate the figures of these 
measures to reduce their tax liabilities. The paper also pointed out that results obtained from FDI 
spillover regressions are sensitive to the level of industry aggregation; the definition of the foreign 
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presence variable and the measure of technology15. In a similar vein, a meta-analysis conducted by Gorg 
and Strobl (2001) also revealed that the choice of foreign presence variable affect the results obtained 
from the spillover analysis. Thus the choice of using a measure such as share of foreign employment, as 
opposed to share of foreign output could affcect the results significantly (Gorg and Strobl 2001). An 
important methodological design issue is the fact that the difficulty in accounting for the spillover 
channels in the econometric model in empirical studies is a major shortcoming in the investigation (Gorg 
and Strobl 2005, Smeets 2008).  
While acknowledging the data problems identified in literature, this study intends to bring light on other 
implications of the data used for modelling FDI spillovers which were rather neglected in previous 
studies. Specifically, the present study explores empirical studies on spillovers to reveal how the 
sampling procedure and consistency of data might affect the measurement of FDI spillovers (See Table 
A1 in Appendix 5.1 for a summary of articles reviewed). Thus unlike previous surveys, this study does 
not seek to find an answer to why there are mixed results in investigating FDI spillovers; but rather we 
try to evaluate previous studies to show how that the structure and quality of data used could have a 
significant effect in measuring foreign and spillovers. To my knowledge, only very few studies such as 
Haskel et al. (2007) had noted the importance of the sampling approach on the measure on foreign 
presence albeit vaguely. Thus this study intends to reveal the importance of a rather neglected aspect of 
FDI spillover analyses by surveying literature on the data used for the investigation; and illustrating with 
data on Nigerian manufacturing firms. 
In carrying out the survey, this study will focus on empirical studies that use data aggregated at the 
firm/plant/establishment level rather than those dealing with industry/sector level data. This choice is 
appropriate because the present study is based on data aggregated at firm level.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Lipsey and Sjoholm (2005) argued that narrow definition of industries limits the extent to which spillovers are 
likely to occur. They also suggested that the measure of foreign presence variable, the foreign share of an industries 
activity could be endogenous and nonlinear. Furthermore, the study pointed out that the definition of technology in 
empirical studies could be too broad or too narrow.   
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5.5.2. Sampling and foreign presence:  
 
Data coverage 
Data used for the empirical investigation of spillovers had been obtained from different sources. While 
some studies relied on commercial databases16 to source their data, a larger portion obtain their data 
through surveys conducted by national or international organizations. Assuming data collected for such 
analysis is valid, the data coverage should also be a matter of concern. Data coverage implies the scope 
or extent of the population surveyed. In the case of a population of manufacturing firms, the data 
coverage implies the type and quality of the firms included in the sample. Thus while attempting to 
model FDI spillovers in manufacturing, it is important that sample reflects the distribution of 
manufacturing firms of the country or region in question, in order for the measure of foreign presence 
to be appropriate. Said differently, due to the inherent limitation of surveying the entire population of 
firms, it is deemed appropriate to focus on a sample of firms that are most significant in terms of their 
contribution of a chosen measure (employment/output/capital) of the sector. If the most significant 
firms are not sampled, it could lead to selection bias which could render the measure of foreign 
presence unreliable. Appropriate selection of data coverage is particularly important while measuring 
foreign presence because foreign firms are most likely to be present amongst higher levels of any 
chosen measure of categorization of firms. In other words, because foreign firms are more likely to exist 
amongst a sample of large firms, it seems reasonable to select a sample with a higher proportion of 
large firms. In general, the basic question to ask while considering the coverage of the data in studies 
based on a sample is: What category or class of firms would be covered in the sample? 
As a result of the importance of selecting an appropriate sample, different studies set different 
standards on the type of firms they included in their sample. The selection criteria set by surveys vary 
according to the nature of the industry of firms in the country of study. The most common selection 
criterion in literature is the number of employees present in firms included in the survey sample. 
Evidence from literature shows that the more industrialized the country of focus is, the higher the 
number of employees that firms included in the survey must have. Therefore it is not surprising that 
articles like Peri and Urban (2006), Haskel et al. (2007), and Sembenelli and Siotis (2002), which are 
based in Germany, U.K., and Spain respectively, covers mostly firms with 100 or more employees. On 
                                                          
16 A few studies like Keller and Yeaple (2003), Peri and Urban (2006), and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) mad use of Standard 
and Poor’s Compustat database, Centro Studiluca d’Angliano and AIDA database of Bureau van Dijk, and Amadeus 
resp0ectively.   
137 
 
the other hand, articles like Sinani and Meyer (2004), and Kugler (2006) which are based in Estonia and 
Colombia respectively, covers firms with 10 or more employees. The reason behind this pattern could be 
due the fact that the size of employees in the largest firms in industrial countries is likely to outnumber 
that of developing or transition countries by a high margin17. As a consequence, in order to achieve a 
sample that will capture the significant firms in their respective countries, the employment size of the 
sample of firms in industrial countries would be higher than that of the rest. It is therefore expected that 
the benchmark for selecting the firms to survey in Nigeria would be low, considering the fact that small 
firms dominate Nigerian manufacturing industry. This also implies that the definition of a large firm in 
Nigeria would be different from that of a developed country like the UK.  But what is more important is 
that the sample contains a larger portion of large firms in terms of a measure such as employment. This 
is based on the assumption that the labour size of a firm indicates its relevance in an industry, and as a 
result, firms with larger labour force are better candidates for investigating spillovers.   
Representativeness 
A good indication that a study had surveyed the appropriate firms is the degree of representativeness of 
the sample. This degree is commonly expressed in percentage of a chosen measure (employment, 
output, capital, sales, etc.)18. The importance of the representativeness of a sample cannot be 
overemphasized, as it is quite rare that the data is obtained from a census of all firms in the industry, 
thus an estimation or approximation of the sample is always the case. Even in cases where the data is 
obtained from a national census, legal restrictions on dissemination could lead to incompleteness of 
such data. It is therefore sensible to assess the credibility of an empirical work on FDI spillovers by 
questioning representativeness of the sample. Random sampling to obtain an approximation of a 
population is a valid procedure in statistical and econometric analyses but its application to FDI spillover 
analysis would result in particular implications. Spillovers are known to occur within sectors or regions 
and therefore a true measure of FDI spillovers would be achieved if the sample captures the original 
sectoral and regional structure of the population of firms. Specifically the measure of foreign presence 
would be biased if the sample is not truly representative of the population. In FDI spillover literature, 
sample representativeness is shown by disclosing the precise percentage of a chosen measure. This 
disclosure confirms the suitability of the sample for making statistical inference. This is particular 
                                                          
17
 Big MNCs in industrialized countries tend to be associated with higher number of employees than MNCs in 
developing countries.   
18
 Representativeness is normally a relative measure rather than an absolute measure. Thus a sample of 
100,000 firms may be less representative than a sample of 1,000 firms.  
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important in cases where a small or less random sample is used in computing spillover variables, as 
concerns over the validity of the measure becomes eminent.    
 Despite the importance of the representativeness of a sample in spillover analyses, it is quite surprising 
that about half of the empirical studies on this area of research did not disclose the representativeness 
of their sample (Appendix 5.1 shows an examination of empirical studies of major studies on FDI 
spillovers in manufacturing highlighting the extent of their disclosure). The studies that neglected the 
importance of disclosing the degree of representation of the sample include Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
Takii (2005), Dimelis (2005), Bwalya (2006), Girma and Wakelin (2007), Girma et al. (2008), and Blake et 
al. (2009). Fan and Hu (2007) and Blake et al. (2009) disclosed that their data was obtained from a 
survey of Chinese manufacturing firms, which provided a sample of 998 firms, but the sampling 
procedure used to generate the sample was not indicated. Chudnosky et al. (2008) indicated that results 
obtained from their analysis which involved a sample of 722 manufacturing firms were only valid for 
that sample. However they failed to indicate how the shortcomings of employing the sample would 
affect their measure of foreign presence.  A similar group of studies are those that declared their sample 
representative, without specifying the degree. These include Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Ruane and 
Ugar (2004), and Yasar and Paul (2007). To say the least, conclusions made on the existence of FDI 
spillovers should therefore be treated with caution as representativeness of the sample used was not 
ascertained. In order words the inference on the population made with the respective sample used in 
these studies are bound to be questionable.  
However, a notable number of related articles adequately specify the degree of representativeness of 
their sample. Notable in this group are the studies based on high degree of representation (i.e. above 
80% of the stated measure). This category include Feinberg and Majumbar (2001), Javorcik (2004), Gorg 
et al. (2006), Haskel et al. (2007), Kosteas (2008), and Jordaan (2008). The high degree of representation 
implies that their measures of foreign presence are bound to be appropriate. Second to this group, are 
studies based on samples that represent about 50% to 75% of a chosen measure of the population. They 
include Kokko et al. (1996), Aslanoglu (2000), Kugler (2006), and Marin and Bell (2006). The last 
category, are the articles that can be considered as marginally representative. This category comprises 
about 30% or less of a chosen measure of representation. These include Barrios and Strobl (2002), Sinani 
and Meyer (2004), and Peri and Urban (2006).  
It is important to note, that the degree of representativeness is not necessarily controlled by the 
researcher. In other words, in cases where the survey data is used secondarily, the researcher is unable 
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to increase or decrease the representativeness of the sample. What researchers are normally in control 
of is the choice of the observations to be excluded from the original sample. This exclusion of 
observations is typically based on the data requirements set by the researcher, which is dependent on 
what is being explained. The next section would therefore look at the criteria for exclusion of 
observations, and how it could affect the measurement of foreign presence.         
 
Data quality and foreign presence 
 Data cleaning procedures  
Empirical investigations of FDI Spillovers typically involve regressing a measure of productivity of 
domestic firms on a measure of foreign presence, while controlling for other determinants of 
productivity. To achieve this, data on measures of output, capital, labour, raw materials, and firm size, 
among other variables would be required. Unfortunately, in practice, obtaining quality data on these 
variables could pose problems to the researcher. The issue of data quality is particularly a major concern 
when the data collected by an entity other than the user (secondary data). As a result, the original 
survey sample usually undergoes a cleaning process, which involves the exclusion of observations that 
do not satisfy some certain criteria. This is true in literature on FDI spillovers, as exclusion of 
firms/observations is a common practice19. Due to the variety of data used in empirical studies on FDI 
spillovers, the criteria for exclusion vary across articles.  
The most common reason across literature for deleting firms or observations is the occurrence of 
missing values for key variables such as capital, labour, output, and sales. Feinberg and Majumdar 
(2001), Javorcik (2004), Bwalya (2006), Yasar and Paul (2007a, 2007b), and Balock and Gertler (2008) 
excluded observations primarily because of missing values for key variables. The existence of 
questionable or non-positive values for variables like output and employment is another criterion for 
dropping observations in literature. Sembenelli and Siotis (2002, 2008), and Todo and Miyamoto (2006) 
amongst others dropped observations based on that judgement. In the case of like Takii (2005), and 
Girma and Wakelin (2007) the criteria was basically the presence of outliers in the sample.  
                                                          
19
 Even in cases where the data was sourced from a census, exclusion of firms is usually carried out, as some firms 
in the dataset might not match the selection criteria of the investigation. 
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The extent to which observations are excluded has an impact on the measures of foreign presence. This 
could be of greater concern when the firms excluded are either dominantly domestic firms or foreign 
firms. For example, if majority of the firms excluded from the sample are domestic firms, the foreign 
presence in most sectors or regions would be over estimated. This situation would be even more 
worrying if the domestic firms excluded are biased towards certain industries or regions. This would 
wrongly imply that those industries have higher foreign presence, whereas in reality, the measure is 
merely a consequence of poor data quality. This should be a concern especially in cases where a 
significant number of firms in the sample were excluded. Therefore studies were there is a huge 
difference between the population and the final sample could have the problem of either 
overestimating or underestimating foreign presence as a result of lack of symmetry in the type of firms 
excluded (domestic/foreign).        
 Data consistency  
Consistency or consecutiveness of data over time is a desirable quality in empirical estimations. Panel 
data techniques are known to demand a number of consecutive observations. In modelling FDI 
spillovers, this requirement is even more important, particularly in measuring foreign presence. This is 
because the standard way of computing a measure of foreign presence, is to construct a ratio of foreign 
firms’ output/employment/capital to the total in a sector or region20. Therefore the absence of variables 
or observations for output/employment/capital for a particular year could bias this measure. 
Specifically, the absence of observations for the variable required to compute foreign presence could be 
misinterpreted as a fall o rise in foreign presence, as it reduces the value of either the numerator or 
denominator of the fraction used in spillover computation. This is the major reason for the exclusion of 
firms without consecutive values across years in key variables in spillover models. Also, in an unbalance 
panel, where the total number of firms in each year are uneven, the measure of foreign presence for 
one year could differ from another just because of the inconsistency in the number of firms used in each 
year. Thus a panel dataset could have consistent number of firms across years, but inconsecutive 
observations of key variables firms across years; or inconsistent number of firms across years 
(unbalanced panel), but consecutive observations for key variables of firms across years. Both scenarios 
are likely to yield misleading results in modelling FDI spillovers.  
                                                          
20
 Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Sjoholm (1999) are some early firm level panel studies that implemented the 
measure.  
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Despite this importance of data consistency and consecutiveness, it is surprising that most studies do 
not acknowledge this while measuring spillovers. Konings (2001), Dimelis and Louri (2002), Barios and 
Strobl (2002), Takii (2005), Bwalya (2006) amongst others did not consider the consistency of the panel 
while modelling FDI spillovers. However, a small portion of related studies account for data consistency. 
The works of Sjoeholm (1999), Feinberg and Majumdar (2001), Sembenelli and Siotis (2002), Todo 
(2006), and Haskel et al. (2007) took into consideration the consistency of data. But it should be noted 
that these studies were basically concerned about the requirements of the panel data technique (such 
as GMM), rather than its impact on measures of foreign presence. There is also a lack of consensus in 
literature on the minimum number of consecutive year observations required for applying panel data 
techniques. Keller and Yeaple (2003) recommended 2 consecutive observations, while Sembenelli and 
Siottis (2002) recommended 4 consecutive observations. To my knowledge, the closest attempt to link 
the consistency of sample data to foreign presence albeit vaguely was by Haskel et al. (2007). Haskel and 
et al. (2007) pointed out that constructing foreign presence variable by the share of foreign firms’ 
employment in a sector or region could pose problems in measuring foreign presence. The authors 
exemplified this in their study based on UK manufacturing that showed that a general decline in UK 
manufacturing activity in the sample (between 1973 and 1992) lead to a pseudo-increase in foreign 
presence. But rather than selecting consistent or connective year observations as a remedy for this, the 
study added more control variables intended to account for the situation into their model21. The present 
study is therefore a novel attempt to throw light on the relevance of data consistency on the measure of 
foreign presence which had been overlooked in previous studies.  
In conclusion this chapter has provided an extensive review of literature in order to show the different 
directions of research available in FDI effects on both manufacturing and banks. It shows that despite 
the wide-ranging approaches and ingenuity towards analysing spillovers, a critical aspect which involves 
the measurement of the actual proxy for foreign presence has received rather little attention. This study 
therefore provides an important contribution by identifying these potential problems.   
 
                                                          
21
 In particular, Haskel et al. (2007) contended that adding the lag number of domestic (British) firms by region and 
industry; or adding the number of foreign employment and total employment separately in the model could control 
for data inconsistency. 
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Chapter 6: Data and Description 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the datasets employed for the analysis of FDI spillovers and foreign bank 
presence effects. It shows details of the data source, sampling methodology, panel structure, and the 
measures of foreign presence in both industries. An important section is sub-section 6.1.5.4 which 
compares the measure of foreign presence in manufacturing FP in the alternative measures: CBN and 
NMES. In the case of banking data, we provided a detailed description of the dependent variables in 
order to provide a rationale for their inclusion. A comparison of the two datasets is provided at the end 
of the chapter 
6.1.1 Data on Nigerian manufacturing firms 
 
Data for the investigation of FDI spillovers in Nigerian manufacturing industry was sourced from the 
Nigerian Manufacturing Enterprise Survey (NMES).  The NMES survey was conducted by United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) of 
the University of Oxford. As part of the African Manufacturing Surveys (AMES) carried out by UNIDO-
CSAE in the 90s, the survey followed the typical structure implemented in similar surveys in other 
African countries.  
The NMES was essentially aimed at pinpointing the reasons for decades of poor performance in the 
Nigerian economy in order to devise policies to tackle them. In line with African Manufacturing Surveys 
(AMES), manufacturing firms in Nigeria were the focus of the survey. The focus on manufacturing is due 
to the notion that the development of the sector is the key to rapid economic growth as exemplified by 
the Asian Tigers. The main strength of the NMES survey lies in the fact that it based on firm level data 
which contrasts to the dominant use of aggregate data in studies on African firms.  
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6.1.2. NMES as an extension of World Bank Regional Program on Enterprise development (RPED) 
 
Initially, the World Bank RPED conducted surveys on the African manufacturing firms in the early 90s. 
This typically involved interviewing about 200 firms in various African countries. The basic information 
derived from these firms was data on sales, output, capital, employment, etc. These data have been 
extensively studied by researchers in organisations such as World Bank, UNIDO and CSAE. Among other 
uses of the data, the data obtained from these surveys have been used to estimate production 
functions. This makes the data a good candidate for modelling FDI spillovers.  
The major motivation for UNIDO-CSAE to engage in conducting subsequent surveys (AMES) was the 
short time span of the RPED surveys. Thus the AMES of UNIDO-CSAE basically follows the RPED surveys 
but essentially extends the time span. Both NMES survey and RPED survey on Nigeria applied stratified 
random sampling.  This involved classifying the population of firms into groups/strata, and drawing 
random samples from each stratum according to a specified criterion (NMES, 2001). The reason for this 
choice is due to the homogeneity of firms within strata and heterogeneity of firms between strata in the 
case of Nigeria. As a result of this feature, stratified random sampling became the appropriate approach 
because it minimizes variability within strata and maximizes variability between strata. Another feature 
accounted for in both surveys is the fact that homogenous small firms dominate the Nigerian 
manufacturing terrain but larger firms make up a larger proportion of the employment. Thus in order to 
fulfill the data requirements of modelling a production function, the final sample in both surveys 
contained a larger proportion of large firms than the actual population (NMES report, Wave 1). 
The sector and region divisions in both surveys were quite similar. Both NMES and RPED survey on 
Nigeria identified nine sub-sectors, but there were slight differences in the type of sectors identified and 
their aggregation. The regional division of the two surveys were quite similar, as the Southwest region, 
eastern region, and northern region were identified. A distinct feature in both surveys is the dominance 
of the southwest region (Lagos and Ibadan). In general, the sample size of both NMES survey and the 
RPED survey on Nigeria took account of the size, sector and region distribution of the population of 
Nigerian firms. Thus this implies that the samples were representatives of the population of the 
country’s manufacturing firms. However, the sample sizes of the surveys differ slightly. While the RPED 
survey was based on 232 firms, the NMES survey (Wave 1) was based on 175 firms.  
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6.1.3 Sampling procedure 
 
As pointed out in the NMES report, the sampling procedure adopted follows that of the RPED survey. 
This section throws light into the sampling method used by the RPED survey due to the absence of 
sampling details of the NMES survey in its report. 
The first stage in selecting the sample was the identification of the population of manufacturing firms in 
Nigeria. Nigeria is a country with country numerous informal and unregistered firms. But these firms are 
usually small/micro in nature, and therefore of negligible impact on the manufacturing sector. Thus to 
identify the population of manufacturing firms, Nigerian government institutions relied on source data 
on registered firms. The “National Directory of Establishments” published by the Federal Office of 
Statistics (FOS)22 was the source of data of the population of manufacturing firms for the RPED survey. 
This next stage was the elimination of firms which could not be adequately classified as manufacturing 
firms, and firms that do no meet the minimum number of employees required. The rest of the firms 
which met the selection criteria were subjected to stratified sampling. With knowledge of the uneven 
geographical and sectoral distribution across Nigerian manufacturing sector, the listings were grouped 
into appropriate region, size and sector clusters. In line with the requirements of stratified sampling 
procedure, random firm were drawn from each cluster. The sampling method allowed the largest firms 
in the distribution a higher probability of being selected than the rest of the firms.  
              
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 The Federal Office of Statistics merged with the National Data bank to form the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) between 2005 and 2009. 
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6.1.4 The NMES sample 
 
Table 6.1 Basic features of NMES sample 
Year Frequencies 
1998 200 
1999 203 
2000 204 
2001 122 
2002 122 
2003 122 
 
Table 6.1 shows the basic features of the NMES sample. The table shows a clear disparity in the 
frequency of year observations between the years 1998-1999 (Wave 1) and 2001-2003 (Wave 2), as the 
firm observations fell from 204 in 2000, to 122 in 2001.Thus about 40% of firm observations were lost 
between Wave 1 and Wave 2. Table 6.1 also shows differences in year observations of firms in the 
sample. Firms with 3 year observations have the highest frequency, followed by firms with 6 year 
observations. Firms with 2 year, 4 year, and 5 year observations constitute less than 2% of the sample. 
All the firms in the sample have more than 1 year observation.    
Table 6.2 Total firms and employment by size class (last provided employment size) 
Size class (employees) Total firms Total employment 
Micro firms (<=5) 28 95 
Small firms (btw 5and 20) 51 596 
Medium firms (btw 20 and 75) 53 2,067 
Large firms (btw 75 and 500) 45 8,067 
Macro firms (above 500) 21 47,523 
No size class  21  - 
Total 219 58,348 
 
 
 
Year observations per firm Total number of firms 
1 0 
2 1 
3 112 
4 1 
5 2 
6 103 
Total 219 
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Figure 6.1 Histogram of employment variable 
 
  
Table 6.2 shows the total firms and employment according to size class, while Figures 6.1 shows the 
histogram of employment variable. Figure 6.1 show that most firms in the sample have less than 2,500 
employees. 
  
Table 6.3 Total firms and employment by sector (as at 2003) 
Sector  Total firms Total employment 
Food 20 13,582 
Textile 35 25,161 
Garment 42 445 
Wood 9 395 
Paper 23 1,333 
Chemical 22 9,205 
Metal 37 3,752 
Machines 11 3,531 
Furniture 14 944 
No sector  6  - 
Total  219 58,348 
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Figure 6.2a Chart of total firms by sector                                        Figure 6.2b Chart of total employment by sector 
   
Table 6.3 shows the total firms and employment according to sector, while Figures 6.2 shows their 
respective bar chart representations. Table 6.3 and Figures 6.3 show the Garment sector has the highest 
frequency in the sample while Textile sector dominate total employment. The sample of firms from the 
Metal sector and Textile sector are also relatively high, but the total employment in Textile sector is 
clearly higher than every other sector. Wood sector has the both lowest number of firms and the lowest 
share of total employment in the sample.  
Table 6.4 Total firms and employment by region (last provided employment size) 
Region Total firms Total employment 
west  107 21,481 
east  31 904 
north 48 7,551 
No region  33 28,412 
Total  219 58,348 
 
Figure 6.3a Chart of total firms by region                                         Figure 6.3b Chart of total employment by region 
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Table 6.4 shows the total firms and employment according to sector, while Figures 6.3 shows their 
respective bar chart representations. The West region clearly dominates the total number of firms and 
the total employment in the sample. According to the sample, the number of firms and total 
employment in the West region is higher than the summation of that of the east and north.   
 
6.1.5 Measuring foreign presence 
 
Foreign presence across sub-sectors in Nigerian manufacturing Sector 
As noted earlier in Chapter 5, the sample used for measuring presence is of major concern in modeling 
spillovers. Foreign presence can only be captured if the foreign presence across the sectors, regions, and 
years capture the true distribution of the population of firms. In other words, the foreign presence 
distribution of the survey sample of firms should match with the aggregated FDI distribution data of the 
country. In this section, we take a close look at the two  alternative datasets: NMES and CBN, in order to 
tease out their similarities and differences. We start by looking at the Cumulative Foreign Private 
Investment (FPI) by industry in the Manufacturing and Processing sector, published by the CBN 
Statistical Bulletin 2006. The data contains total foreign private investment in 28 industries (sub-sectors) 
in the manufacturing sector between 1970 and 2005, compiled from responses obtained from the CBN 
annual survey of Nigerian companies with imported capital. 
To enable comparison with the NMES data, the present study selected 9 sub-sectors out of the 28 
available sub sectors in the bulletin. The most important task performed while using the data from CBN 
is the matching of the industry classification of CBN with that of NMES. Matching the industry 
classification is highly crucial because while CBN dataset employed the 3-digit level of classification, 
NMES made use of 4-digit level. Thus random matching of the industries could lead to misleading 
measures of foreign presence. A number of steps were followed to ensure accurate matching of the two 
datasets (See Appendix 6.1, Table A1). 
First was to identify industrial classification of each firm in the original NMES dataset. The STATA syntax 
provided from the University of Oxford contained the syntax used to classify the industry or sector of 
each firm. It provided a group classification of firms according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) codes. Thus firms within a range of ISIC codes (numerical value) were classified in 
members of the same sector. The NMES dataset identified nine separate sectors, with each sector 
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consisting of firms with ISIC codes falling within a stated unbounded interval. On the other hand, the 
CBN dataset identified thirty two sectors/industries. But in this case, the names of the industries were 
provided while their corresponding ISIC codes were absent. Thus it becomes pertinent to match the two 
sector classification carefully in order to avoid misrepresentation of foreign presence.  
The second step therefore involves the actual matching of the two datasets. To achieve this, we use the 
“Overview of ISIC code system” published by Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS) to identify the 
names of each 4-digit industry classification provided by the NMES dataset. Pages 4 to 8 of the 
publication provide a table that aids the linkage of 4-digit industries with their corresponding 3-digit 
classification. With this information, we could figure out the 3 digit equivalent of the ISIC code identifiers 
provided in the NMES dataset. Thus for each firm with ISIC 4-digit code identifiers in the sample, a 
corresponding 3-digit ISIC code or classification was provided. As a consequence, for each sector 
classification identified by NMES, a corresponding 3-digit level classification was identified. It is 
important to note that in most cases, the NMES classification of a sector contained more than one 3 
digit-level industry classification. For example the NMES classification for “food” sector contained the 3-
digit level classification for both “food products” and “beverages” industries. A direct implication of this 
is that matching sectors identified in the NMES dataset with that of 3-digit level classification employed 
by CBN would entail the summation of the values of the later. In this study, this was the case for most of 
the sectors. 
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Table 6.5: Distribution of FP (cumulative FPI in nominal values of local currency) across sectors - CBN 
sector 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Food 9,462,640 10,668,817 15,250,266 12,094,355 16,675,804 21,678,545 
Textile 6,028,772 6,267,102 7,428,380 6,474,830 7,636,187 9,604,230 
Garment 44,691 44,691 0 0 0 0 
Wood 210,167 210,167 210,167 216,472 869,542 1,130,405 
Paper 730,284 804,298 1,681,257 888,740 1,777,315 2,297,151 
Chemical 5,014,288 5,201,151 5,270,552 5,389,652 5,459,054 5,459,053 
Metal 2,280,075 2,374,454 3,304,834 2,466,126 3,396,506 3,667,931 
Machines 2,060,650 2,626,566 3,269,664 2,671,905 3,315,003 3,799,437 
Furniture 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: CBN statistical Bulletin 2006 
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 Figure 6.4a FP across sectors (CBN) – 1998- 2003       Figure 6.4b FP across years (CBN) 
    
Each value on Table 6.5 represents the corresponding monetary value share of the total manufacturing 
FPI in a sub-sector and year. Figure 6.4a shows that the Food sector clearly has the highest FPI, 
surpassing the Textile sector which has the second highest FPI by a wide margin. Figure 6.4b shows that 
apart from a decline in FPI between 2000 and 2001, FPI in Nigeria followed an upward trend between 
1998 and 2003. 
Foreign presence across sub-sectors in NMES sample 
Having confirmed earlier that the NMES sample is a representative of the Nigerian manufacturing sector 
in terms of its sectors and regions, in this section, we investigate whether this is true of the foreign 
presence (FP) distribution across sectors. But how is foreign presence measured across sectors in a 
sample of manufacturing firms? An approach commonly used in empirical literature on this area of 
investigation is to construct the foreign share of a chosen measure in each sector. The variable obtained 
will capture intra-sectoral or horizontal spillovers from FDI. We follow a common measure employed in 
literature to measure foreign presence as the share of sectors employment in total employment in the 
sector23. Using that variable constructed, we take the means across sectors and years to show how 
foreign presence varies across sectors and years. Table 6.6 follows the structure of Table 6.5 to show 
variation in foreign presence across sectors and years in the sample. The numbers in parenthesis 
indicate the number of observations. The distribution of FP variable sourced from CBN (Figure 6.4a) is 
                                                          
23
 Notable papers that used this measure include Aitken and Harrison (1999), Aslanoglu (2000), Takii (2005), and 
Peri and Urban (2006).  
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quite different from that of NMES (Figure 6.5a). While Figure 6.4a shows that Food sector has the 
highest FP, Figure 6.5a shows that Wood sector has the highest. Similarly, while Figure 6.4a shows tha 
FP in the Chemical sector is higher than that of the Metal sector, the opposite is the case in Figure 6.5a.   
In the same vein, the upward trend observable in Figure 6.4b is in contrast to the slight downward trend 
shown in Figure 6.5b. It is important to note that the downward trend observed in Figure 6.5b is most 
likely linked to the dramatic loss of number of observations in the sample between 2000 and 200124.  
It does not seem reasonable to attribute this loss of observations to exit (closure) of firms in the survey 
as the Index of Industrial Production, published by The CBN Statistical bulletin, grew within the period in 
question. This suggests that the loss of observations could be as a result of the shortcomings of the 
survey, among other reasons. This scenario is therefore a clear case of how data inconsistency or 
unevenness affects the measure of foreign presence in a sample, as the shortcomings of the NMES data 
resulted in a misleading representation of the actual direction of foreign presence in Nigerian 
manufacturing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 The data for the years 2001-2003 (Wave 2) was collected 3 years after the data for the years 1998-2000 (Wave 1). 
Unfortunately, there was no specified reason for the huge loss of observations in the between the two waves.  
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Table 6.6 Distribution of FP in NMES sample across sectors and years 
 Sector 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total sector 
observations 
Food 0.9863 0.9559 0.6188 0.4315 0.4528 0.5840   
  (19) (19) (19) (15) (15) (15) (102) 
Textile 0.8748 0.4297 0.4239 0.0747 0.0849 0.0931 
 
  (32) (33) (33) (11) (11) (11) (131) 
Garment 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  (40) (40) (40) (27) (27) (27) (201) 
Wood 1 1 0.9044 0.8309 0.8440 0.9044   
  (6) (6) (7) (5) (5) (5) (34) 
Paper 0.3063 .3805 0.3704 0.2603 0.2592 0.2833   
  (20) (21) (21) (12) (12) (12) (98) 
Chemical 0.5872 0.7425 0.2710 0.2234 0.1991 0.1954   
  (20) (20) (20) (11) (11) (11) (93) 
Metal 0.8029 0.7880 0.7798  0.41326  0.4090  0.5444  0.5444 
  (35) (35) (35) (18) (18) (18) (159) 
Machines 0.7407 0.7657 0.5328 0.5905 0.6042 0.6059   
  (9) (9) (9) (7) (7) (7) (48) 
Furniture 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  (11) (12) (12) (11) (11) (11) (68) 
No category 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  (8) (8) (8) (5) (5) (5) (39) 
Total year 
observations  (200) (203) (204) (122) (122) (122) (973) 
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Figure 6.5a FP across sectors (NMES)                                    Figure 6.5b FP across years (NMES) 
  
 
Table 6.6 show the ratio of foreign employment in each sector and each year in the sample. The 
numbers in parenthesis represents the number of firms used for the computation of the FP measure. 
Sectors with a value of 1 imply that 100% of the firms in the corresponding year are foreign, while 
sectors with a value of 0 imply that no foreign firms exist in the sector in the particular year. Figures 6.5a 
and 6.5b show the bar chart representation of the Table 6.6 across sectors and years respectively.  
Comparing Figure 6.5a to Figure 6.4a shows differences in the distribution of FP across sectors in the 
two measures. While Figure 6.4a show that the Food sector is clearly dominates in FP, the Wood sector 
has the highest FP in Figure 6.5a, where years 1998 and 1999 had 100% foreign firms. This is contrary to 
Figure 6.4a, where the Wood sector has the third least foreign presence. The dominance of this Wood 
sector in the sample is likely to be linked to the fact that its computation is based on relatively few firms 
(5 to 7) as indicated in Table 6.6. Thus this makes the computation of FP sensitive to the shortcomings of 
the sample in representing the actual foreign distribution in the sector. Ignoring the Wood sector, 
another difference is that the difference in FP between the Food and Textile sectors in Figure 6.4a is 
larger than that of Figure 6.5a. In terms of order of magnitude of FP, while Figure 6.4a shows that the 
Chemical sector is higher than the metal sector, and the Machine sector is slightly higher than the Metal 
sector, the reverse is the case in Figures 6.5a. However, despite these differences, the major similarity is 
the fact that two sectors, Garment and Furniture sectors, have limited or no FP in the two alternative 
measures. 
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The upward trend in FP across years shown in Figure 6.4b is in direct contrast to the downward trend 
across years show in Figure 6.5b.  
Comparing FP in each sector in the two alternative measures  
Each sector in Figure 6.6 show remarkable differences in the two alternative measures of FP. A common 
feature in each sector is that while the CBN measure shows an upward trend in FP across the years, the 
NMES measure shows a clear downward trend. The downward trend observed in the NMES measure is 
most likely linked to the loss of 40% of observations between 2000 and 2001. The substantial reduction 
in sample size between 2000 and 2001 is reflected in each sector in Figure 6.6 as an abrupt fall in FP, 
suggesting that the loss of observations affected mostly foreign firms in the sample. Figure 6.6 shows 
that the CBN measure also witnessed a fall in FP between 2000 and 2001 in most sectors, but unlike the 
NMES measure, a rise in FP in 2002 followed the fall. Also, the transition of Nigeria to democratic rule in 
1999 saw an increase in FDI between 1999 and 2000, reflected in the increase in FP in each sector in the 
CBN measure. This is in contrast to the fall in FP shown in the NMES measure in most sectors.  Thus the 
CBN measure, due to its broader coverage of the population of manufacturing firms in Nigeria, reflects 
the actual trend of FP in each sector across the years focused in this study. It also reflects the widely 
known realities of foreign presence in the country, especially in terms of political and economic events 
that affected FP in the period studied. On the contrary, the NMES sample seems to be sensitive to the 
problems or errors in sampling encountered in data collection.   
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Figure 6.6 FP across sectors – CBN and NMES measures 
CBN measure                                                                   NMES measure  
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Comparing FP in each year in the two alternative measures  
Figure 6.7 FP across years – CBN and NMES measures  
CBN measure                                                                      NMES measure  
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The distributions of FP across sectors in each year also show dissimilarities between the two alternative 
measures. Figure 6.7 shows that the CBN seemed to follow the same distribution of FP across sectors in 
each year, in exception of the sectors Metal and Machines. This is not true of the NMES measure, as the 
distribution changed substantially between 2000 and 2001. In general, significant changes across years 
are show in sectors Paper, Chemical, Metal, and Machines in the NMES measure. As indicated earlier, 
these variations are most likely linked to problems encountered during data collection. Thus the relative 
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stability of the distribution of FP across sectors in each year shown in the CBN measure suggests that it 
represents the actual distribution of FP in the population; thus it is preferable to the NMES measure.      
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6.2. Data on Nigerian banks 
 
6.2.1. Data Source 
Data for modeling the impact of foreign presence on the performance of Nigerian banks was sourced 
from two main sources: BankScope and Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). BankScope is a 
product of Bureau Van Dijk, which contains extensive information on banks across the globe. Classens et 
al. (2001), Shen et al. (2009), Uiboupin (2005), and Hermes and Lensink (2004) use BankScope as the 
major data source in their respective empirical work. Information available includes balance sheet 
information, income statement, ratios, ownership, and brief history of individual banks. However, 
ownership information on Nigerian banks which is crucial in this study was not available in BankScope. 
An alternative source of foreign ownership information was the annual reports of NDIC. Along with the 
Central of Nigeria (CBN), NDIC is a regulatory institution with the mandate to supervise banking 
operations in Nigeria among its core roles of insuring bank deposits and liquidating failed banks. Thus 
the Corporation collects data on insured banks in the country, and publishes part of this data on its 
annual reports. The key data obtained from NDIC was the percentage of equity owned by foreigners, 
which was used to compute both the micro and macro level measures of foreign presence.   
Macroeconomic variables used in the model were sourced from World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI). WDI dataset contains wide ranging yearly macro economic data on Nigeria. This study 
made use of real macroeconomic values to account for inflation which is quite significant in Nigeria.  
6.2.2. Coverage of data  
 
Data consists of information on 60 Nigerian banks between 1992 and 2009; available on BankScope was 
used in this study (See Appendix 6.1 Table A4 for list of banks used for this study). Thus the choice of 
banks included in the sample was based on their availability on BankScope.  Yearly data mainly 
comprising of balance sheet and income statement information of individual banks provided 356 total 
observations. However, the representation of the sample to the total bank population varied 
considerably across years. Table 6.1 shows how the number of banks sampled and their assets relate to 
the population of banks in the industry.  
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Table 6.7 Coverage of Sample: sample proportion of number of banks and assets each year 
Year 
Number of 
banks in 
sample  
Number of 
banks in the 
population 
% of banks in 
sample to 
population 
Total assets 
of banks in 
sample  
Total assets of 
bank 
population 
% of total 
assets of banks 
in the sample to 
total assets in 
bank 
population 
1992 1 120 0.8 0.5 231.6 0.2 
1993 2 120 1.7 1.3 333.0 0.4 
1994 3 115 2.6 5.0 350.6 1.4 
1995 6 115 5.2 15.0 482.6 3.1 
1996 10 115 8.7 30.7 591.2 5.2 
1997 19 115 16.5 64.8 739.4 8.8 
1998 22 89 24.7 107.5 789.2 13.6 
1999 23 85 27.1 202.2 1325.8 15.3 
2000 27 89 30.3 341.7 1896.1 18.0 
2001 28 90 31.1 472.5 2449.1 19.3 
2002 37 90 41.1 1046.2 2980.5 35.1 
2003 38 89 42.7 2106.6 3365.2 62.6 
2004 33 89 37.1 2385.8 4047.0 59.0 
2005 24 25 96.0 3149.2 5463.1 57.6 
2006 21 25 84.0 5574.4 8054.8 69.2 
2007 22 24 91.7 9390.3 13011.6 72.2 
2008 21 24 87.5 16537.1 17522.9 94.4 
2009 19 24 79.2 14475.3 19261.0 75.2 
Source: BankScope; NDIC 
 
Table 6.7 shows the proportion of the banks and total assets covered by the sample. This comparison 
was possible due to the availability of population data in annual reports on NDIC. It is apparent from 
Table 6.7 that data for the nineties were largely unrepresentative of the population. It could also be 
noticed that the proportion of population sampled is underestimated by the number of banks measure, 
and underestimated by the total assets of bank measure. This raises the question of whether the banks 
not included in the sample are relatively big banks. In general, the more recent years (2005-2009) had a 
high proportion of banks and total assets in population available in the sample.  
Despite the fact that the data was obtained secondarily, knowledge of the events that occurred in the 
industry could give some insight into the reason for differences in banks available in BankScope across 
years. Nigerian banking industry experienced a huge shock in 2004, where the central bank increased 
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the minimum capital requirement for operation by 1250%. This lead to the exit of 14 banks, while 75 
banks engaged in mergers and acquisitions, which left only 25 banks in the and merging and acquisition 
of 75 banks, which left only 25 banks in the industry. This dramatic decline from 89 to 25 banks in the 
industry evident in Table 6.7 has constituted problems in data collection and organization for both 
national and international bodies. Data on the pre 2005 banks are rather scarce, as attention is focused 
on the post 2005 banks. Thus recent studies on Nigerian banking industry are faced with the challenge 
of sourcing data on individual banks over a long period of time.  
BankScope, as a private organization which collects bank information in over 29,000 banks worldwide, 
provides mostly recent information on exiting banks, while information on non-existing ‘old’ banks are 
phased out as a result of frequent updating. This frequent updating also affects the time frame of the 
existing post 2005 banks, as the maximum number of years reported for a single bank at a particular 
point in time is 8 years. Nonetheless, the database was able to provide information on some of the pre 
2005 banks which constitute the 25 banks that emerged from the extensive mergers and acquisition 
(M&A) activity. This implies that information on banks that exited the industry were not provided by 
BankScope, and therefore not included in the analysis in this study. Part of the reasons for the rather 
small representation of the banks in the 90s as shown in Table 6.7, is therefore due to the 2005 M&A 
event which made pre 2005 less important; and the frequent updating of the database which removes 
‘older’ year observations of every bank from the information reported at a particular time. In general, 
this investigation is limited to banks that survived in the industry, as it does not account for banks that 
exited due to reasons such as insolvency or bankruptcy.  
Another reason for the small representation of banks in the sample is due to the inherent problem of 
data availability which affects all research based on Nigeria. BankScope data are largely based on annual 
reports of individual banks collected according to a specified accounting standard. Perceived problems 
experienced by BankScope in collecting data on Nigerian banks could therefore be in the form of failure 
to provide annual reports by some individual banks, non-disclosure of the major information required, 
or simply non-availability of the data required. Banks in Nigeria are not mandated by law to provide data 
to BankScope, therefore they may not have the adequate incentive to provide such information. 
However, they are statutorily required to fully disclose to regulatory to bank regulators, but disclosure 
to the general public is kept at a minimum level (Lyade, 2006).   
Attempts to complement the data available on BankScope with official reports from regulatory bodies 
like the CBN and NDIC yielded limited success. Complementary data on ownership and share capital 
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were the only data sourced from a Nigerian regulatory body: NDIC. This is due to the scarcity of bank 
official bank level data from these institutions. Detailed bank level data are kept confidential from the 
public by CBN and NDIC (Alashi, 2010). However, information provided by the publications of CBN and 
NDIC gave useful insight on modeling options, especially in construction of dummies that indicate 
booms, crises, M&A periods.  
In general the coverage of the data used for this study was mainly driven by their availability on 
BankScope. Data from NDIC were used as complements to the variables obtained on the banks available 
on Bankscope. Thus though data from NDIC annual reports contained information on the population of 
banks in Nigeria, only information on the 60 banks which could be reconciled with the data available 
BankScope was used for this study.   
Basic features of sample  
Table 6.8: Frequencies 
Year Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1992 1 0.3 0.3 
1993 2 0.6 0.8 
1994 3 0.8 1.7 
1995 6 1.7 3.4 
1996 10 2.8 6.2 
1997 19 5.3 11.5 
1998 22 6.2 17.7 
1999 23 6.5 24.2 
2000 27 7.6 31.7 
2001 28 7.9 39.6 
2002 37 10.4 50.0 
2003 38 10.7 60.7 
2004 33 9.3 69.9 
2005 24 6.7 76.7 
2006 21 5.9 82.6 
2007 22 6.2 88.8 
2008 21 5.9 94.7 
2009 19 5.3 100.0 
Total 356 100   
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Table 6.8 reveals the nature of the unbalanced panel data of banks used in this study. It shows that 
majority of the observations fall between 1997 and 2009, with 2003 and 2002 having the highest and 
the second highest number of observations respectively. There are a total of 60 banks, with 41% of the 
banks having between 5 and 8 year observations, and 21% of them having 8 year observations. Thus 
88% of the total number of observations consists of banks with 5 to 8 year observations. Table 6.8 also 
shows that the most observations (70%) in the sample correspond to the years prior to the 2005 M &A 
activity. 
6.2.3. Description of performance/dependent variables 
 
Measures of performance 
In general, evaluating the performance of banks has been focused on specific aspects. These include: 
earnings, efficiency, risk-taking, and leverage (ECB, 2010).However empirical literature on bank 
performance show that the choice of accounting measures for these aspects differ according to the 
nature of investigation carried out. Thus despite the abundance of different accounting measures of 
bank performance, the empirical model employed depend on the sought of enquiry being made. 
Literature on the impact of foreign entry/presence on bank performance focuses on measures of 
profitability, income, and costs. Thus the following widely used25 accounting identity derived from a 
bank’s Income Statement is employed in this study: 
Before Tax Profits/Total assets = (Net Interest Margin + Non-interest income – Overheads – Loan Loss 
provisioning)/Total assets                                                                                                                               (1) 
Table 6.9 Descriptive statistics of performance variables 
Variable Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BTP/TA  355 2.671999 6.943867 -87.4573 42.85714 
NIM/TA 351 9.248803 6.488095 -8.33 76.79 
NII/TA 352 5.875297 3.372724 0.616107 29.16667 
Overhead/TA 351 8.007909 3.947544 1.993336 34.78261 
Loanloss/TA 348 1.737793 5.534937 -38.7755 78.93034 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Demirguc-Kunt and Hinga (1999) and Claessens et al. (2001) are among the notable studies that are based on the 
accounting identity.  
167 
 
Before-tax profits  
We employ a widely used measure of profitability, Before-tax profits over total assets in this study. 
Before tax profits consists of the after tax profits and taxes, and is derived from deducting all expenses 
(both interest and operating expenses) from all revenue (operating and non-operating). Computing 
profitability as a ratio of total assets ensures that the size of individual banks is accounted for in the 
variable. This measure has been used by previous studies such as Clarke et al. (1999), Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huzinga (1999), Claessens et al.,(2001), Unite and Sullivan (2003), Lensink and Hermes (2004), 
Uiboupin (2005), and Okuda and Rungsomboon (2007). Before tax profits is a preferred measure of 
profitability than After-tax profits because of the volatility of tax expense. Thus while modeling 
determinants of profitability across banks, removing the tax component might lead to misleading 
results, as tax expenses are likely to vary across banks. In other words after-tax profits measure may not 
truly reflect a bank’s ability to make profits.  
 
Figure 6.8: BTP/TA across year observations                      Figure 6.9 Box plot of BTP/TA      
            
Figure 6.8 shows the relatively high variation in BTP/TA indicated in Table 6.9 This high standard 
deviation could be linked with the extreme negative value reported in year 2009. The box plot in Figure 
6.9 shows that BFT/TA seems to be tightly distributed around 0, with evidence of outliers amongst 
negative values than positive values. Thus there seem to be more abnormal losses than profits among 
banks used in the sample.    
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Net interest margin (NIM) 
We employ Net interest margin as a ratio of total assets (NIM/TA), defined as the difference between 
interest income from loans and interest expense on deposits over total assets as another measure of 
profitability. This is a different from its closest alternative measure, Interest rate spread, with the major 
difference being that while interest rate spread uses average values of interest payments; interest rate 
margin uses total values of interest payments (Unite and Sullivan, 2003). This study uses NIM/TA 
because of its broader scope in measuring interest income over interest spreads26. Another reason is 
that the sample used in this study had a lot of missing values for the spread measure, making NIM the 
desirable alternative. Unlike BFT/TA, NIM/TA as a measure of profitability is restricted to profits 
generated through interest related activities. It is widely used in foreign presence-bank performance 
literature, alongside BFT/TA to measure profitability/income of banks (Claessens et. al., 2001; Lensink 
and Hermes, 2004; Shen et al., 2009). In addition to measuring profitability, NIM/TA is also a good 
indicator of competition in the industry (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Maudos and Guevara 2004; Zhou and 
Wong, 2008), which is assumed to be driven by foreign presence. It is inversely related to the 
competition in the industry. Thus a higher the competition in the industry, the lower the interest 
margins of banks as they try to charge less for borrowing and more for savings, which leads to a 
reduction in intermediation costs (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). Apart from competition, interest 
rate margins are known to be associated with credit risk (Angbazo, 1997; Allen, 1998), interest rate risk 
(Ho and Saunders, 1981; McShane and Sharpe 1985; Angbazo, 1997), operational costs (Martinez Peria 
and Mody, 2004) among other measures 
Figure 6.10: NIM/TA across year observations                            Figure 6.11 Box plot of NIM/TA 
       
                                                          
26
 Unite and Sullivan pointed out that NIM includes interbank loan receivables and deposits with other banks, which 
are not included in computing interest rate spreads.  
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Figure 6.10 show scatter plots of NIM/TA across years and bank observations respectively. It reveals that 
there was no particular trend in margins in the industry. It also shows that extreme values were 
witnessed in the mid nineties. Figure 6.11 shows the box plot of NIM/TA.this the standa the presence of 
extreme values It is apparent from both plots that NIM/TA is less evenly spread than BFT/TA, implying 
that there is higher variation in interest margins in the sample. Also, abnormal values of NIM/TA seem to 
be the present among positive values as opposed to negative values in the case of BFT/TA  
Non-interest income  
To identify the impact of foreign presence on non-lending/interest activities of a bank, the variable Non-
interest income over total assets is used. Non-interest income includes fee charges, services charges, 
and trading revenue (Stiroh, 2004, p. 853). Deregulation, competition and technological advancement 
are the main drivers of Non-interest income (DeYoung and Rice, 2004). In particular, competition drives 
domestic banks to seek other means of revenue other than traditional banking methods (Unite and 
Sullivan, 2003). Technological advancement in information and technology has led to drift towards the 
use of the internet and ATMs rather than the usual traditional banking activities (Kim and Kim, 2010). 
Non-interest income was applied as a dependent variable in the following studies: Claessens et al. 
(2001), Unite and Sullivan (2003), Lensink and Hermes (2004), and Uiboupin (2005). 
Figure 6.12: NII/TA across year observations                            Figure 6.13 Box plot of NII/TA 
     
Figure 6.12 show the scatter plot of NIM/TA across year observations. It shows that prior to 2005 
consolidation program, some banks reported an NII/TA of above 10%, but afterwards, all the banks in 
the sample reported below the said level. The box plot in Figure 6.13 shows that NII/TA has a lower 
variation than BTP/TA and NIM/TA, as indicated in the standard deviation value in Table 6.9.   
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Overheads 
Another dimension towards the investigation of foreign presence impact on bank performance is to 
measure its effect on the costs of banking activities. This study employs Overhead costs over total assets 
(Overhead/TA) as a measure of operating expenses incurred to provide banking services. Overhead costs 
are the accounting value of overhead costs incurred by the bank to total assets (Beck et al, 2000). They 
are recurring expenses that are required for the functioning of a business, which includes employee 
wages, depreciation charges, utility and equipment expenses (Unite and Sullivan, 2003). These expenses 
are known to decrease when a business becomes efficient, thus it is a good measure of efficiency of 
management and organizational structure of a bank (Claessens, et al., 2000). Overheads are known to 
be higher in industries with tighter restrictions (Barth, et al., 2004). Thus lower overheads are likely to 
be the case in deregulated industries, especially those that allow foreign investment. It is therefore not 
surprising that overhead costs are used as a performance measure in analysing the effect of foreign 
presence in banking industry. Claessens et al. (2001), Unite and Sullivan (2003), Lensink and Hermes 
(2004), Uiboupin (2005), and Okuda (2007) used overhead costs in investigating the impact of foreign 
entry on domestic banks. 
Figure 6.14: Overhead/TA across year observations      Figure 6.15 Box plot of Overhead/TA observations 
   
Figure 6.14 show scatter plots of Overhead/TA across year observations. As indicated by the relatively 
low standard deviation value in Table 6.9, Figure 6.15 reveals that Overheads show no particular trend 
over time. However, some banks in the pre 2005 era, report relatively high Overheads. Figure 6.15 
shows that majority of the banks in the sample have an Overheard/TA value of 10% and below, with a 
few banks exceeding 20%.  
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Loan loss provisions 
To measure the effect of foreign presence on banks’ assessment/perception of the riskiness of loans, 
this study employs loan loss provisions as a percentage of total assets as a performance measure. Loan 
loss provision is an expense set aside to account for future losses due to bad loans. The main role of loan 
loss provision is to account for defaults in a bank’s loan portfolios (Ahmed et al. 1999). It therefore 
provides a signal for credit risks in banks (Johnson, 1989; Misumeci and Skinkey, 1990; Grifith and 
Wallac, 1991; Elliot et al. 1991; Liu, 1995). Claessens et al. 2001, Uiboupin, 2005, and Lensink and 
Hermes (2004) use loan loss provision as a measure of credit quality in their investigation of the effect of 
foreign entry.  
Figure 6.16: Loan loss/TA across year observations        Figure 6.17 Box plot of Loan loss/TA observations 
         
Figure 6.16 and 6.17 show scatter plots of Loan loss/TA across year observations. It could be noticed 
that the scatter plots show the highest level of cluster compared to other measures mentioned above. 
Figure 6.09 shows that Loan loss/TA is tightly distributed, with very few outliers.  
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Table 6.10: Measures of bank performance employed  
Measure of 
performance 
Definition Source Journal articles used  Justification 
Before Tax 
Profits/Total assets 
Pre-tax profit 
as a 
percentage 
of total 
assets 
Computed 
using 
BankScope 
data 
Clarke et al. (1999), 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga (1999), 
Claessens et al. (2001),  Unite and 
Sullivan (2003),Lensink and Hermes 
(2004) 
 
  
 
Measure of 
profitability/operating 
performance 
Net Interest 
Margin/Total assets 
The ratio of 
net interest 
income 
expressed as 
a percentage 
of earning 
assets 
Obtained 
form 
BankScope 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga 
(1999), Clarke et al. (1999), 
Claessens et al. (2001), 
Lensink and Hermes (2004), 
Shen et al. (2009) 
  
 
Reflects 
income/efficiency of 
banks 
Non-interest 
income/Total assets 
Total non-
interest 
operating 
income as a 
percentage 
of total 
assets 
Computed 
using 
BankScope 
data 
Claessens et al. (2001), Unite 
and Sullivan (2003), Lensink and 
Hermes (2004),  
Uiboupin (2005) 
  
 
Measures a bank’s level 
of non-lending activities 
Overheads/Total 
assets 
Overheads 
over total 
assets 
Computed 
using 
BankScope 
data 
Clarke et al. (1999), Denzier 
(1999), Claessens et al. 
(2001)Unite and Sullivan (2003), 
Lensink and Hermes (2004), 
Uiboupin (2005), Okuda (2007) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Measures 
efficiency/resource 
utilization 
Loan Loss 
provisioning/Total 
assets 
Loan loss 
provisions as 
a percentage 
of total 
assets 
Computed 
using 
BankScope 
data 
Claessens et al. (2001), Uiboupin 
(2005) 
Lensink and Hermes (2004) 
 
 
Measures credit 
quality/bank risk 
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Foreign presence measures 
Critical to this study is the approach towards measuring foreign presence. Similar to Shen et al. (2009), 
this study take identifies two definitions of foreign presence:  
MicroFP: defined as is the percentage of equity owned by foreigners in an individual bank. This covers all 
numerical values of foreign equity from 0% to 100%. Thus variation in this variable occurs between 
banks and years as the case may be. Unite and Sullivan (2003) and Okuda (2007) also employed this 
variable in their respective specifications. Figures 6.18-6.20 show distributions of the MicroFP variable in 
the population. 
Figure 6.18a shows the frequency distribution of MicroFP in the sample. It is quite evident that firms 
with no foreign equity dominate the sample, as the first column is way higher than the rest of the 
columns in the sample. This implies that firms with foreign equity constitute a small portion of the 
population of banks. Figure 6.18b shows the frequency distribution of firms with foreign equity, that is, 
firms with MicroFP greater than 0. It shows that banks with 40% foreign equity dominate the population 
by a large margin, while wholly foreign firms (100% foreign equity) constitute just above 10% of the 
sample of firms. In general, firms with foreign equity above 10% constitute the majority of firms with 
foreign equity.   
Figure 6.19a shows the density of MicroFP variable across years in the sample. The distribution is 
basically driven by the population of banks in the industry in each year. Thus it shows sharp declines in 
density in between 1998 and 1999, and 2004 and 2006, due to exit of firms or merger and acquisition 
activity. As noted earlier, there are missing values for year 2005 as foreign equity participation was not 
reported for that year by the source, NDIC. Figure a 6.19b show that among banks with foreign 
participation, sharp declines in density was not the case. This shows that the firms with foreign equity 
were less affected by the large scale exits that occurred in the industry, thus indicating a higher survival 
rate in the industry.  
Figure 6.20a shows yearly average value of MicroFP in the population of banks. It shows a remarkable 
surge in the mean foreign equity in the industry between the years 2004 and 2006. However, the huge 
rise coincides with extensive M&A activities which lead to the exit of many banks. In direct contrast to 
Figure 6.20a, Figure 6.20b shows that foreign equity among banks with foreign equity fell significantly 
between 2004 and 2006.  
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Figure 6.18a Frequency distribution of MicroFP in population 
  
Figure 6.19a Year density of MicroFP in population                                                  
  
Figure 6.20a Year distribution of mean values of MicroFP in population          
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Figure 6.18b Frequency distribution of MicroFP among banks with                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
foreign equity in the population 
Figure 6.19b Year density of MicroFP among banks with foreign 
equity in the population equity 
 
Figure 6.20b Year distribution of mean values of MicroFP 
among banks with foreign equity 
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MacroFP:  
This study defines MacroFP as the percentage of foreign banks in the industry for a particular year. A 
foreign bank is defined a bank with at least 10% foreign equity. This is a departure from Claessens et al. 
(2001) and Unite and Sullivan (2003), where foreign banks were defined as banks with at least 50% 
foreign equity. This is also different from Shen et al. (2009), where 5% foreign equity participation was 
used as the threshold for identifying a foreign bank. The justification for the use of 10% threshold in this 
study is due to the presence of regulatory caps imposed on foreign equity participation in Nigeria 
banking industry. For instance, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) imposed a 10% equity ceiling for 
foreign equity participation in 2007. Another reason is that the OECD definition of Foreign Direct 
Investment specifies that a 10% minimum foreign equity allows for a voting power or significant 
influence in management.  
Due to availability of population data on foreign equity participation, this study uses data on the entire 
banking industry to compute the MacroFP variable. This elimates the bias encountered in using sample 
data for foreign presence identified earlier in this study. Figure 6.16 shows the distribution of MacroFp 
across year observations. It can be noticed that substantial increase in foreign presence was 
experienced post 2005, which coincides with the consolidation era27. MacroFP variable varies only in 
year observations, unlike MicroFP variable with both cross-sectional and time dimension.  
   Figure 6.21 Foreign Presence (MacroFP) across year observations 
 
                                                          
27
 Part of the aims of the bank consolidation program initiated by the CBN was to promote foreign direct investment 
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Control variables 
We use Equity to total assets as an independent variable that affects bank performance. It is a measure 
of the share of total assets owned by shareholders. It measures capitalization (Clarke et al., 1999; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga, 1999; Abreu and Mendes, 2001), capital adequacy (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huzinga, 2000; Kasman et al. 2010), financial leverage of a bank (Galloway et al., 1997; Cole, 1998), or 
risk aversion (Poghosyan, 2010). A high equity to total assets signals that the need for external funding is 
minimal and thus higher NIM and profits (Abreu and Mendes, 2001). It also signals credit worthiness and 
solvency (Kasman et al. 2010). Higher equity to total assets could signal risk aversion as the bank would 
require higher margins for its equity financing as an alternative to external funding (Mcshane and 
Sharpe, 1985; Maudos and Guevara, 2004). There is also a need to cover the cost arising from 
differential equity and debt financing taxes (Kasman et al. 2010).  
On profitability, a wide range of literature opines that banks with high equity to total assets are more 
profitable (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2010). These include Demirguc-Kunt (1999), Goddard et al. (2004), 
Bennaceur and Goaied (2001, 2008), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), and Dietrich and Wanzenried 
(2010); they indicate that high capitalization results in cost reduction in terms of bankruptcy costs. This 
is contrary to the risk-return hypothesis, where low capitalized banks are expected to be less risk averse 
and therefore achieve higher returns. The fall in the need for external funding achieved through 
capitalization also boosts profitability (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2010).   
Customer and short term funding to total assets is also employed as a function of bank performance It 
consists of short and long term deposits, and other non-deposit short term funding as a share of total 
assets (Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga, 2000; Claessens et al., 2001; Uiboupin 2005; Lensink and Hermes, 
2004). It is a measure of liquidity risk (Ben-Khedhirir et al. 2008 Bank of Botswana, 2009). 
In addition, this study uses Non-interest earning assets to total assets as a regressor in the 
specifications. It consists of cash, non-interest earning deposit at other banks, and other non-interest 
earning assets over total assets (Claessens et al., 2001; Unite and Sullivan 2003; Lensink and Hermes, 
2004). These assets bear both financial and opportunity costs, where the opportunity cost is the cost of 
foregoing its use in generating income/revenue (Fathi, 2010).Profits are therefore deemed to be 
negatively related to non-interest earning assets (Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga, 2000).  
We also account for bank concentration in our model.We define bank concentration ratio (CR5) as the 
share of the five largest banks in terms of number of branches, to total branches in the industry.  
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Figure 6.22a Concentration ratios in the industry                Figure 6.22b Concentration ratios among local banks 
               
 
Macroeconomic variables 
To account for the effect of macroeconomic factors on foreign presence, this study uses measures of 
GDP growth, GDP per capita, Real interest rate, and inflation as independent variables.  
The Gross domestic product (GDP) is basically a demand-side indicator (Molyneux and Thorton 1992; 
Goddard et al., 2004). GDP growth/per capita controls for differences in income/development in cross-
country studies (Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga, 1999; Claessens et al., 2001; Liuhto et al., 2006); but for 
studies based on a particular country, it controls for changes in income levels (Unite and Sullivan, 2003) 
or business cycles (Wu, 2007; Shen et al., 2009). Demirguc-Kunt and Hu (2000) show that bank profits 
follow the business cycle. Thus growth effects on bank profitability can either be procyclical or 
countercyclical (Bikker and Hu, 2001). Empirical evidence shows that the effects of cycles vary according 
to the measure of performance implemented. Arpa et al. (2001) show that while GDP growth effects on 
credit risk are procyclical, its effect on net income are countercyclical. The rise in risk associated with 
downswings leads to a reduction in lending activity and a corresponding rise in loan loss provisions as 
loan quality declines (Athanasoglou et al. 2008). On the other hand, economic booms are usually 
associated with a surge in credit activity which can increase interest margins (Friedman and Kuttner, 
1993; Calza,2003; Athanasoglou et al. 2008). This increase in credit activity can be attributed to the 
improvement in financial conditions of borrowers during an economic upturn (Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta, 2009).  
Inflation is measured as the percentage change in Consumer Price Index (CPI). Economic theory predicts 
that inflation is positively related to nominal interest rates (Mankiw and taylor 2008). Thus higher 
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inflation is expected to lead to higher interest margins/spreads and profits (Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga, 
1999; Claessens et al.,2001; Unite and Sullivan, 2003).But the increase in profits depends on the 
corresponding increase in wages and operating expenses (Revell, 1979). It also largely depends on 
whether the inflation was anticipated or unanticipated. If inflation is anticipated, banks would adjust 
their interest rates, salaries, in other to make profits (Perry, 1992; Schwartz, 1995).        
The macroeconomic effects of interest rates include the reduction on investment, output, and 
employment. However, the microeconomic impacts can be quit different, especially in the case of banks. 
Interest rates are known to be positively associated with bank profits. Samuelson (1945) points out that 
an increase in interest rates will substantially increase profits of banks. However, Hancock (1945) show 
that the response of profits on loan rates are elastic, while that of deposit rates are inelastic. This is 
stemmed from Samuelson’s idea, which states, “Increased interest rates help any organization whose 
average time period of disbursements is greater than the time period of its receipts” (Samuelson, 1945, 
p.19). Thus a commercial bank is expected to be more profitable than a savings bank (Samuelson, 1945; 
Hannock, 1985). Furthermore, the volatility of interest rates is known to affect bank margins (Ohlson et 
al., 1980). This is linked to the fact that deposits (liabilities) are more interest sensitive than loans 
(assets), thus liabilities tend to grow faster (Ho and Saunders, 1981). Differences in maturity of assets 
and liabilities create a positive risk premium for loans and a negative risk premium for deposits, which 
are the necessary conditions for intermediation (Pyle, 1971; Ho and Saunders, 1981). Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huzinga (1999) and Claessens et al. (2001) used interest rates as an independent variable in their 
estimations. 
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6.3 Comparing data on Nigerian manufacturing firms and banks used in this study 
 
The data employed for our investigation of spillovers differ in various aspects. The main data on 
manufacturing firms were obtained on request from a survey on Nigerian enterprises conducted by 
CSAE and UNIDO, while the main source of data on banks was obtained from BankScope database. 
Manufacturing data has higher cross-sectional dimension (219 firms) than banking data (60 banks), 
while the opposite is the case for time dimension as data on banks consist 18 year observations 
compared to 6 year observations in the case of manufacturing firms. The important similarity of both 
datasets is therefore the fact that their respective measures of foreign presence used in this study are 
based on population or census data.   
 
Figure 6.22 Differences between data on manufacturing firms and data on banks 
 
 
 
 
 
             
     
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data on manufacturing firms Data on banks 
Nigerian manufacturing enterprise survey 
(NMES) conducted by CSAE, University of 
Oxford and UNIDO 
BankScope and NDIC annual reports – various 
issues 
Unbalanced panel – 219 firms for 6 years Unbalanced panel – 60 banks over 18 years 
Consists of 9 industries and 3 regions  No categorization – all universal banks 
Foreign presence measure based on census/population 
Data Source 
Data structure 
Firm/bank categorization 
Measure of foreign presence 
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Chapter 7: Model Specification and Econometric results 
 
7.1 Modeling FDI spillovers in Nigerian manufacturing 
 
The approach followed in this study is to model productivity of manufacturing firms through an 
augmented production function. This approach has been widely used in empirical investigation of 
spillovers. However, the extent to which we attempt to explain variations in productivity is limited to the 
variables available in the NMES dataset. We also limit the spillover estimation to intra-sectoral 
spillovers, due to unavailability of CBN data on foreign presence within regions. This section estimates 
the effect of foreign presence on productivity using two variants of an augmented Cobb-Douglas model: 
the first relates inputs and other relevant variables to output, while the second specifies Value added as 
a dependent variable. We present results using the two alternative measures of foreign presence: FP 
which is based on the CBN census data, and FPS which is based on the NMES sample.   
7.1.2 Output model  
 
Following Aitken and Harrison (1999) Djankov and Hoeikman (2000), Konishita (2000), we relate the 
value of output produced by a firm, to inputs of production: capital, labour, materials. Also, we include 
control variables that are deemed to affect output in Nigerian manufacturing, with a measure of foreign 
present into the model. Thus: 
                                                            (1)             
Where Y is the measure of productivity (log of output or value added), K is the log of real capital, L is the 
log of labour, M is the log of raw materials,     is the measure of foreign presence which captures 
sectoral spillovers, while ε is the stochastic error term. Subscripts i, j, and t denote firm, sector, and time 
respectively. We exclude dummy variables for sectors and regions for two reasons: First is that the F 
tests indicate that the dummies are statistically jointly insignificant, and secondly the dummy variables 
are marred with missing observations, which would reduce the number of observations considerably28. 
Table 7.1 presents the variable definitions for variables used in both the Output and Value added 
models.  
                                                          
28
 Attempts to add dummy variables into the equation led to the loss of 309 observations 
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At this stage, we impose the strong assumption that there is no significant firm specific or time specific 
effects in the model, and apply Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations to the model. As expected from 
data with a considerable cross-sectional dimension, Breusch-Pagan and Cook Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity show evidence of heteroskedasticity in all the models. Thus all OLS results are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and therefore the standard errors are robust.  
Table 7.1 Variable names, definitions, and similar usage in literature 
Variable label  Variable name Definition Similar usage in Literature 
 Dependent Variable   
Value added Value added in natural logarithms Output- (Total indirect costs + Raw 
materials 
Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999), 
Konishita (2000), Takii (2005), 
Sembenelli and Siotis (2008), 
Girma et al. (2001), Barrios and 
Strobl (2002), Todo and Miyamoto 
(2006),  
Y Output Value of manufactured output Kosteas (2008), Blalock and 
Gertler (2008),  Feinberg and 
Majumdar (2001),  
 Independent Variables   
K Capital Sum of Plant and equipment 
replacement value and Land and 
buildings market value 
Harris and Robinson (2004), Keller 
and Yeaple (2005), Castellani and 
Zanfei (2003, 2007), Girma (2005)  
L Labour Total number of people employed 
by the firm 
Aitken and Harrison (1999), Gorg 
et al. (2006), Liu (2008), Takii 
(2005), Girma et al. (2008), Yasar 
and Paul (2007) 
M Raw materials Value of raw materials used in 
production 
Aitken and Harrison (1999), Peri 
and Urban (2006), Javorcik (2004), 
Lopez and Cordova (2002), 
Konings (2001) 
FE Foreign equity participation Dummy for firms with any foreign 
ownership 
Konishita (2000), Dimelis and 
Louri (2002, 2004), Yasar and Paul 
(2007), Khalifah and Adam (2009) 
Age The age of the frm Present year-Year of inception Chuang and Lin (1999), Girma 
(2005), Castellani and Zanfei 
(2003, 2007) 
FP Spillover variable from CBN ii) Data on cumulative FPI in 
million naira (local currency) in 
each sector from CBN   
 
FPS Spillover variable from sample Defined as the share of foreign 
employment in industry – based 
on the NMES sample 
Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
Javorcik (2004)  
 
Table 7.2 shows the OLS results for the Output model for all firms (both domestic and foreign) and 
domestic firms. As in the case of most Cobb-Douglas models, the R2 is very high, ranging from 0.9483 to 
0.9711. This implies that more than 90% of variation in output can be explained by each model. All four 
models, (1)-(4), show positive and highly significant (0.1%) coefficients for the inputs of production: 
capital (K), labour (l), materials (M); implying that increases in inputs of production results in an increase 
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in outputs, this is expected due to the monotonicity assumption of production functions29. Exports (Exp) 
and Investment (Inv) dummies are both significant and statistically significant at 5% for models (1) and 
(2). This means that our results show that firms that export their products outside Nigeria, and firms 
that engage in investment are more productive than others. In terms of foreign presence, the positive 
and statistically significant coefficients for FE in (1) and (2) show that foreign firms are more productive 
than domestic firms as by about 13%. However, the variable of interest in this study FP, which measures 
the effect of foreign presence on all firms for (1) and (3), and FDI spillovers to domestic firms for (4) is 
not statistically significant. The p-value for the Ramsey Reset test shown in Table 7.2 shows evidence of 
misspecification for (1) to (3), but (4) is well specified.   
Table 7.3 shows similar results to Table 7.2, but the difference being in the measure of foreign presence. 
Foreign presence in Table 7.2 is based on census data from the Central Bank of Nigeria, while foreign 
presence FPS in Table 7.2 is based on share of foreign employment computed from the NMES sample. 
Estimates shown on both tables are very similar in both direction and significance but the measure of 
foreign presence FPS in Table 7.3 is negatively signed, albeit statistically insignificant. Thus the two sets 
of estimations show no evidence of spillovers. We therefore investigate another variant of the Cobb-
Douglas production function, using the value added in production as a dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Monotonicity property of a production function implies that an increase in inputs does not lead to a decrease in outputs 
(Varian, 1992) 
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Table 7.2 OLS results for Output model with FP variable (1998-2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent: Output All firms All firms All firms Dom. firms 
K 0.0305
***
 0.0311
***
 0.027
**
 0.037
***
 
 (3.45) (3.53) (3.1) (3.70) 
l 0.214
***
 0.216
***
 0.230
***
 0.209
***
 
 (9.74) (9.84) (11.05) (8.12) 
M 0.757
***
 0.759
***
 0.763
***
 0.742
***
 
 (61.27) (61.74) (63.01) (51.96) 
Age 0.000437 0.000113 0.000692 -0.00138 
 (0.27) (0.07) (0.42) (-0.68) 
FE 0.132
**
 0.138
**
   
 (2.25) (2.87)   
FP 0.00689  0.00741 0.00807 
 (1.72)  (1.84) (1.66) 
Constant 3.393
***
 3.369
***
 3.315
***
 3.570
***
 
 (11.87) (12.19) (11.59) (20.69) 
N 
R2 
Ramsey Test 
681 
0.9707 
0.0007 
681 
0.9706 
0.005 
681 
0.9705 
0.0001 
548 
0.9478 
0.0518 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
 
Table 7.3 OLS results for Output model with FPS variable (1998-2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent: Output  All firms All firms All firms Dom. firms 
K 0.0321
***
 0.0311
***
 0.0282
***
 0.0386
***
 
 (3.58) (3.53) (3.20) (3.80) 
l 0.2159
***
 0.216
***
 0.233
***
 0.213
***
 
 (9.81) (9.84) (11.19) (8.24) 
M 0.760
***
 0.759
***
 0.766
***
 0.745
***
 
 (61.03) (61.74) (62.86) (51.58) 
Age -0.000101 -0.000113 0.0001741 -0.00226 
 (-0.06) (-0.07) (0.10) (-1.11) 
FE 0.140
**
 0.138
**
   
 (2.36) (2.35)   
FPS -0.0417  -0.0359 -0.05594 
 (-0.69)  (-0.59) (-0.80) 
Constant 3.358
***
 3.369
***
 3.274
***
 3.5496
***
 
 (22.12) (22.41) (22.12) (20.30) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
678 
0.9706 
0.0006 
681 
0.9706 
0.0005 
678 
0.9703 
0.0001 
545 
0.9471 
0.0894 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
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7.1.3 Value added model  
 
An alternative measure of productivity of a firm is the value added measure. In this study, Value added 
is defined as: Output – (total indirect costs + raw materials). Following Konishita (2000), Takii (2005) and 
De Propris and Driffield (2006) we specify a Value added model: 
                                                                                                  (2) 
Where Y measures Value added, and all other variables are as previously defined in sub-section 7.1.2. 
However, the variable that measures the value of raw materials M is excluded from the specification, as 
it is a component of the dependent variable.  
Table 7.4 shows the OLS results for the Value added model on all firms, and domestic firms. The R2 in the 
models (1)-(3) show the about 76% of the variation in Value added can be explained by the model, while 
(4) show about 60% of the same. But importantly, as indicated by the p-value of the Ramsey Reset test, 
most of the specifications in Table 7.4 show no evidence of misspecification. Similar to the Output 
model, the inputs of production are positive and highly statistically significant at 0.01%. All models show 
that firms that export are more productive, but investment has no effect on productivity.   
Of particular interest are the variables that measure foreign participation. Models (1) and (2) in Table 
7.4 show that foreign ownership increases productivity by 65% and 68% respectively. Similarly, the FP 
variable is positive and statistically significant in all three models. In (3), FP is positive and statistically 
significant at 5%, showing a clear evidence of positive FDI spillovers to domestic firms in Nigerian 
manufacturing.  
A crucial goal of this study is to compare the results of spillover measures. Thus Table 7.5 shows results 
similar to Table 7.4, except for the use of FPS which the foreign presence measure based on the NMES 
sample in Table 7.5. From Table 7.5, FPS is insignificant in all three models, showing no evidence of 
productivity spillovers or foreign presence effect on all firms. Thus it is quite interesting that the use of 
foreign presence measures of the same country from two different sources yielded different results. 
However, we do not make conclusions with the estimates in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, as they do not account 
for firm specific effects that might affect productivity. We therefore turn our investigation to the use of 
panel data techniques of estimation to confirm if FDI spillovers occur in Nigerian manufacturing.  
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Table 7.4 OLS results for Value added model with FP variable (1998-2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent: Value 
added 
All firms All firms All firms Dom. firms 
K 0.155
***
 0.161
***
 0.145
***
 0.163
***
 
 (7.10) (7.38) (7.38) (6.83) 
l 0.8567
***
 0.871
***
 0.915
***
 0.804
***
 
 (16.95) (17.30) (20.19) (13.87) 
Age -0.00270 -0.0041 -0.00270 -0.0087 
 (-0.63) (-0.96) (-0.62) (-1.68) 
FE 0.655
***
 0.688
***
   
 (4.35) (4.56)   
FP 0.0261
**
  0.0298
***
 0.0208
*
 
 (2.45)  (3.40) (1.64) 
Constant 10.05
***
 10.02
***
 9.972
***
 10.23
***
 
 (37.88) (37.68) (40.77) (35.29) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
662 
0.7640 
0.0476 
662 
0.7619 
0.0531 
662 
0.7614 
0.0009 
531 
0.6008 
0.2234 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
 
 
Table 7.5 OLS results for Value added model with FPS variable (1998-2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent: Value 
added 
All firms All firms All firms Dom. firms 
K 0.159
***
 0.161
***
 0.148
***
 0.165
***
 
 (7.14) (7.38) (6.63) (6.75) 
l 0.863
***
 0.871
***
 0.980
***
 0.810
***
 
 (17.06) (17.30) (22.03) (14.03) 
Age -0.00346 -0.0041 -0.0022 -0.0103 
 (-0.79) (-0.96) (-0.51) (-1.98) 
FE 0.7008
***
 0.688
***
   
 (4.62) (4.56)   
FPS 0.1007  0.156 0.0377 
 (0.64)  (0.97) (0.21) 
Constant 10.03
***
 10.02
***
 9.875
***
 10.25
***
 
 (37.71) (37.68) (36.86) (35.38) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
659 
0.7625 
0.0396 
662 
0.7619 
0.0531 
659 
0.7547 
0.0007 
528 
0.5963 
0.1843 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
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7.1.4 Panel data modeling: Manufacturing firms data 
 
The time and cross-sectional dimensions of the data (see Chapter 6 for details of data) used for the 
investigation of FDI spillovers allow for the use of panel data techniques which account for 
heterogeneity across firms and years. Thus both equations (1) and (2) can be re-specified as 
             
 
                                                                                                                                (3) 
Y is the measure of productivity, output or value added;    are the explanatory variables that affect 
productivity;    controls for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity;    accounts for the shifts in 
intercept over time or time specific effects; while     is the stochastic error term. Subscripts i and t 
denote firm and time respectively. An important extension of (3) from (1) and (2) is that the (3) includes 
   which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity of firms which can result in inefficient estimates and 
invalid standard errors if OLS were used, especially in cases where it is correlated with the explanatory 
variables (Dougherty, 2006). The assumptions regarding the correlation of unobservable firm 
heterogeneity with the explanatory variables is the major difference between the two major panel data 
techniques: Fixed effects and Random effects. While Fixed effects approach assumes that     and    are 
correlated, Random effects assumes that they are uncorrelated. The choice between Fixed and Random 
effects can be formally tested using the Hausman test. It tests for the presence of systematic differences 
in coefficients of Fixed and Random effects models. The statistically significance of the test, which is 
basically a χ2 test, is an evidence in support of the Fixed effects approach. In all the estimations reported 
in this Chapter, the Hausman test clearly indicates that the Fixed Effects model is preferred to the 
Random effects model. Thus our panel data regressions in this study will be restricted to Fixed effects 
models.  
Fixed effects approach 
The form of Fixed effects model used in this study is the least-square dummy variable model. It is based 
on the assumption that the unobservable firm heterogeneity    is the coefficient of a dummy variable   
             
 
         
 
                                                                                                                (4)                
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Where    is the dummy variable for each individual firm in the sample, other variables remain as 
previously defined. The consequence of the inclusion of the dummy variable is that the each cross-
sectional unit (firm in this case) will have its own constant term in the model, while the slopes remain 
fixed across firm observations (Baum, 2006).  
The application of Fixed effects models to FDI spillovers model imply that in addition to accounting for 
observable factors which are deemed to affect productivity in the model, the model also accounts for 
unobservable factors that may affect productivity such as managerial skill, know-how, and other forms 
of ownership advantages. Thus we apply the same variables specified in equations (1) and (2) using fixed 
effects estimation techniques.  
Table 7.6 show the fixed effects estimates for the Output model on All firms and Domestic firms. Similar 
to the OLS results in Table 7.2, the R2 is very high, ranging from 0.9241 to 0.9668 in the four models 
specified. Thus more than 92% of the variation in output can be explained by then each of the models. 
An important measure in fixed effects models is the Rho value which measures the percentage of 
variation in dependent variable related to differences in cross-sectional observations. Thus in the 
models in Table 7.6, (1)-(3) show that more than 75% of the variation in Output is attributed to firm 
specific heterogeneity. In the case of (4), which consists of domestic firms exclusively, a slightly lower 
Rho of 0.6578 is obtained. This may be connected to the fact the model on domestic firms may be have 
less firm specific heterogeneity compared to the models with both domestic and foreign firms. This 
seems reasonable because foreign firms are quite different from domestic firms in various aspects.  
Models (1)-(3) show that that input measures such as labour and materials are positive and highly 
significant, while capital K is insignificant in all models. Exports and Investment are important 
determinants of variations in Output as indicated by their positive and statistical significance in all four 
models. Unlike Table 7.2 which is based on OLS estimates, our variable of interest, FP is positive and 
statistically significant in all three models in the Fixed effects estimates reported in Table 7.6. Of 
particular importance is the FP coefficient for model (4) which measures FDI spillovers to domestic firms. 
The coefficients show a strong evidence of FDI productivity spillovers to domestic firms in Nigeria. The 
coefficient of 0.0465 imply that a unit increase in the level of foreign presence in an industry will result 
in about 5% increase output 
We also compare the FP coefficients with that of its alternative measure FPS in Table 7.6. In direct 
contrast, Table 7.7 show negative and statistically significant coefficients for foreign presence in all three 
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models. This is strong evidence that foreign presence measures based on a sample can yield misleading 
results.   
Table 7.6 Fixed effects results for Output model with FP variable (1998-2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent: Output All firms All firms All firms Dom. firms 
K -0.0165 -0.0140 -0.0194 0.0513 
 (-0.36) (0.17) (-0.42) (0.70) 
l 0.106
*
 0.114
**
 0.109
**
 0.0884 
 (2.69) (2.76) (2.78) (2.03) 
M 0.709
***
 0.705
***
 0.708
***
 0.7102
***
 
 (30.67) (30.18) (30.72) (27.36) 
Age -0.0138 -0.0033 -0.0141 -0.0218
*
 
 (-1.53) (-0.60) (-1.56) (-2.06) 
FE 0.1063 0.1036   
 (0.80) (0.71)   
FP 0.0331
***
  0.0331
***
 0.0465
***
 
 (3.20)  (3.20) (3.45) 
Constant 5.541
***
 5.426
***
 5.630
***
 4.5150
***
 
 (6.77) (6.21) (6.95) (3.92) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
681 
0.9576 
0.7647 
681 
0.9668 
0.7519 
681 
0.9563 
0.7813 
548 
0.9241 
0.6578 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 7.7 Fixed effects results for Output model with FPS variable (1998-2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent: Output All firms All firms All firms Dom. firms 
K -0.0130 -0.0140 -0.0161 0.0426 
 (-0.28) (0.17) (-0.35) (0.57) 
l 0.116
**
 0.114
**
 0.119
**
 0.105
*
 
 (2.93) (2.76) (3.02) (2.39) 
M 0.705
***
 0.705
***
 0.703
***
 0.706
***
 
 (30.33) (30.18) (30.37) (26.97) 
Age -0.00673 -0.0033 -0.00703 -0.0142 
 (-0.77) (-0.60) (-0.81) (-1.37) 
FE 0.1149 0.1036   
 (0.85) (0.71)   
FPS -0.179
*
  -0.177
*
 -0.251
*
 
 (-2.21)  (-2.18) (-2.36) 
Constant 5.547
***
 5.426
***
 5.642
***
 4.741
***
 
 (6.36) (6.21) (6.91) (4.05) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
678 
0.9653 
0.7663 
681 
0.9668 
0.7519 
678 
0.9643 
0.7851 
545 
0.9401 
0.6078 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 7.8 shows the estimates of the Value added model using Fixed effects estimation techniques. The 
R2 show of the four models show that between 51-68% of variation in Value added can be explained by 
the models. But of higher magnitude, is the Rho value, which indicates that between 72-82% of the 
variation in Value added can be attributed to firm specific heterogeneity. Our model of interest (4), 
show that the inputs of production are statistically significant, the age of a firms, reduces its 
productivity, and firms that invest have higher value added. Also, of particular interest, the FP variable is 
positive and statistically significant in model (4), implying that the value added model also show 
evidence of FDI spillovers to domestic firms. It indicated that a unit increase in FP would lead to a 7% 
rise in value added of domestic firms.  
 
We also compare our results with that of the models with the FPS variable. As in the case of the output 
models, Table 7.9 show negative and statistically significant coefficients for all the models.  
 
Table 7.8 Fixed effects results for Value added model with FP variable (1998-2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent: Value 
added 
All firms All firms All firms Dom. firms 
K 0.157 0.162 0.170 0.339
*
 
 (1.56) (1.60) (1.69) (2.19) 
l 0.460
***
 0.473
***
 0.449
***
 0.425
***
 
 (5.47) (5.61) (5.35) (4.72) 
Age -0.0357 -0.0168 -0.0346 -0.0736
*
 
 (-1.78) (-0.90) (-1.73) (-2.12) 
FE -0.523 -0.531   
 (-1.76) (-1.78)   
FP 0.0607
**
  0.0611
**
 0.0735
*
 
 (2.61)  (2.63) (2.48) 
Constant 12.23
***
 11.92
***
 11.93
***
 9.30
***
 
 (7.34) (7.13) (7.18) (3.94) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
662 
0.6163 
0.8155 
662 
0.6821 
0.8082 
662 
0.6720 
0.7857 
531 
0.5166 
0.7285 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 7.9 Fixed effects results for Value added model with FPS variable (1998-2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent: Value 
added 
All firms All firms All firms Dom. firms 
K 0.162 0.162 0.175 0.319
*
 
 (1.61) (1.60) (1.73) (2.05) 
l 0.475
***
 0.473
***
 0.466
***
 0.447
***
 
 (5.66) (5.61) (5.54) (4.98) 
Age -0.0239 -0.0168 -0.0230 -0.0376 
 (-1.25) (-0.90) (-1.20) (-1.71) 
FE -0.503 -0.531   
 (-1.69) (-1.78)   
FPS -0.388
*
  -0.401
*
 -0.502
*
 
 (-2.14)  (-2.21) (-2.17) 
Constant 12.20
***
 11.92
***
 11.92
***
 9.703
***
 
 (7.30) (7.13) (7.16) (4.07) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
659 
0.6585 
0.8188 
662 
0.6821 
0.8082 
659 
0.7115 
0.7896 
528 
0.5399 
0.70 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
Overall, our results of the estimates on manufacturing firms show evidence of positive productivity 
spillovers in both OLS models and Fixed effects. The evidence of spillovers is stronger in Fixed effects 
models than the OLS models. In addition to evidence of FDI spillovers to domestic firms, the estimates 
also show that foreign presence increases productivity of the overall firms in the industry (both foreign 
and domestic). Also, there is evidence that foreign firms are more productive than domestic firms in 
Nigerian manufacturing sector.  
 
In addition, the results show that foreign presence measure based on a limited sample can lead to 
misleading results as they show evidence of negative spillovers, which is contrary to the positive 
spillovers obtained from the CBN based measure based on a census of firms.  
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7.2 Modeling the impact of foreign entry on bank performance 
 
In this section, we estimate the impact of foreign presence on the performance of banks using data on 
Nigerian banks sourced from BankScope. Our approach is to estimate the impact on key indicators of 
performance commonly used in literature. This involves the estimation of impact of foreign presence on 
measures of profitability, costs, and risk. Thus the specification is based on the following accounting 
identity:  
Before Tax Profits/Total assets = (Net Interest Margin + Non-interest income – Overheads – Loan Loss 
provisioning)/Total assets  
All the variables that constitute the accounting identity will be used as dependent variables in our 
model. We therefore specify the model as  
   
                     
                                                                                      (5) 
   is a vector of measures of bank performance. We define           as the percentage of foreign 
banks to total banks in a given year. Foreign banks are banks with at least 10% foreign equity ownership. 
   is a vector of bank specific variables known to affect the performance of banks; while    is a vector 
of macroeconomic variables.     denotes the error term.  
Empirical models of bank performance are marred by lack of clear theoretical underpinnings. Thus the 
same explanatory variables are used for different dependent variables that measure bank performance. 
This is true of empirical studies such as. Claessens et al. (2001), Unite and Sullivan (2003) Lensink and 
Hermes (2004) Liuhto et al. (2006). This study therefore follows these studies closely in choice of 
variables. However, dummy variables such as CRI which measure the periods of crises in Nigerian 
banking industry are peculiar to this study. 
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Table 7.10 Variables names, definitions, and similar usage in literature (banks) 
Variable label Variable  Definition 
Dependent variables  
NIM NIM/ TA Net interest margin over total assets: interest 
income minus interest expense over total 
assets 
 
NII NII/ TA Noninterest income over total assets 
BTP BTP/ TA before tax profits over total assets 
 
OV Overhead /TA personal expenses and other non-interest 
expenses over total assets 
 
LLP/TA LLP/ TA Loan loss provisions over total assets 
Independent variables   
EQ Equity/TA book value of equity (assets minus liabilities) 
over total assets 
NEA NEA/TA cash, non-interest earning deposit at other 
banks, and other non-interest earning assets 
over total assets 
CSTF CSTF/TA all short term and long term deposits plus 
other non-deposit short term funding over 
total assets 
OV Overhead / TA  
LN loans  
 Macroeconomic variables 
GCAP GDP/cap real GDP per capita in thousands of US$ 
GDP Growth annual growth rate in real GDP 
INF Inflation the annual inflation of the GDP deflator 
R Real interest the nominal interest rate minus rate of 
inflation 
MacroFP MacroFP The number of foreign banks to total number 
of banks. Foreign banks are banks with at 
least 10% foreign ownership 
MicroFP MicroFP % of equity owned by foreigners 
GVT Government  % of equity owned by governement 
CRI Crises dummy Dummy variable that captures years of bank 
industry instability 
CONC Bank concentration (CR5) Ratio of number of branches of the 5 largest 
banks to total branches in the industry 
 
Table 7.11 shows OLS estimates of five different models of bank performance on domestic banks. The 
explanatory variables in each model explain between 34-49% of variation in each of the measures of 
performance. The Ramsey Reset test shows evidence of misspecification in all models. Most of the bank 
specific variables are insignificant in all five models. However, non-earning assets NEA increase positive 
relationship with Overheads. This is similar to Claessens et al. (2001) findings based on first differences.  
The crises dummy is negative and statistically significant for the measures of profitability and risks, 
implying that in periods of crises, a significant loss of profits, non-interest income and rise in loan loss 
provisions due to the high risk in those periods. Thus the coefficients are representative of the Nigerian 
banking industry. As in the case of Hermes and lensink (2004), GDP per capital show significant 
relationship with profits BTP and margins NIM.  
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Our variable of interest, MacroFP, shows positive and statistically significant results for measures of 
profits and non-interest income. The result is similar to the findings in Lensink and Hermes (2004), 
Okuda and Rungsomboom (2007) and Xu (2011). The positive effect of foreign presence is also true for 
NII in estimations that include both foreign and domestic firms, as shown in Appendix 7.1, Table A1. The 
measure of the effect of foreign equity on bank performance MicroFP, is insignificant in all the five 
models, as indicated in Appendix 7.1, Table A2.  
As in the case of the estimates on manufacturing models, we compare the foreign presence measure 
with an alternative measure computed from the sample of Nigerian banks on BankScope, MacroFPS, as 
shown in Table 7.12. It is evident that there is no statistically significant effect of MacroFPS on all the 
models.  
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Table 7.11 OLS results for domestic firms with MacroFP variable (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BTP NIM NII OV LLP 
EQ -0.000912 0.127 0.00351 -0.00194 0.0295 
 (-0.02) (1.31) (0.18) (-0.09) (0.94) 
NEA 0.00360 0.102 -0.0280 0.186
***
 -0.0825 
 (0.04) (1.12) (-0.90) (4.01) (-1.05) 
CSTF -0.000291 0.232
*
 -0.0243 0.0411 0.0509 
 (-0.01) (2.53) (-1.00) (1.44) (1.19) 
OV -0.649
*
 0.429
*
 0.462
**
  0.506 
 (-2.25) (2.17) (3.21)  (1.94) 
MacroFP 0.301
*
 -0.0478 0.113
*
 -0.121 -0.140 
 (2.00) (-0.44) (2.17) (-1.76) (-1.05) 
TA -0.00968 -0.00463 -0.00101 -0.00168 0.00557 
 (-1.66) (-1.15) (-0.71) (-1.07) (1.12) 
LN 0.0540 0.0238
*
 0.00238 -0.00142 -0.0386 
 (1.89) (2.08) (0.61) (-0.23) (-1.47) 
GVT 0.00841 0.0408 -0.0188
*
 -0.0248 -0.0152 
 (0.36) (1.29) (-1.98) (-1.63) (-0.70) 
CRI -11.62
*
 -2.462 -1.410
*
 2.182 9.515
*
 
 (-2.28) (-1.63) (-2.30) (1.91) (2.02) 
CONC -24.48 -19.24 29.51
*
 -11.79 37.92 
 (-1.02) (-0.76) (2.42) (-0.82) (1.97) 
GCAP -0.282
*
 -0.103
*
 -0.0134 0.0129 0.228
*
 
 (-2.35) (-2.48) (-0.80) (0.42) (2.06) 
INF -0.0608 -0.0832 0.109
**
 0.0400 0.115
**
 
 (-1.17) (-1.39) (2.87) (1.08) (2.62) 
R 0.125
**
 0.109
*
 0.0214 0.0382 -0.0867
*
 
 (2.66) (2.29) (1.01) (1.37) (-2.37) 
CRR -0.846 -0.482 0.360 -0.0554 1.050
*
 
 (-1.55) (-1.00) (1.80) (-0.19) (2.27) 
Constant 136.4
*
 42.45 -8.787 4.319 -122.4
*
 
 (2.34) (1.41) (-0.78) (0.24) (-2.33) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
232 
0.3829 
0.0000 
232 
0.4931 
0.0000 
232 
0.4384 
0.1946 
232 
0.3944 
0.0081 
232 
0.3453 
0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 
 
Table 7.12 OLS results for domestic firms with MacroFPS variable (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BTP NIM NII OV LLP 
EQ -0.000123 0.126 0.00375 -0.00122 0.0291 
 (-0.00) (1.30) (0.19) (-0.06) (0.89) 
NEA 0.00404 0.100 -0.0280 0.189
***
 -0.0828 
 (0.05) (1.11) (-0.89) (4.07) (-1.07) 
CSTF 0.00167 0.230
*
 -0.0237 0.0426 0.0499 
 (0.03) (2.50) (-0.99) (1.51) (1.12) 
OV -0.672
*
 0.438
*
 0.454
**
  0.517 
 (-2.25) (2.25) (3.13)  (1.92) 
MacroFPS 1.918 -5.396 0.195 8.682 -1.168 
 (0.15) (-0.53) (0.03) (1.11) (-0.12) 
TA -0.00743 -0.00453 -0.000113 -0.00343 0.00454 
 (-1.33) (-1.14) (-0.07) (-1.90) (0.96) 
LN 0.0475 0.0238
*
 -0.000201 0.00321 -0.0356 
 (1.72) (2.12) (-0.05) (0.48) (-1.41) 
GVT 0.00804 0.0416 -0.0188
*
 -0.0260 -0.0150 
 (0.36) (1.32) (-2.03) (-1.69) (-0.71) 
CRI -10.61
*
 -2.445 -1.010 1.444 9.053
*
 
 (-2.13) (-1.63) (-1.68) (1.24) (1.98) 
CONC -18.09 -27.05 31.22
*
 -1.769 34.57 
 (-0.59) (-0.77) (2.08) (-0.09) (1.38) 
GCAP -0.231
*
 -0.100
*
 0.00726 -0.0288 0.204 
 (-1.98) (-2.43) (0.41) (-0.90) (1.94) 
INF -0.0568 -0.102 0.109
*
 0.0715 0.112 
 (-0.81) (-1.22) (2.42) (1.37) (1.89) 
R 0.0953
*
 0.116
*
 0.0104 0.0451 -0.0726
*
 
 (2.18) (2.19) (0.49) (1.59) (-2.32) 
CRR -0.696 -0.468 0.421
*
 -0.188 0.982
*
 
 (-1.26) (-1.00) (2.12) (-0.67) (2.17) 
Constant 118.0
*
 45.31 -15.76 11.91 -113.8
*
 
 (2.21) (1.42) (-1.38) (0.65) (-2.38) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
232 
0.3730 
0.0000 
232 
0.4935 
0.0000 
232 
0.4320 
0.0566 
232 
0.3944 
0.0216 
232 
0.3422 
0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
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An alternative specification of bank performance models is to specify the variables in first differences. 
This implies that all variables in the models will be in form of the changes from their previous year 
values. Thus following Claessens et al. (2001), we re-specify (5) in first differences  
 
    
                       
                                                                                                      (6) 
 
Where   denotes first differences, and all variables are as previously defined. 
 
Table 7.13 shows the OLS results for first difference models of bank performance on domestic firms. A 
key consequence of differencing is the loss of observation and therefore loss of degrees of freedom of 
the estimations. The R2 values indicate that the explanatory variables explain 28-38% of variations in 
each of the models. There is strong evidence of misspecification in all five models .Changes in NEA also 
show a positive association with Overheads, as in the case of the specifications in levels. However, our 
variable of interest, ∆MacroFP is statistically insignificant in all five models in Table 7.13. As in the 
previous specifications, we compare the values with the models based on foreign presence measures 
based on the sample. From Table 7.14 there is evidence of positive association between ∆MacroFP and 
∆OV. Thus the results reported on Table 7.13 and Table 7.14 also shows that different measures of 
foreign presence could produce different results, as the foreign presence measure based on the 
population of firms,  ∆MacroFP , was insignificant in all models, while the measure based on the sample, 
∆MacroFPS was significant in change in Overheads model (4).  
 
However, the specifications based on the entire sample of foreign and domestic banks (Appendix 7.2, 
Table A3) show that ∆MacroFP is positively related to ∆BTP and negatively related to ∆LLP. This implies 
that there is evidence that foreign presence is negatively associated with risks in the Nigerian banking 
industry. There is also no evidence of changes in foreign equity participation with changes in bank 
performance, as indicated by estimates of MicroFP reported in Appendix 7.1, Table A4.  
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Table 7.13 OLS results for domestic firms with ∆MacroFP variable – first differences (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆BTP ∆NIM ∆NII ∆OV ∆LLP 
∆EQ -0.00738 0.0883
***
 -0.00901 0.0220 0.0376 
 (-0.13) (3.64) (-0.63) (0.66) (0.84) 
∆NEA 0.115 0.169 -0.0361 0.211
*
 -0.186 
 (0.85) (1.40) (-1.07) (2.38) (-1.65) 
∆CSTF -0.107 -0.00668 -0.00655 0.0498 0.127
*
 
 (-1.51) (-0.14) (-0.33) (1.02) (2.19) 
∆OV -0.801 0.408 0.367
***
  0.626 
 (-1.97) (1.86) (6.06)  (1.78) 
∆MacroFP 0.224 0.0312 0.0787 0.0168 -0.0962 
 (1.94) (0.43) (1.83) (0.29) (-0.95) 
∆TA 0.0137 0.00225 -0.0000365 -0.00589
**
 -0.0121 
 (1.56) (0.86) (-0.03) (-2.63) (-1.56) 
∆LN 0.00624 0.00255 -0.00425 0.00427 -0.0113 
 (0.31) (0.40) (-1.56) (1.00) (-0.64) 
CRI 0.559 1.348 -0.289 1.838 0.674 
 (0.17) (0.85) (-0.33) (1.70) (0.25) 
∆CONC -18.01 -14.05 26.34
*
 5.638 49.98 
 (-0.50) (-0.52) (2.19) (0.29) (1.72) 
∆GCAP 0.0255 0.0190 -0.00374 0.0723 0.00122 
 (0.22) (0.34) (-0.11) (1.82) (0.01) 
∆INF -0.0663 -0.0429 0.0600
**
 0.0677 0.0965
***
 
 (-1.90) (-1.21) (2.91) (1.87) (4.06) 
∆R -0.00859 -0.00877 0.0238
*
 -0.00358 0.00421 
 (-0.31) (-0.39) (2.00) (-0.18) (0.19) 
∆CRR -0.271 -0.0392 -0.105 -0.135 0.0957 
 (-0.95) (-0.19) (-0.91) (-0.73) (0.40) 
Constant -1.143 -1.346 0.698 -1.977 0.498 
 (-0.36) (-0.82) (0.69) (-1.74) (0.19) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
180 
0.3479 
0.0000 
180 
0.2879 
0.0000 
180 
0.3872 
0.0156 
180 
0.3031 
0.0000 
180 
0.3577 
0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
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Table 7.14 OLS results for domestic firms with ∆MacroFPS variable – first differences (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆BTP ∆NIM ∆NII ∆OV ∆LLP 
∆EQ -0.00900 0.0847
***
 -0.00778 0.0282 0.0394 
 (-0.16) (3.49) (-0.53) (0.90) (0.88) 
∆NEA 0.106 0.153 -0.0322 0.228
*
 -0.177 
 (0.82) (1.33) (-0.94) (2.58) (-1.64) 
∆CSTF -0.107 -0.0129 -0.00354 0.0603 0.130
*
 
 (-1.52) (-0.26) (-0.17) (1.33) (2.22) 
∆OV -0.782 0.440
*
 0.359
***
  0.608 
 (-1.88) (2.10) (6.17)  (1.67) 
∆MacroFPS -3.773 -7.734 2.460 15.85
**
 3.891 
 (-0.45) (-1.06) (0.70) (2.64) (0.69) 
∆TA 0.0107 0.00144 -0.000853 -0.00482
*
 -0.0107 
 (1.32) (0.58) (-0.65) (-2.24) (-1.47) 
∆LN 0.00985 0.00343 -0.00318 0.00340 -0.0130 
 (0.50) (0.56) (-1.21) (0.84) (-0.75) 
CRI -2.088 -0.0911 -0.657 3.926
***
 2.148 
 (-0.66) (-0.05) (-0.68) (3.37) (0.81) 
∆CONC -32.64 -29.71 28.36 34.69 60.55 
 (-0.83) (-0.94) (1.91) (1.46) (1.94) 
∆GCAP -0.0631 -0.0346 -0.0132 0.154
***
 0.0522 
 (-0.57) (-0.53) (-0.35) (3.43) (0.55) 
∆INF -0.0758 -0.0622 0.0661
**
 0.103
**
 0.106
***
 
 (-1.61) (-1.43) (3.24) (2.82) (3.42) 
∆R 0.00822 0.00960 0.0213 -0.0380 -0.00806 
 (0.23) (0.31) (1.57) (-1.69) (-0.32) 
∆CRR -0.155 -0.110 -0.0186 0.0761 0.0733 
 (-0.60) (-0.55) (-0.16) (0.48) (0.37) 
Constant 1.653 0.265 1.039 -4.383
***
 -1.088 
 (0.53) (0.14) (0.94) (-3.53) (-0.42) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
180 
0.3418 
0.0000 
180 
0.2941 
0.0000 
180 
0.3809 
0.0241 
180 
0.3481 
0.0000 
180 
0.3568 
0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
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7.2.1 Panel data models: Banks 
 
We extend equation (5), to account for unobserved heterogeneity that may bias the OLS estimates 
reported in previous tables. As in the case of manufacturing firms’ estimations, we employ Fixed effects 
approach of panel data modeling, as the Hausman test also confirms the adequacy of the model in 
comparison to the alternative model, Random effects.  Thus we re-specify (5) as a Fixed effects model: 
 
   
            
 
         
 
                                                                                                     (6)                                                              
 
Equation (6) relates bank performance variables    
  to a vector of explanatory variables    defined in 
Table 7.10;    which accounts for unobserved bank-specific effects;    is a dummy variable for each 
individual bank in the sample,    accounts for time-specific effects, while     is the stochastic error term. 
The Fixed effects model (6) assumes that the    is correlated with    . 
 
Table 7.15 shows the estimates of the fixed effects model of the effect of foreign presence on domestic 
firms. The overall R2 of the models are lower than the equivalent using OLS estimates in Table 7.11. For 
example, the R2 for the LLP model show that only about 29% of the variations in the explanatory variable 
can be explained by the model. However, in terms of the percentage of variation accounted by bank-
specific heterogeneity, NIM, NII, and OV models show values above 60%. Thus this implies that panel 
estimates are more appropriate for modeling performance of Nigerian banks. Unlike the OLS estimates, 
key bank specific variables such as NEA, CSTF, and OV are statistically significant in most models. As 
expected, the measure of overheads OV is negatively associated with profitability measures: BTP, NIM, 
and NII. Also, the crises dummy CRI, is negative and statistically significant to measures of profitability, 
and positively related to measures of costs (OV) and risks (LLP).  
 
However, the main variable in focus, MacroFP, is insignificant in all five models reported in Table 7.15. 
This implies that after controlling for bank-specific effects, foreign presence shows no significant effect 
on the performance of Nigerian banks. This is also true of the alternative specification on Table 7.16, 
using the foreign presence measure based on the sample, as no statistically significant estimates were 
obtained. In addition, alternative specifications (Appendix 7.1, table A5 and A6) based on all firms and 
the effect of foreign equity participation also has insignificant coefficients. 
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As in the case of the OLS models, we also run similar regressions using the first differences. The results 
reported in Appendix 7.1 Table A7, show no evidence of foreign bank effect on domestic banks. 
However, specifications based on the entire sample of banks show evidence of positive association 
between changes in foreign presence and changes in bank profits (BTP), and negative relationship with 
risks (LLP).  
 
Table 7.15 Fixed effects results for domestic firms with MacroFP variable (1992-2009 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BTP NIM NII OV LLP 
EQ -0.00775 0.0649 -0.00606 0.00313 0.0420 
 (-0.16) (1.83) (-0.35) (0.13) (1.06) 
NEA -0.0123 0.185
**
 -0.0767
*
 0.254
***
 -0.0900 
 (-0.15) (2.94) (-2.47) (6.44) (-1.28) 
CSTF -0.0133 0.107
**
 0.00128 0.0302 0.0833 
 (-0.25) (2.71) (0.07) (1.10) (1.89) 
OV -0.633
***
 0.446
***
 0.313
***
  0.428
***
 
 (-4.27) (4.03) (5.75)  (3.47) 
MacroFP 0.181 0.0131 0.0890 -0.115 -0.0531 
 (1.14) (0.11) (1.54) (-1.41) (-0.40) 
TA -0.00360 -0.00275 -0.00209 -0.00253 0.0000756 
 (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.83) (-0.71) (0.01) 
LN 0.0518
**
 0.0169 0.00450 -0.00214 -0.0379
*
 
 (2.66) (1.16) (0.63) (-0.21) (-2.34) 
GVT 0.0896 0.316
***
 -0.0396 0.0143 -0.0482 
 (1.59) (7.53) (-1.92) (0.49) (-1.03) 
CRI -11.08
***
 -1.563 -1.572
*
 2.441
*
 8.960
***
 
 (-5.53) (-1.05) (-2.14) (2.39) (5.38) 
CONC -36.22 -25.95 20.95
*
 -12.89 39.86
*
 
 (-1.51) (-1.45) (2.38) (-1.04) (2.00) 
GCAP -0.312
***
 -0.0716 -0.0201 0.0409 0.256
***
 
 (-5.61) (-1.72) (-0.98) (1.42) (5.53) 
INF -0.0832 -0.0763 0.0822
***
 0.0186 0.118
**
 
 (-1.56) (-1.92) (4.20) (0.67) (2.66) 
R 0.110
*
 0.0725
*
 0.0346
*
 0.0269 -0.0619 
 (2.39) (2.12) (2.06) (1.13) (-1.63) 
CRR -0.962
*
 -0.356 0.225 -0.0527 1.107
**
 
 (-2.20) (-1.09) (1.40) (-0.23) (3.04) 
Constant 155.9
***
 36.30 0.0288 -6.552 -136.7
***
 
 (5.34) (1.66) (0.00) (-0.43) (-5.63) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
232 
0.3146 
0.4792 
232 
0.3177 
0.7119 
232 
0.3467 
0.6652 
232 
0.3116 
0.6030 
232 
0.2906 
0.4923 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 7.16 Fixed effects results for domestic firms with MacroFPS variable (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BTP NIM NII OV LLP 
EQ -0.00917 0.0646 -0.00652 0.00496 0.0426 
 (-0.19) (1.83) (-0.37) (0.20) (1.08) 
NEA -0.0171 0.183
**
 -0.0771
*
 0.262
***
 -0.0864 
 (-0.20) (2.89) (-2.45) (6.71) (-1.22) 
CSTF -0.0156 0.107
**
 0.000898 0.0344 0.0848 
 (-0.29) (2.69) (0.05) (1.26) (1.92) 
OV -0.647
***
 0.449
***
 0.302
***
  0.427
***
 
 (-4.32) (4.03) (5.47)  (3.44) 
MacroFPS -2.219 -2.125 1.259 10.95 3.312 
 (-0.20) (-0.26) (0.31) (1.92) (0.36) 
TA -0.00161 -0.00238 -0.00137 -0.00483 -0.000806 
 (-0.24) (-0.47) (-0.55) (-1.39) (-0.14) 
LN 0.0468
*
 0.0161 0.00257 0.00313 -0.0358
*
 
 (2.42) (1.12) (0.36) (0.31) (-2.24) 
GVT 0.0924 0.316
***
 -0.0383 0.0121 -0.0491 
 (1.64) (7.54) (-1.85) (0.42) (-1.05) 
CRI -10.37
***
 -1.452 -1.296 1.685 8.672
***
 
 (-5.29) (-1.00) (-1.80) (1.68) (5.34) 
CONC -38.34 -28.76 23.09
*
 1.520 44.09 
 (-1.35) (-1.36) (2.20) (0.10) (1.87) 
GCAP -0.278
***
 -0.0654 -0.00725 0.00106 0.241
***
 
 (-5.22) (-1.66) (-0.37) (0.04) (5.48) 
INF -0.0943 -0.0838 0.0847
***
 0.0579 0.130
*
 
 (-1.44) (-1.72) (3.51) (1.73) (2.40) 
R 0.0949
*
 0.0726
*
 0.0260 0.0305 -0.0590 
 (2.15) (2.21) (1.60) (1.35) (-1.61) 
CRR -0.879
*
 -0.340 0.254 -0.153 1.069
**
 
 (-2.00) (-1.04) (1.57) (-0.68) (2.94) 
Constant 147.3
***
 35.99 -4.599 -2.579 -134.6
***
 
 (5.20) (1.71) (-0.44) (-0.18) (-5.74) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
232 
0.3021 
0.4874 
232 
0.3180 
0.7109 
232 
0.3382 
0.6689 
232 
0.3115 
0.6068 
232 
0.2861 
0.4969 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
 
In general, the effects of foreign bank presence on the performance of all banks are only significant in 
OLS estimates. In particular, we found evidence of positive and statistically significant coefficients for 
foreign presence on Before-tax profits (BTP) and Non-interest income (NII). Estimates using the 
alternative measure of foreign bank presence based the sample are statistically insignificant. However, 
after controlling for bank-specific effects in the models, we found no evidence of foreign bank effects on 
domestic firms. Models based on first differences also show no evidence of foreign bank effects on 
domestic banks, which is contrary to the results using the sample, which show significant positive 
association with changes in profits (∆BTP) and negative relationship with risks (∆LLP). We therefore 
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conclude that our data on Nigerian banks provide weak evidence of foreign bank effects on domestic 
banks 
 
7.3 Discussion of results 
 
The overall results obtained from the estimations show that FDI measured by a proxy for foreign 
presence is positive related to the productivity or performance of domestic firms and banks respectively. 
However, robust evidence of the positive association of foreign presence were found amongst were 
found amongst manufacturing firms. Panel data estimates show that foreign presence in manufacturing 
industries or sub-sectors leads to about 5% rise in output or about 7% rise in value added of domestic 
firms. However, in the case of banks, panel data estimates show no significant effect of foreign presence 
on domestic banks. But OLS estimates reported on Table 7.11 show evidence of positive effects of 
foreign presence on profits (BTP) and non-interest income (NII).  
Interpretation of the results in this chapter should be made in recognition of the environment in which 
the analysis is based. Chapter 2 points out that unlike manufacturing firms where foreign firms 
dominate the industry, Nigerian banking industry is dominated by domestic banks. Similarly the 
manufacturing sector is completely open to foreign investment while the banking sector often imposes 
limits to foreign equity participation on Nigerian banks. A recent imposition of 20% limit was imposed on 
foreign equity participation in banks in 2007 (NDIC, 2008). This can explain the insignificance of foreign 
presence in the sector as Schoors and Van der Tol (2002) has shown that openness of sector enhances 
positive effects of foreign presence. Similarly, Sinani and Meyer (2004) show that productivity spillovers 
arise from majority owned foreign firms, albeit their focus on manufacturing firms rather than banks.  
 
A different line of thought which can explain the differences in FDI effects in the two sectors is the 
“catching up” hypothesis attributed to Findley (1978). As pointed out in Chapter 5, the hypothesis is 
based on the assertion that sectors with large technological differences between foreign and domestic 
firms are better positioned to benefit from FDI spillovers. Thus as highlighted in Chapter 2, the 
manufacturing industry in Nigeria operates at a low technological level, in comparison to banks in the 
country. Therefore we expect MNCs in the industry to operate at a higher technology level as 
technology gaps are most likely to exist between domestic and foreign manufacturing firms. This is in 
contrast to the case in the banking sector, as domestic banks in Nigeria operate at a similar 
technological level similar to their foreign counterparts. Thus the robust positive and significant FDI 
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spillover effects obtained in our estimations and the absence in the banking sector confirm to the 
“catching up” hypothesis. Empirical studies that support the “catching up” hypothesis include Sjohlm 
(1999), Castellani and Zanfei (2003), and Peri and Urban (2006).        
 
Another plausible reason for the lack of evidence of foreign bank presence effects on domestic banks is 
the due to the nature of bank performance models. Unlike the Cobb-Douglas model applied in the case 
of manufacturing firms, bank performance models do not explain variations in bank performance 
adequately. This is evident in the value of the R2 in most bank performance estimations, which are all 
mostly below 0.5. Our results of weak evidence of foreign bank presence are similar to results obtained 
in literature. Wu et al. (2007), Poghosyan (2010), and Lin (2011) found no significant effects on foreign 
bank presence in their respective estimations.  
 
An important finding in this study is that the alternative measures of foreign presence can yield different 
results. This finding was particularly exemplified in the estimations based on manufacturing firms where 
directly contrasting results were obtained. Specifically the foreign presence measure FP obtained from 
central bank census surveys show positive spillover coefficients while the measure based on foreign 
share of employment in the sample FPS show negative and significant coefficients on Output and Value 
added models. However, most studies in literature apply the variants of the latter variable which is 
deemed to show very misleading results. Thus are results confirm that it is of much importance to pay 
close attention to the measure of foreign presence employed for the investigation of FDI spillovers, as 
the simple reliance on an existing dataset collected for the purpose of production function estimation 
rather than industry or census data can lead to bias estimates as the measure of foreign presence is 
likely to be a random variable, subject to sampling error.  
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Chapter 8: Overall Conclusion  
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This study has conducted a detailed enquiry into the impact of FDI on manufacturing firms and banks in 
Nigeria through econometric estimations of augmented Cobb-Douglas and Dealership models 
respectively. It has also explored the country specific characteristics of the Nigerian operating 
environment, as well as the sector-specific characteristics of its manufacturing sector and banking 
sector, in an attempt to provide explanations for the results obtained from the investigation. Overall, 
the analysis found strong evidence of positive FDI impact on manufacturing firms but not in the case of 
banks. We also threw light into the importance of employing an appropriate measure of foreign 
presence in estimating FDI effects in using firm level data.  
This final chapter concludes the thesis by revisiting the research questions posed in Chapter 1, and   
providing final conclusions, implications and suggests directions for future research.   
8.2 Revisiting the Research Questions 
 
Question 1: Are there spillover effects from FDI to domestic firms in Nigerian manufacturing firms? 
Two approaches towards the estimation of FDI effect on manufacturing data were followed in this 
study. Chapter 7 shows that both OLS and Fixed effects estimations were applied of augmented Cobb-
Douglas models using output and value added as dependent variables. However, we lay more emphasis 
on the fixed effects models due to the ability of the estimation technique to control for firm-specific 
heterogeneity which can potentially bias OLS estimates in a models with both cross-sectional and time 
dimensions. Our results on both Output and Value added models show robust evidence of positive and 
significant spillovers of FDI on foreign presence. Specifically, a unit increase in foreign presence leads to 
4.8% rise in output or and 7.6% rise in value added of domestic firms.  
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Question 2: Does foreign presence in Nigerian banking industry affect domestic bank performance? 
 In the case of estimating foreign presence effect on bank performance, this study employs variants of 
augmented dealership models using both OLS and Fixed effects models. Five indicators of bank 
performance which measure profitability, income, and risks were employed. Specifically we investigate 
the effect of foreign presence on Before-tax profits (BTP), Net interest margins (NIM), Non-interest 
income, Overheads (OV), and Loan loss provisions (LLP). As in the case of estimations based on 
manufacturing firms, we lay emphasis on fixed effects regressions due to its desirable property of 
controlling for bank-specific heterogeneity. In the case our bank performance investigation, we also 
estimate models based on the same dependent variables, but in first differences. Our results show no 
evidence of FDI effects on domestic bank performance, as coefficients of foreign presence appear 
insignificant in both models based on levels and those based on first differences. Thus we found no 
evidence of foreign bank presence effects domestic banks.  
 Question 3: How does the approach taken towards the computation of foreign presence measure affect 
spillover estimates? 
This thesis has shown that the approach towards the computation of foreign presence in terms of the 
sampling procedure and data quality can affect spillover estimates. Two alternative measures of foreign 
presence was employed our analysis on both manufacturing firms and banks. On manufacturing firm 
analysis, we employ foreign presence measure based on the census of manufacturing firms in Nigeria, 
provided by the Central bank of Nigeria (CBN). Alternatively, we compute foreign presence using the 
dominant approach in literature, which measures the share of foreign employment in each sector. 
Graphical representation of these two variables in Chapter 6 show remarkable difference in these two 
variables, terms of their respective sectoral and year distributions. These implies that the measure 
based on census data from the CBN and the measure based on share of foreign employment computed 
from the sample are two different variables, with the latter being a random variable, subject to sample 
error. 
 To confirm these observations, we also provide alternative specifications using the measure of foreign 
presence based on the sample in both models based on manufacturing data and banking data In 
Chapter 7. Results based on manufacturing firms data show remarkable differences in coefficients of the 
alterative measures of foreign presence. In particular, while the measures based on census data from 
CBN show positive and significant coefficients, the alternative measure computed from the sample show 
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negative and significant coefficients. We therefore link these differences to the nature of the sample 
used for the estimation, highlighting how the representativeness of the sample, the occurrence of 
missing observations, and data inconsistencies can bias the foreign presence measure. Thus we 
conclude that these factors can affect spillover estimates which can result in bias or misleading results. 
8.3 Final conclusion  
 
This thesis has contributed to FDI literature, by providing evidence in support of the notion that FDI 
generates positive externalities on domestic firms. The enquiry for the impact was based on 
manufacturing firms and banks in Nigeria, a country which stand as a top recipient of FDI in Africa. The 
study has provided a detailed examination of FDI by highlighting its trends in the globe, developing 
countries, Africa, and Nigeria. It points out that despite the fact that developed countries are the major 
drivers of FDI flows, African countries have been experiencing a substantial rise in flows for the past 
decade, with Nigeria having 108% rise in 2005. This study also highlights global policies of FDI, pointing 
out that the recent emergence of protectionism after decades of liberalization policies. In contrary, 
outlines of policies that affect FDI in Nigeria shown in this study indicate that the country moved from 
decades of various degrees of protectionism, to an economy generally open to FDI. However, 
restrictions to foreign equity participation are evident at in the banking sector.  
In order to understand the nature of the environment in which is study is based, this study has 
extensively examined the nature of Nigerian operating environment, with insights into the dynamics of 
both manufacturing and banking sectors. This investigation examines the contrast in the two sectors 
with emphasis on broad indicators such as percentage shares in GDP, capacity utilization in the case of 
manufacturing firms, and number of branches in the case of banks. Comparisons of the Nigerian 
manufacturing and banking sectors show that while the former is mildly regulated, with light technology 
industries; the banking sector is highly regulated, operating at modest technology levels. In addition, the 
manufacturing sector is completely open to FDI, while the banking sector alternates between 
liberalization and restriction with a recent imposition of limits to foreign equity participation in 2007. 
Detailed review of theories of FDI in this study provide the underpinnings of spillover mechanisms, 
pointing out its origins in the neo-classical trade theories and the subsequent incorporation of industrial 
organization theories; identifying particular contributions by Mundell (1957), Hymer (1960), 
Kindleberger (1969), Buckley and Casson (1976), and Dunning (1979). The mechanism of FDI spillovers is 
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examined, pointing out the different channels in which spillovers are known to occur. The channels of 
spillover occurrence such as demonstration, workers’ mobility and competition are applicable to both 
manufacturing firms and banks. 
  Extensive review of empirical literature carried out in this study show the directions of the investigation 
of FDI spillover literature in manufacturing firms, which are categorized as studies based on spillover 
occurrence, and studies that show that spillovers are determined by domestic firm as well as MNC 
characteristics. However, in the case of banking sector studies the limited literature are quite similar 
with the effect of foreign presence on measures of bank performance with augmented dealership 
models. An important contribution of this thesis includes a detailed critique of previous studies, pointing 
out the lack of attention towards the importance of appropriate computation of measures of foreign 
presence, especially in terms of its sampling procedure and quality of data employed. 
A detailed data description was provided in this study the showing the industry and regional 
distributions of the NMES data, and the distribution of the measures of bank performance obtained 
from BankScope. Particular attention was paid on the distribution of measures of foreign presence for 
manufacturing firms and banks, sourced from the census/population data from Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) respectively. To illustrate the differences 
in alternative measures of foreign presence, we compare the foreign presence measure obtained from 
CBN with the alternative proxy based on foreign share of employment computed from the NMES 
sample. The histograms reported in Chapter 6 show significant differences in these two variables, 
implying that the sample based measure could provide misleading estimations. 
The methodology for identifying the presence of FDI effects on both manufacturing firms and banks is 
the econometric estimations of foreign presence measures on productivity/performance models. Using 
augmented Cobb-Douglas models for manufacturing data and dealership models for bank data, OLS and 
Fixed effects estimates of foreign presence were obtained. The Fixed effects estimations which control 
for firm-specific and bank specific effects show strong evidence of positive effects of FDI in 
manufacturing sector, and no effect on the banking sector. We interpret these results as evidence in 
support of “catching-up” hypothesis which imply that firms in sectors with high technology gaps are 
more likely to benefit from FDI as in the case of Nigerian banking sector. 
In conclusion, the investigation of FDI effects on Nigerian manufacturing and banking sectors in this 
study has provided evidence of positive productivity effects on manufacturing, and also evidence of its 
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absence in banking sector. In addition it recommends that attention should be focused on the 
computation of measures of foreign presence to avoid misleading estimates.  
 
 8.4 Policy Implications 
 
The results of this thesis show evidence of beneficial effects of FDI on the manufacturing sector of 
Nigeria and its absence on banking sector. Chapter 2 which describes these two sectors identify that 
while the manufacturing sector is completely open to FDI and mildly regulated, the banking sector is 
highly regulated with reoccurring limits placed on foreign participation. Reflecting on these two points, 
one can infer that the lack of positive effects of FDI could be linked with their respective policies both in 
terms of government regulation and orientation to FDI. 
Nigerian government claims to be completely open to FDI, but recurring policies aimed at restriction are 
still evident in some sectors. The Nigeria banking sector is a particular sector where the policy directives 
and operational guidelines given by the regulatory body (CBN) may not align with the Federal 
government’s orientation towards FDI. Thus while sectors such as manufacturing aligns with the Federal 
governments openness policy towards FDI, the CBN has autonomous powers to give  guidelines for bank 
operation that go contrary to government policies. It is therefore not surprising that despite the 
openness of other sector to FDI since 1995, the banking industry recently placed limits of 20% on foreign 
equity participation to restrict foreign dominance of Nigerian banks in periods of boom.  
The Nigerian banking industry, being the most regulated institution in the country, makes it less 
desirable for foreign investors. Frequent changes in minimum paid-up capita requirements and controls 
on loan portfolio on banks may not attract potential foreign investors. Thus the absence of these 
regulations in the manufacturing sector could explain the positive FDI spillovers evident in the industry. 
However, despite the ability of the manufacturing industry to reap the benefits of foreign presence, its 
FDI potentials have not been fully exploited. Institutional challenges and harsh operating conditions still 
undermine FDI flows to the sector. Inadequate infrastructure in the form of power outages and poor 
transportation; coupled with the incidence of corruption and lack of transparency diminish its locational 
advantages. Thus in order to reap the full benefits of FDI, the government should urgently tackle these 
problems in order to promote market-seeking FDI rather than resource-seeking FDI, which has been 
dominant in the country due to its oil reserves.  
209 
 
8.5 Limitations and directions for further research 
 
Despite the important contributions made in this study, particularly in terms of producing adequate 
measurements of foreign presence, issues of the reliability of our estimates may be a matter of concern. 
Similar to most investigations based on developing countries, and Africa in particular, availability, 
reliability, and representativeness of data have always been questionable. In the case of the data 
employed in this present study, questions about its reliability also arise. The NMES data, based on a 
survey of Nigerian manufacturing firms are reliable to the extent that the numerical values obtained 
from the questionnaires reflect the true values. However this could be a strong assumption as there is 
no sufficient evidence to verify their accuracy, as many Nigerian firms are known to falsify details of 
their sales, output, capital, employment, etc. to avoid appropriate taxation of their enterprise. Also 
some smaller firms may not be keeping appropriate records that would enable the valuation of their 
firms. In the case of banking data, the BankScope data set used for the bank models provide indictors of 
bank performance that sometimes conflict with the Nigerian regulatory bodies such as the CBN and 
NDIC. Thus our estimations are based on the assumption that these data reflect were accurately 
measured. 
Another limitation of this study is that the time dimension of our data may not capture the actual trend 
of productivity measures in Nigerian manufacturing. Our results are based on 6 year observations which 
might not truly reflect the overall productivity of Nigerian firms. Also, a significant loss of observations 
(82 firms) between 2000 and 2001 could affect our estimates of our regressions. In case of banks, 
despite the relatively large time frame (1992-2009), the percentage of the sample available in 
BankScope to the population range from 0.8% in 1992 to 96% in 2005. This could also lead to less 
efficient estimates. Similarly, as the methodological approach of estimating the impact of FDI on 
domestic firms involve running regression on only domestic firms; this significantly reduces observations 
and therefore degrees of freedom in our models. This is of particular concern in estimations based on 
banking data, as it results in basing our judgment on foreign presence effect on 232 observations in the 
case of models in levels, and 180 observations in the case of models in first differences. Thus our 
conclusions about FDI impact on the banking sector are base on limited number of observations.  
Further research on FDI effect on Nigerian sectors should be aimed at improving the data quality for the 
analysis especially in terms of coverage or representativeness.  Also, as indicated in this study, analysis 
of FDI impact on firms are applicable to both industrial and services sectors. Thus it would be 
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worthwhile to estimate FDI effects in other sectors in Nigeria with considerable foreign presence such as 
the oil sector, and telecommunications sector. In terms of estimation of FDI spillovers in general, further 
research could lay emphasis on the approaches towards the computation of foreign presence variable, 
as its importance has been pointed out in this thesis. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 5.1  
Table A1: Tabulated list of articles reviewed  
Journal Article Sampling Methodology 
Kokko, A., Tansini, R., & Zejan, M. C. (1996). Local 
Technological Capability and Productivity 
Spillovers from FDI in the Uruguayan 
Manufacturing Sector. Journal of Development 
Studies, 32 4, 602-611. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Two sources: Plant level survey collected by the Department of Economics at the 
University of the Republic of Uruguay. Unpublished worksheets collected for the 
Uruguayan Economic Census of 1988 by the national institute of Statistics in 
Montevideo.   
Data coverage 
Cover all plants belonging to private-locally owned manufacturing firms with more than 
99 employees 
How representative is the sample? 
Represents 60% of total output; 47% of total employment; and 57% of the local sales in 
Uruguayan manufacturing sector in 1988 
Form of data 
Cross-section of 289 plants  
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Excluded 8 observations because of missing or uncertain data for some variables. 
Excluded plants operating in 4-digit industries without foreign presence 
Final sample used 
159 plants in 1998 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not applicable 
 
 
 
 
Sjoeholm, F. (1999). Technology Gap, Competition 
and Spillovers from Direct Foreign Investment: 
Evidence from Establishment Data. Journal of 
Development Studies, 36(1), 53-73.  
 
What is the source of the data? 
Data was obtained from the yearly industrial survey conducted by Central Bureau of 
Statistics  
Data coverage: All Indonesian firms with more than 20 employees 
How representative is the sample? Not mentioned. 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? Observations that were  not available 
for both 1980 and 1990 were removed from growth estimations 
Form of data: Data for two years was available 1980 and 1990.   
Final Sample used: Consists of 8,086 establishments in 1980, and 16,382 
establishments in 1991.892 domestic establishments available for both 1980 and 1990 
were used for growth estimations 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Inconsistency of panel limited 
establishments used for growth estimations to 2,892. Establishments which left the 
industry after 1980 and establishments which entered the industry after 1980 were 
excluded from the sample.  
 
Aitken, B. J., & Harrison, A. E. (1999). Do Domestic 
Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment? 
Evidence from Venezuela. American Economic 
Review, 89(3), 605-618. 
What is the source of the data? 
Annual census of industrial plants conducted by National Statistics Bureau of Venezuela. 
Data appeared without plant identifiers 
Data coverage: Covers all plants in the formal sector with more than 50 workers  
How representative is the sample? Not mentioned 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 15,569 observations that could not 
be linked across years were excluded 
Form of data: Unbalanced panel of 6,044 plants between 1976 and 1989. Number of 
firms surveyed ranged from 3,955 in 1982 to 6,044 in 1978 
Final Sample used: 43,010 observations 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: The authors created a program to link 
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the plant identifiers. However, as many as 15,569 observations could not be linked and 
therefore deleted from the sample. The paper acknowledged the importance of 
identifying firms across years but did not specify the implication of unidentified 
observations on the spillover variable.  
 
Djankov, S., & Hoekman, B. (2000). Foreign 
Investment and Productivity Growth in Czech 
Enterprises. The World Bank Economic Review, 
14(1), 49-64. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Compiled information from surveys conducted by the Czech Statistical Office 
Data coverage: Covers 513 large firms quoted on the Prague stock exchange whose 
shares traded not less than 4 times in a year. 
How representative is the sample? 
Noted that selection bias existed as privately owned firms were not included in the 
sample. However the authors noted that the high percentage of foreign firms in the 
sample represents the Czech industry ownership structure. 
   
What are the criteria for excluding observations? Not mentioned 
Form of data: Panel data over the period 1992-1999.  
Final Sample used: 513 firms of which 91were joint ventures, 82 had majority foreign 
equity, and 340 were domestic firms.  
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned  
 
 
 
Aslanoglu, E. (2000). Spillover Effects of Foreign 
Direct Investments on Turkish Manufacturing 
Industry. Journal of International Development, 
12(8), 1111-1130. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Regular survey of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ISO) 
Data coverage 
Cover the largest 500 industrial firms 
How representative is the sample? 
Represents 50% of the industrial value added in Turkey 
Form of data 
Cross-section data over the period 1993-1998 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Not mentioned 
Final sample used 
500 firms in 28 sectors in 1993. Some variables made use of 1988 data 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not applicable. Made use of cross- section data 
Konings, J. (2001). The effects of foreign direct 
investment on domestic firms Evidence from firm-
level panel data in emerging economies. 
Economics of Transition, 9(3), 619-634. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Annual accounts published by: 
Creditreform Bulgaria OOD 
Data coverage 
Company accounts of all manufacturing firms satisfying at least one of the following 
criteria: 100 or more  employees, and total assets and operating revenues exceeding 16 
million and 8 million respectively  
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified  
Form of data 
Unbalanced panel of over 5,000 firms in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland for the years 
1993-1997 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Excluded firms with missing observations on some of the input factors needed in the 
estimation 
Final sample used 
2,321 firms in Bulgaria between 1993 and 1997; 
3,844 firms in Romania between 1994 and 1997; 
262 firms in Poland between 1993 and 1997 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not mentioned 
Feinberg, S. E., & Majumdar, S. K. (2001). 
Technology Spillovers from Foreign Direct 
Investment in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 32(3), 
421-438. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Unpublished data on domestic and foreign corporations complied by the Reserve bank 
of India (RBI) 
Data coverage 
Covers 1700 to 1800 large publicly traded companies 
How representative is the sample? 
Represents 85% of the paid-up capital of 3-digit industries 
Form of data 
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1361 firm-year observations on 141 firms over the period 1971- 1994 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Small firms and government owned firms were excluded from the survey. 
Firms with less than 3 consecutive year observations were removed. 
As a result of the creation of R&D stock variables, non contiguous observations were 
removed from the sample. 
Due to unavailability of UNIDO data prior to 1980, data from 1976 to 1979 were 
excluded from the regressions  
Final sample used 
95 firms/832 firm year observations over the period 1980-1994 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Due to irregularities in the data, 4 firms/150 firm year observations that only appeared 
for the years 1971-1975 were excluded. As a result, the sample began in 1976. 
Due to sporadic coverage of small firms, smaller firms that did not submit data are 
mistaken as “entries” and “exits” in and out of the sample. 
As a standard, only firms observed at least 3 consecutive times were selected. This 
resulted in the elimination of 23 firms/46 firm year observations which were only 
observed twice in the dataset. 
Dimelis, S., & Louri, H. (2002). Foreign Ownership 
and Production Efficiency: A Quantile Regression 
Analysis. Oxford Economic Papers, 54 3, 449-469. 
  
What is the source of the data? 
Data derived from the ICAP directory. ICAP collects data on all Plc. and Ltd. who publish 
their annual accounts on the press 
Data coverage: ICAP collects data on all Plc. and Ltd. who publish their annual accounts 
on the press. The firms included are large-sized firms. 
 
How representative is the sample?  
The sample produced 85% of manufacturing sales in 1997 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? Not mentioned 
Form of data: Cross section of 4,056 firms in 1997. 3,840 are domestic and 216 are 
foreign. 
Final Sample used: 4,056 firms were used 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned  
 
Sembenelli, A., & Siotis, G. (2002). Foreign Direct 
Investment, Competitive Pressure and Spillovers. 
An Empirical Analysis on Spanish firm level Data 
Centro Studi Luca D'Angliano. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Database Central de Balances, gathered by the Bank of Spain 
Data coverage 
Covers large firms with 100 or more employees and a shorter version of smaller firms 
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified 
Form of data 
Above 91,000 observations for the time period 1983-1996 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Eliminated observations/firms with: 
Questionable values; reporting non-positive values for labour input, gross output, and 
net fixed assets; a  value greater or equal to 1 or less than or equal to 1;  different 3 
digit affiliation during the sample period.   
Final sample used 
Unbalanced panel of 29,318 observations over the period 1983-1996 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Due t the requirements of the panel data technique applied (GMM), only firms with a 
minimum of 4 consecutive observations were applied. 
Barrios, S., & Strobl, E. (2002). Foreign Direct 
Investment and Productivity Spillovers: Evidence 
from the Spanish Experience. Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, 138(3), 459-481. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
“Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariate” from the Ministerio de Industria y Energia 
(MINER, Madrid) and the Fundacion Empresa publica (Madrid) 
Data coverage 
Covers all manufacturing companies with 200 e+mployees or more; and a 
representative sample of manufacturing firms with less than 200 employees 
How representative is the sample? 
Represents 22% of total Spanish employment in the manufacturing industry  
Form of data 
Annual panel of approximately 2,100 Spanish manufacturing firms for 1990-1998. 
Dataset does not allow one to distinguish btw exits and random non-response. 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Not mentioned 
Final sample used 
Not mentioned  
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
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Not mentioned 
Keller, W., & Yeaple, S. R. (2003). Multinational 
Enterprises, International Trade, and Productivity 
growth: Firm level Evidence from the United 
States. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database 
Data coverage 
Compustat covers only publicly traded companies 
How representative is the sample? 
Represents about 58% and 70% of U.S manufacturing employment and manufacturing 
R&D expenditures respectively 
Form of data 
1,115 U.S. owned firms that were active between 1987-1996 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Removed foreign owned firms from the sample. 
Excluded firms form which any time series exhibited implausibly large year to year 
changes. 
Dropped firms that displayed large changes in inputs while output was flat, or vice 
versa. 
Final sample used 
839 firms that reported output sand inputs, including R&D, and 1,115 firms that did not 
report R&D were included 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
The study made use of firms which had data on key variables for at least 2 consecutive 
years which is necessary for dynamic estimation framework. 
 
Khawar, M. (2003). Productivity and foreign direct 
investment - evidence from Mexico. Journal of 
Economic Studies, 30(1), 66-76. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Raw dataset from Mexico Industrial Survey for the year 1990 
Data coverage 
Not mentioned 
How representative is the sample? 
Not mentioned 
Form of data 
Cross section for 1990 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Not mentioned 
Final sample used 
2,362 firms for the year 1990 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not mentioned 
Ayanwale, A. B., & Bamire, S. (2004). Direct 
Foreign Investment and Firm-level productivity in 
the Nigerian Agro-agro-allied sector. Journal of 
Social Sciences, 9(1), 29-36. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Publications of Nigeria Stock Exchange Commission and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)  
Data coverage: Covers agro/agro allied companies listed in the first tier market (firms 
with foreign component) and second tier (domestic owned firms) foreign exchange 
markets 
How representative is the sample? 
Not mentioned 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? Not mentioned 
Form of data: Data on 52 companies from 1987 to 1996 
Final Sample used: 52 ago/agro allied companies  
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned 
 
Javorcik, B. S. (2004). Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic 
Firms? In Search of Spillovers Through Backward 
Linkages. American Economic Review, 94, 605-
627. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Based on annual survey of Lithuanian Statistical Office 
Data coverage: Extensive coverage of firms accounting for 85% of output in each sector. 
Panel could not be extended due to limited foreign presence before 1990. 
How representative is the sample?  
Data represents 85% of output across sectors included. 
What are the criteria for excluding observations?  
Deleted values with missing values, zero sales or employment, as well as observations 
that could not satisfy other basic error checks 
Form of data: Unbalanced panel over the period 1996-2000.  12% of the firms are 
foreign 
Final Sample used: Varies between 1,918 and 2,711 firms in a given year 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Mentioned that the inconsistency of 
panel due to a firm not being surveyed in a given year was not accounted for.  
 
Sinani, E., & Meyer, K. E. (2004). Spillovers of What is the source of the data? 
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technology transfer from FDI: the case of Estonia. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 32, 445-466. 
 
Dataset obtained from Estonian Statistical Agency (ESA) 
Data coverage: Covers firms with more than 10 employees in a given year  
How representative is the sample? Sample covers 30% of the manufacturing 
employment in 1994. 
What are the criteria for excluding observations?  
Not mentioned 
Form of data: Unbalanced panel data over the period 1994-1999. Different years had 
different number of firms 
Final Sample used: Consists of 2250 observations over the period 1994-1999. 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned  
 
Ruane, F., & Ugar, A. (2004). Foreign direct 
investment and productivity spillovers in irish 
manufacturing industry: evidence from plant level 
data. International Journal of the Economics of 
Business, 11(3), 53-66. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Irish Census of Industrial Production (CIP), conducted annually by the Central Statistics 
Office of Ireland 
Data coverage 
Covers all industrial local units with at least 2 or 3 persons engaged 
How representative is the sample? 
The only representative survey of plants in Ireland 
Form of data 
An average of 4,600 companies over the period 1991-1998. Each year has different 
number of firms in the panel (unbalanced). 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Apparently used the whole sample without eliminating observations 
Final sample used 
Unbalanced panel of about 4,600 companies over the period 1991-1998 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Since the survey covers all firms in the industry, inconsistency was attributed to entry 
and exit of firms.  
Takii, S. (2005). Productivity Spillovers and 
Characteristics of Foreign Multinational Plants in 
Indonesian Manufacturing 1990-1995. Journal of 
Development Economics, 76 2, 521-542. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Two datasets based on industrial surveys conducted by Indonesia’s Bureau of Statistics. 
Data coverage: Survey covers plants with 20 or more workers 
How representative is the sample? Not mentioned 
 What are the criteria for excluding observations?  
Outliers were eliminated. Plants that did not reply to surveys/census were omitted from 
dataset. In order to ensure a consistent industrial classification across plants, the 
sample was limited to 1990-1995.  
Form of data: Two datasets were available. One dataset contained cross section of 
information on plants for each year. The second dataset contained panel data from 
1975 to the most recent available year 
Final Sample used: Not mentioned   
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned 
 
Dimelis, S. P. (2005). Spillovers from Foreign Direct 
Investment and Firm Growth: Technological, 
Financial and Market Structure Effects. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 
12, 85-104. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Directory of the confederation of Greek Industries (ICAP) 
Data coverage 
All Plc and Ltd firms operating in Greece 
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified 
Form of data 
2589 with complete information for 1995 and 1997. Cross section of two years 
 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Not mentioned 
Final sample used 
2589 firms with complete information for 1995 and 1997. 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not mentioned  
Kugler, M. (2006). Spillovers from foreign direct 
investment: Within or between industries? 
Journal of Development Economics, 80(2), 444-
477. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Based on annual surveys Colombia Manufacturing Census) conducted by the National 
Statistics bureau of Colombia and Central Bank data. 
Data coverage: Covers firms with more than 10 workers from 1974 to 1998. 
How representative is the sample? 
Sample represents 63% of the average share of workforce between 1974 and 1991, and 
71% of the average share of the product  
What are the criteria for excluding observations? Not mentioned 
Form of data: Not mentioned 
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Final Sample used: Not mentioned 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned 
 
Gorg, H., Hijzen, A., & Murakozy, B. (2006/08). The 
productivity spillover potential of foreign owned 
firms: Firm-level evidence for Hungary. The 
University of Nottingham. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Officially reported balance sheet data 
Data coverage: Covers 20-30% of all manufacturing in Hungary 
How representative is the sample? The sample represents 90% sales and 98% exports 
of all manufacturing firms in Hungary 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? Not mentioned 
Final Sample used: Not mentioned 
Form of data: Panel data for the period 1995-2001 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned 
 
 
 
Peri, G., & Urban, D. (2006). Catching-Up to 
Foreign Technology? Evidence on the 'Veblen-
Gerschenkron' Effect of Foreign Investments. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36 1, 72-
98. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Two datasets containing data on two different countries Italy and Germany were used. 
Data on Italian firms was sourced from the Centro Studiluca d’Angliano and merged 
with the AIDA database of Bureau van Dijk. Data on German firms was sourced from 
current releases of Bureau van Dijk 
Data coverage: A subset of German firms containing large firms with more than 100 
employees. The coverage of Italian firms broadens over time, i.e. the early periods of 
the sample was broader than the later periods. 
How representative is the sample? 
Sample represents 2% of all manufacturing firms and 16% of manufacturing 
employment in Germany. Covers the whole universe of Italian firms, but smaller firms 
were under-represented 
  
What are the criteria for excluding observations? For Italian firms, observations 1992 
and 1993 were excluded because of missing data. 
Form of data: Unbalanced panel of about 800 German manufacturing firms over the 
period 1993-1999. Unbalanced panel of Italian firms over three years: 1994, 1996 and 
1998.  
Final Sample used: For Italian firms, the number of foreign firms across years ranged 
from 354 to 832, while the number of domestic firms was between 9,858 and 36,738.  
For German firms, number of foreign firms across sectors ranged from 203 to 226, while 
the number of domestic firms was between 556 and 653.  
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology:  
Not mentioned 
 
Bwalya, S. M. (2006). Foreign direct investment 
and technology spillovers: Evidence from panel 
data analysis of manufacturing firms in Zambia. 
Journal of Development Economics, 81(2), 514-
526. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Based on annual data on Zambian manufacturing collected by World Bank through 
Regional Programme on Enterprise Development (RPED). 
Data coverage: Covered 145 manufacturing firms.   
How representative is the sample? Not mentioned  
What are the criteria for excluding observations? Firms with missing key information 
were deleted  
Form of data: Panel data over the period 1993-1995 
Final Sample used: Sample of 125 firms over the period 1993-1995 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned 
 
Marin, A., & Bell, M. (2006). Technology spillovers 
from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): the active 
role of MNC subsidiaries in Argentina in the 1990s. 
Journal of Development Studies, 42, 678-697. 
 
 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Innovation Survey in Argentina, 1992-1996 
Data coverage 
Covers 50% of all industrial firms 
How representative is the sample? 
Sample accounts for 53% of total assets of industrial firms, 505 of total employment, 
and 61% of the total exports 
Form of data 
Cross section of 1992 and 1996 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Not specified 
Final sample used 
246 
 
1533 firms for the period 1992 and 1996 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not specified 
Todo, Y. (2006). Knowledge spillovers from foreign 
direct investment in R&D: Evidence from Japanese 
firm-level data. Journal of Asian Economics, 17(6), 
996-1013. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Kigyo Katsudo Kihou Chosa (Basic Survey of Enterprise Activities) Dataset has been 
collected annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and Industry level 
data from the Japan Industry Productivity (JIP) Database 2006. 
Data coverage 
Covers all Japanese firms in manufacturing industries that employ 50 employees or 
more 
How representative is the sample? Not specified 
Form of data 
Firm level data for the period 1995-2002. Industry level data over the period 1970-2002 
at the 3-digit industry level. 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Sample limited to domestic firms. 
Only firms that had available data on TFP level and R&D expenditure for 6 consecutive 
years were used. 
Firms whose growth rate of TFP were among the top or bottom 1% and firms whose 
R&D expenditure were among the top 1% were dropped. 
Final sample used 
Sample consists of 21,404 observations  
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
The study made use of firms with at least 6 consecutive years of data available. 
Todo, Y., & Miyamoto, K. (2006). Knowledge 
Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Role of Local R&D Activities: Evidence from 
Indonesia. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 55, 173-200. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Annual plant-level surveys conducted by the central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia 
Data coverage 
Covers all Indonesian manufacturing plants with  20 or more employees  
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified 
Form of data 
Panel data for the period 1994-1997 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Excluded 5,600 firms whose reported valued added, employment, or capital stock for 
any year was non-positive. 
Dropped 600 firms because the estimated value of capital stock was dubious 
Removed 100firms whose value added per efficiency unit of labour o capital stock in a 
year is more than 100 times or less than 0.01 
Final sample used 
Removed all foreign firms and about 1,300 firms/ 12,146 observations whose TFP 
growth rate estimated by the Olley-Pake procedure falls outside 3 standard deviations 
from the average. 
One of the 4 years was excluded to achieve a balanced panel. However, while 
conducting robustness checks, the sample size was increased from 12,146 to 12, 690. 
The reason was to capture firms that exited the sample, in order to eliminate selection 
biases.  
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Used a balanced panel due to the requirements of the GMM technique used in the 
study 
  
Yasar, M., & Morrison Paul, C. J. (2007). 
International linkages and productivity at the 
plant level: Foreign direct investment, exports, 
imports and licensing. Journal of International 
Economics, 71(2), 373-388. 
 
 
 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries compiled by Turkey’s State Institute of 
Statistics 
Data coverage 
Covers manufacturing plants with greater than 25 employees 
How representative is the sample? 
The textile, wearing apparel, and the leather industry accounts for 35% of total 
manufacturing employment; 23% of wages; 20% of the output produced; 48% of 
Turkish exports 
The motor vehicle and parts accounts for 5% of total manufacturing employment, 
nearly 66% of wages, 10% of output, 5.2% of Turkish manufacturing exports. 
Form of data 
Unbalanced panel over the period, 1990-1996 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Removed observations with clearly erroneous values or missing data 
Final sample used 
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1556 firms/7024 observations  
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not mentioned 
 
Fan, C. S., & Hu, Y. (2007). Foreign direct 
investment and indigenous technological efforts: 
Evidence from China. Economics Letters, 96(2), 
253-258. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
World Bank firm-level survey from 1998-2000 
Data coverage 
Randomly selected manufacturing firms in five major cities over the period 1998-2000. 
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified 
Form of data 
Panel data of 998 Chinese firms over the period 1998-2000 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Not mentioned  
Final sample used 
998 Chinese firms over the period 1998-2000 
 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not mentioned 
Yasar, M., & Paul, C. J. M. (2007). Firm 
performance and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Evidence from Transition Economies. Economics 
Bulletin, 15(21), 1-11. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
“BEEPS II-Business Environment 2002” collected b the World Bank through the 2003 
Investment Climate Survey of five Transition countries  
Data coverage 
Covers garment and food processing firms in Poland, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Kyrgyz Republic. A sample of 100 firms were drawn from each country  
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified. Referred to Bastos and Nasir (2004) for detailed explanation of data 
Form of data 
Cross-section for 2002 for 5 countries 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Eliminated firms with missing variables especially for capital data 
Final sample used 
437 firms were used. 76, 96, 88 99, and 78 for Poland, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Kyrgyz Republic respectively  
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not applicable 
Mullen, J. K., & Williams, M. (2007). Foreign Direct 
Investment and Regional Productivity Spillovers in 
Us Manufacturing. Rurds, 19(3), 185-196. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Two sources: 
U.S department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) published establishment 
within the manufacturing sector. 
1997 Economic Census, Manufacturing, Geographic Area series  
Data coverage 
Not specified  
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified  
Form of data 
432 observations/48 state observations for the year 1997  
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Missing data on key variables were eliminated 
Final sample used 
312 observations for 1997 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not applicable 
Girma, S., & Wakelin, K. (2007). Local productivity 
spillovers from foreign direct investment in the 
U.K. electronics industry. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 37(3), 399-412. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Annual Business respondents Database (ARD) provided by the office of National 
Statistics (ONS) in the U.K.  
Data coverage 
Covers electrical and electronic sector. 
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified 
Form of data 
Unbalance panel over the period 1980-1992. Highly inconsistent panel  
 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Excluded domestic establishments with zero output. 
Excluded establishments with observations at the top and bottom 1 percentile in terms 
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of the capital/labour ratio, due to concerns over the size of the measurement errors.  
Final sample used 
Unbalanced panel of 2,773 establishments.   
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not specified 
 
Haskel, J. E., Pereira, S. C., & Slaughter, M. J. 
(2007). Does Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
Boost the Productivity of Domestic Firms? Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 89, 482-496. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Annual Census of Production Respondents Database (ARD), conducted by the U.K. office 
of National Statistics  
Data coverage 
Covers all plants with employment over a minimum size of 100 in most years. 
50% of more plants with employment from 50 to 100. 
25% of plants with employment from 20 to 50.  
How representative is the sample? 
Selected sample each year accounts for around 90% of total U.K. manufacturing 
employment.  
Form of data 
Unbalanced panel over the period 1973-1992.  
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Not specified  
Final sample used 
Unbalanced panel of 13,000-23,000 plants per year, over the period 1973-1992 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Noted that the general decline in the number of British plants could increase the foreign 
presence measures even if there were no changes in FDI activity. The authors pointed 
out that to control for the decline in domestic firms, the lagged number of British plants 
was added to the equation. Another solution noted by the study, was to enter the 
numerator and denominators of the spillover variable separately.  
Kosteas, V. (2008). Foreign direct investment and 
productivity spillovers: a quantile analysis. 
International Economic Journal, 22(1), 25-41. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI) 
Data coverage: Only large firms were included in the sample          
How representative is the sample? Represents 80% of output with small firms excluded 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? When output, capital stock, material 
inputs or labour is equal to zero.   
Form of data: Panel data (1984-1990). Panel data used to estimate total factor 
productivity (TFP) residuals, while 1990 cross section used to analyse production 
spillovers.  
Final Sample used: Contains 2,328 observations. 578 of them have some degree of 
foreign ownership 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned 
Jordaan, J. A. (2008). Intra-industry and Inter-
industry externalities from foreign direct 
investment in the Mexican manufacturing sector: 
New evidence from Mexican regions. World 
Development, 36(12), 2838-2854. 
What is the source of the data? 
Unpublished data from the National Mexican manufacturing census carried out by 
INEGI. Contains data for 1993 
Data coverage: Covers plant level observations aggregated at 6-digit industrial level for 
regions with significant manufacturing activity and FDI in 1993. 
How representative is the sample? Sample covers 65% of total manufacturing output 
and 85% of total FDI manufacturing employment. 
What are the criteria for excluding observations?  
Not mentioned 
Form of data: Not mentioned 
Final Sample used: Not mentioned 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned 
 
 
Javorcik, B. S., & Spatareanu, M. (2008). To share 
or not to share: Does local participation matter for 
spillovers from foreign direct investment? Journal 
of Development Economics, 85(1-2), 194-217. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Data was sourced form the commercial database Amadeus. Supplemented with 
ownership data from the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Data coverage: Limited to firms with the average employment of more than 5 workers 
How representative is the sample?  
Not mentioned 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? Firms with negative vales for 
turnover, materials and fixed assets were dropped. Also firms reporting unusually large 
fluctuations were excluded. 
Form of data: Unbalanced panel (1998-2003), with observations ranging from 6,782 to 
8,820 
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Final Sample used: 13, 129 firms in 48 industries between 1998 and 2003 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned 
 
Liu, Z. (2008). Foreign direct investment and 
technology spillovers: Theory and evidence. 
Journal of Development Economics, 85(1-2), 176-
193. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Sample of manufacturing firms obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Data coverage: Covers over 20,000 industrial firms in China 
How representative is the sample? 
The sample represents one third of China’s industrial output. Actual population of 
manufacturing firms in China in 1999 is 8 million. 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? Not mentioned 
Final Sample used: Sample of 17,675 manufacturing firms randomly selected from the 
database. 
Form of data: Unbalanced panel of 50,667 observations from 1995 to1999  
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: Not mentioned  
 
Sembenelli, A., & Siotis, G. (2008). Foreign Direct 
Investment and mark-up dynamics: Evidence from 
Spanish firms. Journal of International economics, 
76, 107-115. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
From the data base, Central de Balances, collected by Bank of Spain 
Data coverage 
Covers all sectors of economic activity, except financial institutions 
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified  
Form of data 
Original data contains more than 91,009 firms over the period 1983-1996 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Removed from the sample: 
Non-manufacturing firms, manufacturing firms changing sector over the sample period, 
manufacturing sectors with less than 100 initial observations. 
Excluded observations with missing values for at least one of the variables of interest. 
Removed observations reporting non-positive values for variables like sales, number of 
employment, and net accounting physical capital.  
Final sample used 
3,567 firms/29318 observations over 1983-1996. 
 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Used firms with at least 4 consecutive observations 
Girma, S., Gorg, H., & Pisu, M. (2008). Exporting, 
linkages and productivity spillovers from foreign 
direct investment. Canadian Journal of Economics, 
41(1), 320-340. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Two sources: 
OneSource firm-level panel data for the U.K. 
U.K. Input-Output Supply and Use Tables. 
Data coverage 
All companies with 50 employees or more. All public limited companies. Only private 
companies that were in operation in 1999. 
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified  
Form of data 
Unbalanced panel over the period 1992-1999 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Not mentioned  
Final sample used 
Unbalance panel of 18,000 observations containing information on 4,600 firms, over the 
period 1992-1999 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not specified  
Chudnovsky, D., Lopez, A., & Rossi, G. (2008). 
Foreign Direct Investment Spillovers and the 
Absorptive Capabilities of Domestic Firms in the 
Argentine Manufacturing Sector (1992-2001). 
Journal of Development Studies, 44(5), 645-677. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
National Statistical Institute of Argentina 
Data coverage 
Included the best performing firms and those with high probability of survival. Excluded 
firms that went bankrupt 
How representative is the sample? 
Inclusion and exclusion of firms from the sample was random. 
Sample represented 29% of sales; 27% of employment; and 24% of export over the 
period 1992-1996 
Form of data 
Unbalanced panel over the period 1992-2001 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Excluded firms with less than 2 observations with positive values of the ratio between 
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sales and employees. 
Also dropped firms that belong to sectors with very few firms. 
Final sample used 
722 firms with detailed data for 1992, 1996, 1998, and 2000. 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not specified  
Blalock, G., & Gertler, P. J. (2008). Welfare gains 
from Foreign Direct Investment through 
technology transfer to local suppliers. Journal of 
International Economics, 74, 402-421. 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Annual survey of manufacturing establishments from the Republic of Indonesia’s Budan 
Pusat Statistik (BPS), Central Bureau Statistics. Primary data is conducted by Biro 
Statistik Industri, the industrial Statistics Division of BPS.  
Data coverage 
Covers manufacturing establishment with 20 or more employees from 1975 onward.  
How representative is the sample? 
Not specified  
Form of data 
Unbalanced panel over the period 1988-1996 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Removed establishments with especially frequent non-responses to fundamental 
questions such as number of employees 
Final sample used 
Domestic firms: 8,888-14,912  
Foreign firms: 276-888; over the period 1988-1996. 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
As result of missing data for some variables, the sample count varied across different 
regressions. The authors noted that details of data preparation are available on request 
from the authors.  
Blake, A., Deng, Z., & Falvey, R. (2009). How does 
the productivity of foreign direct investment spill 
over to local firms in Chinese manufacturing? 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 
7(2), 183-197. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the source of the data? 
Survey conducted by Asian Market intelligence 
Data coverage 
Randomly selected from 5 manufacturing  sectors located in 5 super-sized cities in China 
How representative is the sample? 
Not mentioned 
Form of data 
Cross-section of manufacturing firms in 2000 
 
What are the criteria for excluding observations? 
Not mentioned 
Final sample used 
998 firms in 2000 
Effect of consistency of panel on methodology: 
Not applicable – cross-sectional data used 
 
 
 
 
251 
 
 
Appendix 6.1  
Table A1: Linking the ISIC code of CBN and ESDS 
CBN 3-digit level category name  ISIC code  Category name (ESDS)  NMES category  
Food products  
1514  Vegetable and animal oils and fats  
Food  
1520  Dairy products  
1541  Bakery products  
1543  Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery  
Beverages  
1552  Wines  
1554  Soft drinks; mineral waters  
Textiles  
1711  Textile fibre preparation; textile weaving  
Textile  
1721  Made-up textile articles, except apparel  
1723  Cordage, rope, twine and netting  
1729  Other textiles, n.e.c.  
Footwear  1920  Footwear  
Rubber Products  
2511  Rubber tyres and tubes  
2519  Other rubber products  
Plastic Products  2520  Plastic products  
Wearing Apparel  1810  Wearing apparel, except fur apparel  Garment  
Wood and Wood Products  
   
2021  Veneer sheets, plywood, particleboard, etc.  
Wood  
   
2022  Builders' carpentry and joinery  
Paper and Paper Products  
2102  Corrugated paper and paperboard  
Paper  
   
   
   
   
 
2109  Other articles of paper and paperboard  
Printing and Publishing  
2211  Publishing of books and other publications  
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2212  Publishing of newspapers, journals, etc.  
 
2221  Printing  
Other Chemical Products  
2422  Paints, varnishes, printing ink and mastics  
Chemical  
   
   
   
 
2423  Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, etc.  
 
2424  Soap, cleaning & cosmetic preparations  
 
2429  Other chemical products, n.e.c.  
Other Non-Metal Mineral Products  
2695  Articles of concrete, cement and plaster  
Metal  
   
   
   
   
    
2699  Other non-metallic mineral products, n.e.c.  
Metal Products (Fabricated)  
2811  Structural metal products  
 
2812  Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal  
 
2891  Metal forging/pressing/stamping/roll-forming  
 
2899  Other fabricated metal products, n.e.c.  
Non-Electrical Machinery  2930  Domestic appliances, n.e.c.  
Machines  
   
   
   
   
   
   
Electrical-Machinery  
3120  Electricity distribution & control apparatus  
 
3190  Other electrical equipment, n.e.c.  
Professional & Scientific Equipment  3210  Electronic valves, tubes, etc.  
Transport Equipment  
3410  Motor vehicles  
 
3430  Parts/accessories for automobiles  
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3592  Bicycles and invalid carriages  
Furniture and Fixtures  3610  Furniture  Furniture  
 
Appendix 6.2  
Data preparation: NMES data 
Data cleaning  
Initial data cleaning involved the elimination of firm observations that are deemed unsuitable for 
statistical analysis. These basic criteria for elimination at this stage involved the removal of firms with 
persistent missing values for most relevant variables. Since our primary concern is to investigate the 
impact of foreign presence on firms (FDI spillovers), we delete firm observations which have missing 
values for variables that are possible candidates for construction of foreign presence variable. These 
variables are output, employment, and capital. Thus firms with missing values for all three variables are 
excluded at this stage. For 1998 and 1999 cross-sections, firms “20”,”85”, “1027”, “1035”, “1037”, 
“4006”,“5010”,“5016”,”6019”, “6022”, ”6073”, “6118”, “6119”, “6134”, “6158”, “6211”, “6224”, “6326”, 
“9005”, and ”99082”, were deleted from the dataset. Another firm was removed due to the said criteria 
had no firm identification. Thus the number of firms remaining after this initial cleaning for 1998 and 
1999 cross-sections were 177 and 180 respectively. The same firms were excluded in 1998 and 1999 
cross-sections were also removed for that of year 2000, except for 3 firms: “4010”, “6134”, and “6326”. 
These firms satisfied the conditions for inclusion in the year 2000 dataset. Thus the initial data cleaning 
for year 2000 cross-section brought the number of firm observations down to 184.  
For cross-sections computed from the Wave 2 dataset (2001, 2002, and 2003), each of the firms met the 
criteria for inclusion, except for firm “40” of 2001dataset. Thus the number of firms for 2001 cross-
section reduced to 121, while that of 2002 and 2003 remained the same. 
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 Identification of ownership, sectors, and regions of firms across years 
Since our empirical investigation involves the constructing measures of foreign presence within sectors 
and regions, a good starting point would be to identify the firms that are classified foreign; and also to 
identify the various sectors and regional classification present in the dataset. The NMEs dataset uses 
dummies to indicate foreign firms, sectors and regions. A careful look through these indicator variables 
across years show some degree of inconsistency, as some had missing values, and some indicators 
changed from one year to another. To substantially investigate this observation, we rearrange the 
original data set in manner that links each firm with its values across years. With this arrangement, 
changes that occur in a firm across years could be observed with more clarity. 
We investigate the possibility that some firms changed ownership during the course of the survey. In 
particular, we look out for firms that change from either foreign to domestic, or domestic to foreign 
(Appendix 6.2). Such changes are important in this study because they affect the measure of foreign 
presence. In other words, when a firm changes from foreign to domestic, the direct implication of this 
change is that the foreign presence of the sector or region in the subsequent year would be reduces 
ceteris paribus. From the original dataset, we detect changes in foreign ownership indicators within four 
firms. Firm 4016 and 6053 ownership indicators changed from foreign in Wave1 to domestic in Wave2. 
We therefore acknowledge this change actual change of the firms from being foreign to domestic. This 
change has some important implications. For empirical analysis using pooled Wave1 dataset, the said 
firms would be considered as foreign firms, while in the case of Wave 2 pooled data, the firms would be 
considered domestic.  
A similar change in ownership indicators occurred within two firms in Wave2. Firm “6190” changed from 
being foreign in year 2000 to domestic in year 2001, and back to foreign in year 2002.Firm “6199” 
changed from being foreign in year 2000 to domestic in years 2001 and 2002, and back to foreign in year 
2003. These erratic changes in this case are considered as data errors rather than changes in foreign 
ownership. Thus as shown in Appendix 6.2, Table A2, we assume these firms to be foreign, since they 
were regarded foreign in their first three years (1998-200). Another irregularity in the ownership 
indicator is that some firms have no ownership indicators. Thus we consider those firms (2091, 2093, 
2094, 6120, and 8020) as domestic firms.  
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As consistency in foreign ownership indicators have been confirmed, the next task is to ensure 
consistency in the sector and region indicators. A careful observation of both sector and region 
indicators show absolute consistency across indicators. But despite this consistency, some firms in the 
dataset have missing values for region indicators. Since the corresponding sector indicators of these 
firms are present, excluding these firms would affect the affect the measures of foreign presence within 
the sector. Thus we take a different approach by using the value “99”as region indicator value to denote 
firms with missing region indicators. Tale A2 and Table A3 shows the particular firm and year 
observations replaced.  
Table A2: Identification of firms with ownership identification problems 
Problem Firms  Nature of problem 
Change of ownership indicator 4016, 6053, 
6190, 6199 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 20003 
  4016 1 1 1 0 0 0 
  6053 1 1 1 0 0 0 
  6190 1 1 1 0 1 1 
  6199 1 1 1 0 0 1 
No foreign ownership indicator 2091, 2093, 
2094, 6120, 8020 
Missing values for ownership dummy 
 
Table A3: Treatment of firms with ownership identification problems 
Problem Firms  Remedy 
Change of ownership indicator 4016, 6053, 
6190, 6199 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 20003 
  4016 1 1 1 0 0 0 
  6053 1 1 1 0 0 0 
  6190 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  6199 1 1 1 1 1 1 
No foreign ownership indicator 2091, 2093, 
2094, 6120, 8020 
Considered as domestic firms 
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Construction of measures of foreign presence with sample data  
A centre point of this data transformation is the construction of foreign presence variables which are 
intended to capture productivity spillovers. In accordance with literature we define this measure as the 
share of employment/output/capital of foreign firms in a sector or region. In this study, we investigate 
apply all three indices of capturing foreign presence in a sector or region. To achieve this, we designed 
syntaxes to construct these measures accurately. The syntax basically performs the following operation: 
First it orders all firms in a sector or region in ascending order of their respective indications. Thus 
“Food” sector with the indicator “1” precedes the “textile” sector with the indicator “2” in order. In a 
similar way, “Lagos” region with an indicator “1” precedes “Ibadan” with an indicator “2”. The next 
operation involves summing employment/output/capital of all firms (domestic and foreign) in a sector 
or region. This is followed by the computation of this sum for only foreign firms in sector or region. The 
final stage computes the measure of foreign presence which is equal to the ratio of the sum computed 
for foreign firms to the sum computed for all firms in the sector or region. The ascending order 
arrangement aids the observation of the differences in foreign presence between sectors, regions, and 
years.  
 Further data transformation 
In preparation for regression analysis, we undergo further data transformation in order to ensure that 
our results are not plagued by outliers, wrong data entry, missing values, inappropriate units of 
measurement. Close observation revealed that the variable that captured “value added” was not in 
logarithm like other variables used for production function specification. Thus we create a new variable, 
log of value added “lnvadd” which is simply the conversion of the variable present in the dataset to 
natural logarithms. This ensures the use of the appropriate functional form in regressions with value 
added as the dependent variable. But prior to computing this variable, we had to delete all firm 
observations with a negative value for two reasons: First is that it is not mathematically possible to 
compute the logarithm of a negative value. Secondly, it does not make economic sense to have negative 
values for value added, as the total indirect costs and raw materials should not exceed the total value 
output for a firm engaged in production. Thus we exclude observations with negative values for value 
added as they may distort the regression results.   
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Further transformations involved entry of appropriate sector and region indicators in cases where they 
were erroneously omitted, and the computation of two region dummies which appeared in the original 
command syntax but were absent in the final NMES dataset. Thus we compute two dummy variables 
“Lagos” “Ibadan” and “Kano” using the numerical indicators of “town” variable. We also make use of the 
sector and town indicators to provide values for the erroneous missing values for the dummies in the 
dataset. 
Appendix 6.3: List of banks names 
 Bank name Frequency 
(year 
observations) 
Frequency 
(banks) 
Percentage of 
total banks 
Percentage of 
observations 
1 Bond Bank Limited 1 1 1.67 0.28 
2 Access Bank Plc 2 8 13.33 4.49 
3 Centre- Point Merchant Bank Plc 2 
4 First Inland Bank Plc 2 
5 Lion Bank of Nigeria Plc 2 
6 Magnum Trust Bank Plc 2 
7 New Africa Merchant Bank Plc 2 
8 Reliance Bank Ltd 2 
9 Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 2 
10 NNB International Bank Plc 3 3 5 2.53 
11 Skye Bank Plc 3 
12 Société Bancaire Nigeria Ltd 3 
13 EIB International Bank Plc 4 4 6.67 4.49 
14 First Interstate Bank Plc 4 
15 Regent Bank Plc 4 
16 Unity Bank Plc 4 
17 Bank PHB Plc 5 3 5 4.21 
18 Gateway Bank Plc 5 
19 Indo-Nigerian Bank Ltd 5 
20 Bank of the North Limited 6 9 15 15.17 
21 Broad Bank Nigeria Ltd 6 
22 Fidelity Bank Plc 6 
23 Inland Bank (Nig.) Plc 6 
24 NBM Bank 6 
25 NUB International Bank Ltd. 6 
26 Oceanic Bank International Plc 6 
27 Stanbic Bank Nigeria Limited 6 
28 Zenith Bank Plc 6 
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29 Co-operative Bank Plc 7 11 18.33 21.63 
30 DevCom Bank Limited 7 
31 Diamond Bank Plc 7 
32 Equity Bank of Nigeria Ltd 7 
33 First Bank of Nigeria Plc 7 
34 First City Monument Bank Plc 7 
35 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc 7 
36 Intercontinental Bank Plc 7 
37 Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc 7 
38 Tropical Commercial Bank Plc 7 
39 Union Bank of Nigeria Plc 7 
40 Afribank Nigeria Plc 8 21 35 47.19 
41 Capital Bank International Limited 8 
42 Chartered Bank Plc 8 
43 Citibank 8 
44 Ecobank Nigeria 8 
45 Equitorial Trust Bank Limited 8 
46 FBN (Merchant Bankers) Limited 8 
47 First Atlantic Bank Limited (Merchant Bankers) 8 
48 FSB International Bank Plc 8 
49 Habib Nigeria Bank Limited 8 
50 IMB International Bank Plc 8 
51 Intercity Bank Plc 8 
52 Manny Bank Plc 8 
53 Marina International Bank Limited 8 
54 MBC International Bank Ltd 8 
55 Standard Chartered Bank Nigeria 8 
56 Standard Trust Bank Limited 8 
57 Sterling Bank Plc 8 
58 United Bank for Africa Plc 8 
59 Universal Trust Bank of Nigeria Limited 8 
60 Wema Bank Plc 8 
 Total 356 60 100 100.00 
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Appendix 7.1 
 
Table A1: OLS results for all firms with MacroFP variable (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BTP NIM NII OV LLP 
EQ -0.00946 0.0790 -0.00527 -0.0145 0.0251 
 (-0.32) (0.92) (-0.33) (-0.83) (0.95) 
NEA 0.0180 0.148
*
 -0.0452
*
 0.138
***
 -0.0696 
 (0.29) (2.32) (-2.03) (3.80) (-1.13) 
CSTF -0.0238 0.158
*
 -0.0347 0.0309 0.0474 
 (-0.56) (2.37) (-1.75) (1.53) (1.50) 
OV -0.660
*
 0.358
*
 0.482
***
  0.489 
 (-2.30) (2.17) (3.96)  (1.91) 
MacroFP 0.196 -0.0651 0.0849
*
 -0.0921 -0.0984 
 (1.81) (-0.77) (2.11) (-1.84) (-1.00) 
TA -0.00955 -0.00443 -0.000887 -0.00146 0.00535 
 (-1.48) (-1.32) (-0.78) (-1.05) (0.97) 
LN 0.0253 0.00907 0.000229 0.00206 -0.0196 
 (1.05) (0.98) (0.07) (0.43) (-0.91) 
GVT 0.00299 0.0404 -0.0148 -0.0133 -0.0121 
 (0.16) (1.22) (-1.74) (-1.01) (-0.71) 
CRI -4.955 -0.577 -0.697 1.622
*
 4.766 
 (-1.58) (-0.52) (-1.48) (2.13) (1.61) 
CONC -14.19 -11.09 30.14
**
 -15.32 38.75
*
 
 (-0.72) (-0.55) (3.07) (-1.30) (2.46) 
GCAP -0.142 -0.0335 -0.00376 -0.00202 0.136
*
 
 (-1.95) (-1.06) (-0.29) (-0.09) (1.99) 
INF -0.0537 -0.0807 0.0962
**
 0.0258 0.102
**
 
 (-1.35) (-1.72) (2.87) (0.82) (2.99) 
R 0.0723
*
 0.0781
*
 0.00254 0.0245 -0.0607
*
 
 (2.15) (2.07) (0.14) (1.09) (-2.31) 
CRR -0.621 -0.265 0.299 -0.0505 0.898
**
 
 (-1.54) (-0.72) (1.91) (-0.21) (2.66) 
Constant 76.09
*
 15.83 -11.11 12.86 -83.91
*
 
 (2.02) (0.70) (-1.29) (0.95) (-2.43) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
325 
0.2668 
0.0000 
325 
0.4316 
0.0000 
325 
0.4229 
0.0136 
325 
0.3520 
0.0320 
322 
0.2426 
0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
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Table A2: OLS results for all firms with MicroFP variable (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BTP NIM NII OV LLP 
EQ -0.00548 0.0885 -0.00363 -0.0223 0.0233 
 (-0.17) (1.02) (-0.23) (-1.24) (0.80) 
NEA 0.0155 0.146
*
 -0.0467
*
 0.121
***
 -0.0717 
 (0.24) (2.25) (-2.14) (3.87) (-1.16) 
CSTF -0.0151 0.173
*
 -0.0385 0.0213 0.0409 
 (-0.32) (2.38) (-1.82) (1.00) (1.12) 
OV -0.686
*
 0.347 0.573
***
  0.541 
 (-2.02) (1.79) (5.28)  (1.80) 
MicroFP 0.0152 0.0257 -0.00595 -0.00872 -0.0114 
 (1.05) (1.64) (-1.18) (-1.27) (-0.92) 
TA -0.00784 -0.00477 0.0000539 -0.00244 0.00457 
 (-1.36) (-1.51) (0.05) (-1.80) (0.95) 
LN 0.0219 0.0122 -0.00223 0.00326 -0.0182 
 (0.97) (1.39) (-0.70) (0.68) (-0.91) 
GVT 0.00631 0.0452 -0.0187
*
 -0.00805 -0.0150 
 (0.30) (1.33) (-2.18) (-0.67) (-0.80) 
CRI -4.514 -0.926 -0.582 1.494
*
 4.512 
 (-1.57) (-0.82) (-1.21) (2.02) (1.66) 
CONC -9.934 -8.963 28.30
**
 -11.17 35.39
*
 
 (-0.50) (-0.43) (2.99) (-1.09) (2.23) 
GCAP -0.111 -0.0534 0.00666 -0.00143 0.119
*
 
 (-1.90) (-1.55) (0.66) (-0.08) (2.16) 
INF -0.0518 -0.0725 0.0804
**
 0.0428 0.0948
**
 
 (-1.27) (-1.51) (2.70) (1.63) (2.81) 
R 0.0549 0.0832
*
 -0.00216 0.0234 -0.0512
*
 
 (1.74) (2.09) (-0.11) (1.09) (-2.17) 
CRR -0.505 -0.299 0.252 0.0751 0.802
*
 
 (-1.32) (-0.75) (1.95) (0.42) (2.57) 
Constant 64.74 19.95 -12.20 8.642 -76.82
*
 
 (1.95) (0.84) (-1.60) (0.82) (-2.56) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
324 
0.2581 
0.0000 
324 
0.4252 
0.0000 
324 
0.4697 
0.0071 
324 
0.3635 
0.1134 
321 
0.2464 
0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
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Table A3: OLS results for all firms with ∆MacroFP variable – first differences (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆BTP ∆NIM ∆NII ∆OV ∆LLP 
∆EQ 0.0412 0.0757
***
 -0.00176 -0.00663 -0.00305 
 (0.67) (3.67) (-0.13) (-0.29) (-0.07) 
∆NEA 0.127 0.143 -0.0358 0.139
*
 -0.158 
 (1.45) (1.93) (-1.67) (2.46) (-1.96) 
∆CSTF -0.0569 -0.0115 -0.00341 0.0223 0.0718 
 (-1.12) (-0.31) (-0.24) (0.66) (1.69) 
∆OV -0.904
*
 0.362 0.384
***
  0.690
*
 
 (-2.32) (1.93) (5.30)  (1.99) 
∆MacroFP 0.222
*
 0.00337 0.0280 0.0610 -0.177
*
 
 (2.27) (0.07) (0.92) (1.54) (-2.19) 
∆TA 0.00959 0.00164 -0.000713 -0.00394
*
 -0.0106 
 (1.41) (0.75) (-0.78) (-1.99) (-1.83) 
∆LN 0.00509 0.000898 -0.000626 0.00253 -0.00282 
 (0.31) (0.23) (-0.34) (0.70) (-0.20) 
CRI 2.787 0.781 -0.618 2.650
**
 -3.032 
 (1.30) (0.72) (-1.11) (2.83) (-1.80) 
∆CONC -8.357 -5.417 0.531 -5.685 7.443 
 (-0.70) (-0.73) (0.11) (-1.12) (0.84) 
∆GCAP 0.0805 -0.00662 -0.0306 0.0880
*
 -0.131 
 (0.98) (-0.13) (-1.25) (2.35) (-1.92) 
∆INF -0.0382 -0.0512 0.0677
*
 0.0623
*
 0.0663
**
 
 (-1.16) (-1.89) (2.22) (2.06) (2.65) 
∆R -0.0167 0.00900 0.0180 -0.0116 0.0301 
 (-0.67) (0.48) (1.83) (-0.75) (1.49) 
∆CRR -0.488
*
 -0.150 -0.0530 -0.123 0.280 
 (-2.28) (-1.12) (-0.58) (-0.97) (1.78) 
Constant -3.389 -0.502 0.700 -2.756
**
 4.033
*
 
 (-1.44) (-0.40) (1.09) (-2.61) (2.18) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
280 
0.2986 
0.0000 
280 
0.2595 
0.0000 
280 
0.3035 
0.9005 
280 
0.2572 
0.0000 
278 
0.2828 
0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
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Table A4: OLS results for all firms with ∆MicroFP variable – first differences (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆BTP ∆NIM ∆NII ∆OV ∆LLP 
∆EQ 0.0357 0.0768
***
 -0.00173 -0.00937 0.000248 
 (0.59) (3.59) (-0.13) (-0.43) (0.01) 
∆NEA 0.108 0.139 -0.0419 0.137
*
 -0.142 
 (1.24) (1.91) (-1.95) (2.39) (-1.77) 
∆CSTF -0.0614 -0.00953 -0.00231 0.0200 0.0755 
 (-1.21) (-0.25) (-0.16) (0.61) (1.75) 
∆OV -0.884
*
 0.374 0.396
***
  0.664 
 (-2.26) (1.97) (5.47)  (1.91) 
∆MicroFP -0.0316 -0.0202 -0.0134 -0.0145 0.00759 
 (-1.08) (-1.84) (-1.58) (-0.72) (0.33) 
∆TA 0.00709 0.00154 -0.00106 -0.00475
*
 -0.00885 
 (1.12) (0.73) (-1.12) (-2.52) (-1.64) 
∆LN 0.00629 0.00104 -0.000408 0.00298 -0.00350 
 (0.38) (0.27) (-0.22) (0.84) (-0.25) 
CRI 0.316 0.561 -1.030 1.908
*
 -1.225 
 (0.18) (0.67) (-1.83) (2.39) (-0.91) 
∆CONC -13.48 -7.883 -1.021 -5.793 11.93 
 (-0.96) (-0.94) (-0.18) (-0.93) (1.18) 
∆GCAP 0.0138 -0.00719 -0.0376 0.0648 -0.0817 
 (0.19) (-0.16) (-1.51) (1.90) (-1.36) 
∆INF -0.0407 -0.0543
*
 0.0654
*
 0.0633
*
 0.0691
**
 
 (-1.23) (-2.00) (2.16) (2.13) (2.79) 
∆R -0.00360 0.00918 0.0194
*
 -0.00616 0.0213 
 (-0.15) (0.52) (2.05) (-0.39) (1.15) 
∆CRR -0.287 -0.114 -0.0100 -0.0749 0.130 
 (-1.42) (-0.87) (-0.12) (-0.62) (0.92) 
Constant -0.877 -0.386 1.053 -1.925
*
 2.214 
 (-0.47) (-0.38) (1.65) (-2.16) (1.55) 
N 
R
2 
Ramsey Test 
275 
0.2900 
0.0000 
275 
0.2690 
0.0000 
275 
0.3191 
0.9725 
275 
0.2593 
0.0000 
273 
0.2727 
0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All estimates have robust standard errors 
 
 
 
\ 
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Table A5: Fixed effects results for all firms with MacroFP variable (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BTP NIM NII OV LLP 
EQ 0.0391 0.0352 0.0104 0.00168 -0.000620 
 (0.96) (1.31) (0.73) (0.08) (-0.02) 
NEA 0.0400 0.178
***
 -0.0767
**
 0.204
***
 -0.121
*
 
 (0.59) (3.97) (-3.23) (6.55) (-2.08) 
CSTF 0.0210 0.0724
*
 0.0138 0.0415 0.0398 
 (0.46) (2.42) (0.87) (1.86) (1.04) 
OV -0.749
***
 0.363
***
 0.365
***
  0.517
***
 
 (-5.90) (4.33) (8.22)  (4.83) 
MacroFP 0.157 -0.0430 0.0770 -0.104 -0.0760 
 (1.27) (-0.53) (1.78) (-1.71) (-0.73) 
TA -0.00548 -0.000847 -0.00253 -0.000365 0.00119 
 (-1.03) (-0.24) (-1.36) (-0.14) (0.27) 
LN 0.0204 0.00281 0.00498 -0.00188 -0.0146 
 (1.42) (0.30) (0.99) (-0.27) (-1.19) 
GVT 0.102 0.319
***
 -0.0372
*
 0.00794 -0.0498 
 (1.95) (9.21) (-2.03) (0.30) (-1.13) 
CRI -4.782
***
 -0.131 -0.974
*
 1.783
*
 4.571
***
 
 (-3.39) (-0.14) (-1.98) (2.58) (3.70) 
CONC -21.98 -17.43 23.73
***
 -19.49 40.19
*
 
 (-1.09) (-1.31) (3.37) (-1.96) (2.37) 
GCAP -0.170
***
 -0.0284 -0.0124 0.0204 0.161
***
 
 (-4.28) (-1.09) (-0.90) (1.04) (4.63) 
INF -0.0692 -0.0739
*
 0.0798
***
 0.0132 0.104
**
 
 (-1.45) (-2.35) (4.79) (0.56) (2.60) 
R 0.0740 0.0559
*
 0.0149 0.0227 -0.0530 
 (1.95) (2.24) (1.13) (1.21) (-1.66) 
CRR -0.892
*
 -0.283 0.243 -0.0389 1.086
***
 
 (-2.44) (-1.17) (1.90) (-0.21) (3.52) 
Constant 89.24
***
 20.29 -6.043 4.032 -94.15
***
 
 (4.11) (1.42) (-0.80) (0.37) (-5.04) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
325 
0.1916 
0.3286 
325 
0.2912 
0.7376 
325 
0.3555 
0.5895 
325 
0.2718 
0.4539 
322 
0.2085 
0.2541 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table A6: Fixed effects results for all firms with MicroFP variable (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BTP NIM NII OV LLP 
EQ 0.0363 0.0354 0.0101 -0.00243 -0.000764 
 (0.88) (1.31) (0.72) (-0.13) (-0.02) 
NEA 0.0383 0.178
***
 -0.0765
**
 0.169
***
 -0.121
*
 
 (0.56) (3.97) (-3.27) (5.84) (-2.07) 
CSTF 0.0207 0.0731
*
 0.00937 0.0419
*
 0.0379 
 (0.45) (2.43) (0.60) (2.05) (0.99) 
OV -0.809
***
 0.361
***
 0.424
***
  0.559
***
 
 (-5.79) (3.93) (8.87)  (4.77) 
MicroFP 0.00408 -0.00191 -0.0112 -0.00295 -0.0204 
 (0.12) (-0.08) (-0.94) (-0.19) (-0.70) 
TA -0.00408 -0.00131 -0.00161 -0.00187 0.000371 
 (-0.78) (-0.38) (-0.91) (-0.80) (0.08) 
LN 0.0165 0.00391 0.00312 0.000845 -0.0123 
 (1.17) (0.42) (0.65) (0.13) (-1.03) 
GVT 0.107
*
 0.318
***
 -0.0397
*
 0.0128 -0.0540 
 (2.03) (9.16) (-2.19) (0.53) (-1.22) 
CRI -4.291
**
 -0.237 -0.865 1.523
*
 4.294
***
 
 (-3.11) (-0.26) (-1.83) (2.47) (3.57) 
CONC -20.65 -17.54 23.23
***
 -14.36 39.37
*
 
 (-1.02) (-1.32) (3.35) (-1.57) (2.32) 
GCAP -0.140
***
 -0.0350 -0.00361 0.0162 0.146
***
 
 (-4.09) (-1.56) (-0.31) (1.05) (4.89) 
INF -0.0683 -0.0723
*
 0.0711
***
 0.0307 0.102
*
 
 (-1.42) (-2.28) (4.31) (1.42) (2.53) 
R 0.0616 0.0591
*
 0.00998 0.0242 -0.0463 
 (1.67) (2.44) (0.79) (1.46) (-1.50) 
CRR -0.788
*
 -0.295 0.230 0.0769 1.037
***
 
 (-2.15) (-1.22) (1.83) (0.46) (3.36) 
Constant 79.88
***
 22.10 -7.331 0.645 -89.11
***
 
 (3.79) (1.59) (-1.02) (0.07) (-4.94) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
324 
0.1801 
0.3340 
324 
0.2835 
0.7374 
324 
0.3931 
0.5789 
324 
0.2847 
0.4672 
321 
0.2137 
.2547 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table A7: Fixed effects results for all firms with ∆MacroFP variable – first differences (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆BTP ∆NIM ∆NII ∆OV ∆LLP 
∆EQ 0.257
***
 0.0350 0.0368 -0.0297 -0.134
**
 
 (4.34) (1.00) (1.72) (-1.15) (-2.75) 
∆NEA 0.120 0.146
***
 -0.0369 0.126
***
 -0.142
**
 
 (1.82) (3.74) (-1.55) (4.58) (-2.60) 
∆CSTF -0.0578 -0.00534 -0.00876 -0.00903 0.0754 
 (-1.24) (-0.19) (-0.52) (-0.44) (1.97) 
∆OV -0.917
***
 0.417
***
 0.401
***
  0.782
***
 
 (-5.84) (4.47) (7.05)  (6.05) 
∆MacroFP 0.261
*
 0.00150 0.0253 0.0640 -0.225
*
 
 (2.20) (0.02) (0.59) (1.23) (-2.30) 
∆TA 0.0126
*
 0.00346 -0.000674 -0.00429 -0.0128
**
 
 (2.18) (1.01) (-0.32) (-1.70) (-2.68) 
∆LN -0.00580 -0.000408 -0.00214 0.00159 0.00307 
 (-0.42) (-0.05) (-0.43) (0.26) (0.27) 
CRI 2.688 1.028 -0.892 2.846
**
 -3.259 
 (1.07) (0.69) (-0.98) (2.61) (-1.57) 
∆CONC -28.62
*
 -2.630 -2.955 -2.904 19.13 
 (-2.35) (-0.36) (-0.67) (-0.54) (1.90) 
∆GCAP 0.100 -0.0141 -0.0263 0.0924
*
 -0.158
*
 
 (1.08) (-0.26) (-0.78) (2.28) (-2.05) 
∆INF -0.0356 -0.0671
*
 0.0699
***
 0.0512
*
 0.0566 
 (-0.74) (-2.36) (4.02) (2.46) (1.44) 
∆R -0.0139 0.00792 0.0205 -0.0259 0.0310 
 (-0.44) (0.43) (1.80) (-1.89) (1.19) 
∆CRR -0.524
*
 -0.124 -0.0472 -0.108 0.383 
 (-2.07) (-0.82) (-0.52) (-0.98) (1.84) 
Constant -4.611 -0.603 0.775 -2.645
*
 5.440
*
 
 (-1.75) (-0.39) (0.81) (-2.31) (2.51) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
280 
0.1935 
0.7653 
280 
0.2018 
0.3524 
280 
0.2257 
0.5149 
280 
0.2204 
0.4957 
278 
0.1848 
0.6912 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table A8: Fixed effects results for all firms with ∆MicroFP variable – first differences (1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆BTP ∆NIM ∆NII ∆OV ∆LLP 
∆EQ 0.258
***
 0.0395 0.0396 -0.0325 -0.135
**
 
 (4.30) (1.14) (1.86) (-1.24) (-2.73) 
∆NEA 0.0856 0.139
***
 -0.0442 0.124
***
 -0.113
*
 
 (1.29) (3.63) (-1.87) (4.46) (-2.05) 
∆CSTF -0.0582 0.00410 -0.00604 -0.0114 0.0774 
 (-1.22) (0.15) (-0.36) (-0.55) (1.97) 
∆OV -0.867
***
 0.438
***
 0.415
***
  0.742
***
 
 (-5.45) (4.75) (7.32)  (5.67) 
∆MicroFP -0.0252 -0.0312 -0.0102 0.00952 -0.00118 
 (-0.80) (-1.71) (-0.91) (0.69) (-0.05) 
∆TA 0.0102 0.00335 -0.000873 -0.00491 -0.0108
*
 
 (1.78) (1.01) (-0.43) (-1.97) (-2.30) 
∆LN -0.00603 0.0000930 -0.00222 0.00168 0.00357 
 (-0.43) (0.01) (-0.44) (0.27) (0.31) 
CRI 0.0427 0.691 -1.201 2.304
*
 -1.199 
 (0.02) (0.52) (-1.48) (2.34) (-0.64) 
∆CONC -36.73
**
 -5.727 -5.534 -1.877 24.80
*
 
 (-2.78) (-0.75) (-1.18) (-0.32) (2.26) 
∆GCAP 0.0289 -0.0118 -0.0305 0.0726 -0.102 
 (0.33) (-0.23) (-0.97) (1.90) (-1.40) 
∆INF -0.0378 -0.0679
*
 0.0693
***
 0.0509
*
 0.0589 
 (-0.78) (-2.41) (4.01) (2.42) (1.47) 
∆R -0.000667 0.00903 0.0210 -0.0226 0.0225 
 (-0.02) (0.50) (1.88) (-1.65) (0.87) 
∆CRR -0.266 -0.0747 -0.00259 -0.0761 0.182 
 (-1.09) (-0.53) (-0.03) (-0.71) (0.90) 
Constant -1.830 -0.444 1.031 -1.955 3.252 
 (-0.79) (-0.33) (1.25) (-1.93) (1.69) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
275 
0.1871 
0.7683 
275 
0.2082 
0.3820 
275 
0.2356 
0.5332 
275 
0.2102 
0.5097 
273 
0.1782 
0.6966 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table A9: Fixed effects results for domestic firms with ∆MacroFP variable – first differences (1992-
2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆BTP ∆NIM ∆NII ∆OV ∆LLP 
∆EQ 0.259
**
 0.0639 0.0234 0.00678 -0.126 
 (2.85) (1.02) (0.73) (0.15) (-1.64) 
∆NEA 0.163 0.188
**
 -0.0482 0.173
***
 -0.234
**
 
 (1.72) (2.88) (-1.44) (3.99) (-2.92) 
∆CSTF -0.0729 0.00840 -0.00883 0.00616 0.111
*
 
 (-1.19) (0.20) (-0.41) (0.21) (2.13) 
∆OV -0.652
***
 0.530
***
 0.406
***
  0.595
***
 
 (-3.49) (4.13) (6.17)  (3.77) 
∆MacroFP 0.110 0.000102 0.0617 0.0653 -0.0315 
 (0.67) (0.00) (1.06) (0.81) (-0.23) 
∆TA 0.0144
*
 0.00314 -0.0000205 -0.00519 -0.0129
*
 
 (1.98) (0.63) (-0.01) (-1.48) (-2.10) 
∆LN 0.000144 0.00366 -0.00446 -0.000791 -0.00749 
 (0.01) (0.30) (-0.72) (-0.09) (-0.50) 
CRI 1.908 0.504 -0.311 2.243 -0.830 
 (0.53) (0.20) (-0.25) (1.30) (-0.27) 
∆CONC -29.50 -10.60 23.93
*
 6.080 54.61
*
 
 (-1.03) (-0.54) (2.36) (0.43) (2.25) 
∆GCAP 0.125 -0.00381 0.00116 0.0913 -0.0904 
 (0.98) (-0.04) (0.03) (1.47) (-0.83) 
∆INF -0.0609 -0.0545 0.0580
**
 0.0513 0.0817 
 (-1.06) (-1.37) (2.85) (1.85) (1.68) 
∆R -0.0239 0.00289 0.0265 -0.0243 0.0253 
 (-0.60) (0.11) (1.89) (-1.26) (0.75) 
∆CRR -0.0378 0.112 -0.116 -0.168 -0.0116 
 (-0.11) (0.48) (-0.97) (-1.03) (-0.04) 
Constant -4.476 -0.499 0.529 -2.194 3.739 
 (-1.20) (-0.19) (0.40) (-1.22) (1.19) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
180 
0.1561 
0.8148 
180 
0.2334 
0.3351 
180 
0.3034 
0.4711 
180 
0.2421 
0.5206 
180 
0.1799 
0.7527 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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TableA10: Fixed effects results for domestic firms with ∆MacroFPS variable – first differences 
(1992-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆BTP ∆NIM ∆NII ∆OV ∆LLP 
∆EQ 0.252
**
 0.0595 0.0231 0.0148 -0.122 
 (2.77) (0.95) (0.72) (0.35) (-1.58) 
∆NEA 0.146 0.172
*
 -0.0455 0.196
***
 -0.221
**
 
 (1.48) (2.55) (-1.31) (4.60) (-2.66) 
∆CSTF -0.0771 0.00162 -0.00583 0.0223 0.115
*
 
 (-1.24) (0.04) (-0.26) (0.76) (2.19) 
∆OV -0.612
**
 0.562
***
 0.403
***
  0.568
***
 
 (-3.17) (4.24) (5.89)  (3.48) 
∆MacroFPS -5.904 -6.244 1.624 14.11
**
 4.870 
 (-0.58) (-0.90) (0.45) (3.08) (0.57) 
∆TA 0.0127 0.00286 -0.000761 -0.00500 -0.0123
*
 
 (1.83) (0.60) (-0.31) (-1.55) (-2.09) 
∆LN 0.00242 0.00376 -0.00326 0.000251 -0.00819 
 (0.14) (0.32) (-0.53) (0.03) (-0.56) 
CRI -0.0500 -0.398 -0.696 3.515
*
 0.189 
 (-0.01) (-0.17) (-0.56) (2.19) (0.06) 
∆CONC -42.23 -21.19 25.17
*
 28.11 63.65
*
 
 (-1.27) (-0.93) (2.14) (1.82) (2.27) 
∆GCAP 0.0574 -0.0397 -0.00860 0.147
*
 -0.0527 
 (0.44) (-0.44) (-0.19) (2.44) (-0.47) 
∆INF -0.0768 -0.0711 0.0622
**
 0.0852
**
 0.0947 
 (-1.21) (-1.63) (2.76) (2.95) (1.76) 
∆R -0.00558 0.0173 0.0254 -0.0526
*
 0.0128 
 (-0.12) (0.55) (1.57) (-2.52) (0.33) 
∆CRR -0.0281 0.0354 -0.0499 0.0615 0.0247 
 (-0.08) (0.15) (-0.42) (0.39) (0.09) 
Constant -2.289 0.569 0.912 -3.803
*
 2.571 
 (-0.62) (0.22) (0.70) (-2.23) (0.82) 
N 
R
2 
Rho 
180 
0.1560 
0.8118 
180 
0.2391 
0.3360 
180 
0.3052 
0.4574 
180 
0.3028 
0.5051 
180 
0.1814 
0.7514 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
